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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
The following list aims to provide brief explanations of key words and phrases. 
Catchment The area of land, including the hills and mountains, woodlands, and 
buildings which water drains from, before flowing into the streams, 




DEFRA framework published June 2013 to encourage the adoption of 
an integrated catchment based approach to improve the water 
environment through collaborative working at the catchment level. The 
aim for this approach is to balance environmental, economic and social 
demands and align funding and actions within river catchments to bring 
about long-term improvements. DEFRA supports civil society 




Non-statutory, unincorporated groups that consist of key stakeholders, 
including local communities, to agree and deliver the strategic priorities 
for the catchment and to support the Environment Agency in 
developing appropriate River Basin Management Plans 
Collaborative 
Working 
Collaborative working refers to a way of working that involves sharing 
power, risks and ownership of the process. 
Complexity 
Science 
A set of ideas and principles which describe the nuances which 
underpin the processes and dynamics of change, that is, the logical 
properties of nonlinear behaviour and network feedback systems that 
create themselves over time through reflection and learning, while 





A whole system approach defined by relationships and networks 
working together with a uniting, common purpose, where control and 




A global treaty, the goals of which cover not just the conservation of 
biological diversity, but also the social features of sustainable use and 
the fair, equitable sharing of the benefits arising, through an integrated 
management approach based on ecosystems.  The CBD contained 




Environment Agency of England and Wales.  
Host The lead individual and/or organisation responsible for each catchment 
stakeholder group (partnership), funded from DEFRA’s Water 
Environment Improvement Fund, established 2016, administered on 
behalf of DEFRA by the Environment Agency 
Localism  Principle that power should be exercised at the lowest practical level. 
The Government’s Localism Bill involves giving Local Authorities new 
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Natural England  
 
The government-funded body whose purpose is to promote the 
conservation of England’s wildlife and natural features. The previously 
existing organisations of English Nature, the Countryside Agency and 
Rural Development Service were merged to form Natural England.  
NETDRAW 
 
Widely used Visualization software that creates pictures of networks.  It 
can also incorporate attribute data into the diagrams.  See 
www.analytictech.com.  NETDRAW automatically generates a 
visualisation of the data using a standard algorithm to push the most 
connected nodes to the centre of the screen and the least connected 
nodes to the periphery.  Standard algorithms locate the most central 
nodes in a network in the centre of the visualisation.  
Qualitative 
Research 
Qualitative Research is primarily exploratory research. It is used to gain 
an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. It 
provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or 
hypotheses for potential quantitative research. Qualitative Research is 
also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper 
into the problem. Qualitative data collection methods vary using 
unstructured or semi-structured techniques. Some common methods 
include focus groups (group discussions), individual interviews, and 
participation/observations. The sample size is typically small, and 




Quantitative Research is used to quantify the problem by way of 
generating numerical data or data that can be transformed into usable 
statistics. It is used to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviours, and 
other defined variables – and generalize results from a larger sample 
population. Quantitative Research uses measurable data to formulate 
facts and uncover patterns in research. Quantitative data collection 
methods are much more structured than Qualitative data collection 
methods. Quantitative data collection methods include various forms of 
surveys – online surveys, paper surveys, mobile surveys and kiosk 
surveys, face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, longitudinal 
studies, website interceptors, online polls, and systematic observations.  
(DeFranco, 2011) 
River Basin  
 
A river basin is the area of land from which all surface run-off and 
spring water flows through a sequence of streams, lakes and rivers into 
the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta. It comprises one or 




The management and associated planning process that underpins 
implementation and operation of the Water Framework Directive. It is 
both an overarching process in terms of existing processes and also 
defines new sub-processes such as those for hydromorphology. The 








Management Plan  
 
For each River Basin District, the Water Framework Directive requires 
a River Basin Management Plan to be published. These are plans that 
set out the environmental objectives for all the water bodies within the 
River Basin District and how they will be achieved. The plans will be 
based upon a detailed analysis of the pressures on the water bodies 
and an assessment of their impacts. The plans must be reviewed and 
updated every six years.  
Rivers Trusts  
 
Charities and organisations set up to assist in the conservation, 





A set of techniques for identifying and representing patterns of 
interaction among social entities, be it individuals, groups, 
organisations or social artefacts. It provides precise and specific insight 
in place of intuition and general hunches.  
Social network analysis is predominantly an application of the 
mathematics of graph theory. The approach employs four principal 
tools:  
•social entities are represented as points, each known as a ‘node’ or 
‘vertex’; 
•relationships are represented by lines, known as ‘ties, ‘edges’ or ‘arcs’.  
It is also possible to represent: 
•the strength of the relationship, for example, by line width; 
•attributes of the nodes, for example, by different colours or size. 
Sourced from Getting Started in Social Network Analysis with 
NETDRAW, Bruce Cronin 
Stakeholder  
 
Individuals or groups that are or could become interested in, involved in 
or affected by our policies and activities. Our stakeholders include 
regulators, statutory bodies, professional organisations, local 
organisations and members of the public.  
Stakeholder 
Forum  
A group of interested parties to guide and advise on catchment 
planning and management.  
UCINET UCINET provides extensive tools for comprehensive network analysis. 
Widely used social network analysis software (Borgatti, Everett and 
Freeman, 2002) which represents the informal relationships in the 
organisation.   A Windows based tool which is used to manipulate and 
analyze data collected from individuals during a social network 
analysis.  It includes a comprehensive range of network techniques.  
There are regular inclusions of new analytical techniques in the field as 
they are developed. See www.analytictech.com. 
Water Framework  
Directive  
European Union legislation – Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) 
– establishing a framework for European Community action in the field 




A weight of evidence approach integrates results or evidence from 











With thanks to Professor Philip James, for stimulating ideas, rebuttals and 
commentary which has influenced the development of the work contained in this 
thesis. 
My appreciation to those who participated for their support and interest. 
 
Movers & Shakers: 
Definition: ‘people who are active or influential in some field of endeavour’ 
       ‘powerful people who initiate events and influence others’ 








The current UK Government policy implementation framework, which directs the 
structure of partnership involvement in the environmental area, has introduced an 
implementation model which encompasses both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
theoretical typologies, consequently, there is an opportunity to examine the impact of 
this novel framework by in-depth, practical examination. To address this gap, a 
critical analysis of UK Government environmental implementation strategy was 
undertaken, framed within the financial challenges, political devolution debate and 
social factors which impact implementation agents. 
The research consisted of a case study on the practical experience of selected river 
catchment conservation partnerships (NW England River Basin), critically examining 
the overall governance structure and individual partner relationships through the 
application of a complexity science approach incorporating social network analysis.   
UK DEFRA guidance encourages the adoption of an ecosystem framework to direct 
goal prioritisation, consequently, positioning environmental goals against ecosystem 
services and disservices formed an important facet of the research, established by 
novel analysis of historical, narrative records and contemporary reports. Both 
quantitative and qualitative measures were used in the evaluation. 
Powerful stakeholders, including partnership development support, are found to 
influence collaborative activity and maintain a strong focus on statutory goals: 
suggestions for establishing accountable stakeholders in a complex network are 
outlined.  Understanding long-term trends offers greater potential for robust, 
innovative environmental interventions, however, the lack of an explicit application of 
the ecosystem framework is considered to contribute to the prioritisation of water 
quality and quantity goals within the partnership.  The current devolution debate has 
a discernible impact on the governance arrangements of one of the studied 
partnerships.  Given the restrictions on funding and stakeholder participation found in 
this study, alternative governance arrangements for catchment partnerships are 
proposed.  Policy frameworks need to support an approach which involves potentially 
competing UK Government departments, consequently, findings have implications for 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1993) is a global treaty, the goals of 
which cover not just the conservation of biological diversity, but also the social 
features of sustainable use and the fair, equitable sharing of the benefits arising, 
through an integrated management approach based on ecosystems. The Convention 
was opened for signature on 5 June 1992 at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (the Rio Earth Summit). It remained open for 
signature until 4 June 1993, by which time it had received 168 signatures (CBD, 
1993).  
Table 1.1: Summary of the revised Principles of the CBD Ecosystem Approach (Korn 
et al., 2003). 
Principal Text 
1 The objectives of management of land, water and living resources are a 
matter of societal choice involving all relevant sectors of society.  
2 The ecosystem approach should seek the appropriate balance between, 
and integration of, conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits.  
3 Ecosystem management must ensure the sustainable provision of 
ecosystem goods and services.  
4 In order to maintain the provision of ecosystem goods and services, the 
conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning is a priority target.  
5 Ecosystem management should be decentralised to the lowest 
appropriate level taking into account the linkages with other levels.  
6 Management decisions should be based on all forms of relevant 
information, including that from all scientific disciplines as well as 
indigenous and local knowledge, innovations and practices.  
7 Ecosystem management must consider the relevant economic values, 
impediments and opportunities including:  
(a) the reduction of those market distortions that adversely affect 
biological diversity;  
(b) the alignment of incentives to promote biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable use; 
(c) the internalisation of costs and benefits to the extent feasible.  
8 Ecosystem management should be undertaken at spatial and temporal 
scales appropriate to the objectives taking into consideration effects on 
adjacent and other ecosystems.  
9 Ecosystem management should set objectives for the long term 
recognising the varying temporal scales and lag effects that characterise 
ecosystem processes.  
10 Ecosystem management should adopt adaptive management strategies 
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The CBD contained twelve principals concerned with the development of an 
ecosystem management approach, later refined to ten (Korn et al., 2003), which 
cover stakeholder involvement, decision making processes, information sources and 
scoping considerations (Table 1.1).   
In 2010, the CBD acknowledged a failure to achieve the biodiversity target agreed in 
2002, with consequential serious impacts for the future of humanity (CBD, 2010).  
The Conference of the Parties (COP), who govern the Convention and goal 
implementation, at their 10th Conference held in Aichi 2010, therefore launched a 
new strategic plan covering 2011-2020.  The strategic plan mission is to take 
effective and urgent action to halt the loss of biodiversity in order to ensure that by 
2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to provide essential services (CBD, 
2017, p2).  To implement the strategic plan, governments are required to incorporate 
biodiversity considerations into national planning, with programmes of work themes 
aligned to ecosystems for example, inland water biodiversity, forest biodiversity or 
island biodiversity (CBD, 2010).  Mechanisms for implementation are anticipated to 
require broad political support, involving national Governments, and delivery is to be 
through partnerships which leverage actions at the required scales (CBD, 2017).  
The EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, which fulfils CBD requirements, is delivered 
through a common implementation framework involving the European Commission 
and Member States, in partnership with key stakeholders and civil society (EU, 
2011).  A further target to 2050 is outlined in the EU Biodiversity Vision, where 
biodiversity and the ecosystem services it provides – its natural capital – are 
protected, valued and appropriately restored for biodiversity's intrinsic value, for their 
essential contribution to human wellbeing and economic prosperity and so that 
catastrophic changes caused by the loss of biodiversity are avoided (BISE, 2018, 
p1).  There is a need for close coordination between the authorities responsible for 
ensuring implementation of the strategy, from the overarching EU level, through to 
national and sub-national levels, plus important input from local level stakeholders, 
including business and society at large (EU, 2014).  Consequently, to achieve 
environmental goals in the 21st Century, implementing organisations need to adopt 
new, complex delivery mechanisms. The delivery of EU environmental policy by 
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therefore, has failed to deliver environmental benefits (HoC, 2016).  Effective 
environmental policy delivery requires an understanding of how environmental goal 
achievement is influenced by political, economic and social forces (Roseland, 2000), 
thus, in order to examine the influencing forces in detail, the overarching political, 
financial and social UK context will form the subject of the next section of the thesis. 
1.1 Political Forces Within the UK  
Following referendums in Scotland and Wales in 1997 and Northern Ireland in 1998, 
devolved powers have been transferred from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament, 
the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly (UK Gov, 2013).  
The Localism Act of 2011 heralded a further change in policy delivery by extending 
devolution in England (DCLG, 2011): it is a key piece of legislation in the UK 
Government’s drive for decentralisation, devolving power from central government to 
individuals, communities and local councils. The UK Government is committed to 
passing selected powers and freedoms to local and combined authorities, with the 
aim of encouraging the delivery of creative solutions to meet local people’s needs 
(DCLG, 2011).  Consequently, there has been a spate of devolution agreements with 
cities and regions across the UK, including Greater Manchester, Merseyside and the 
West Midlands (Kay, 2017). The measures set out in the Localism Act (2011) include 
new freedoms for local government in England, new rights and powers for 
communities and individuals, reforms to the planning system and reforms in relation 
to housing decisions, all of which impact upon the local environment.  Paul Lenister, 
at the time of writing, the Chief Executive of the Environment Agency (EA), reported 
in January 2014 that with Localism, the whole agenda’s moved, as historic Regional 
development agencies and spatial strategies are no longer relevant (Marshall, 2014, 
p1). 
1.2 Economic Forces Within the UK 
As a result of severe fiscal challenges resulting from the global financial crisis of 
2008 and subsequent reductions to government funding, the approach to 
environmental policy implementation in the UK is rapidly changing.  Financial 
challenges have been outlined by the current Chancellor of the Exchequer (the Rt 
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up to 6% for the years 2019-20 (Merrick, 2017).  The EA, which is responsible for the 
delivery of many of the UK environmental policies has had grant funding reduced by 
£150m over five years (Table 1.2) and there are long-term plans to cut a further 1550 
from the workforce (Marshall, 2014).   
Table 1.2 Environment Agency Grant level changes from 2009 to 2014. Sourced 
from unison (2014).  







As the EA is increasingly finding it necessary to focus on higher flood-risk areas and 
assets (ADA, 2017) there are calls from public figures to control costs by using 
contractors rather than directly employed personnel (Redwood, 2014).  
Consequently, EA management are restructuring how the agency works, supporting 
increased partnership working through formal agreements with third-party 
contractors, particularly river and coastal flood risk reduction, and the use of 
volunteers in monitoring work, for example, with invasive species (Marshall, 2014).  
This raises questions relating to the effectiveness of such complex, multiple agency 
interactions and where accountability for policy delivery lies. 
1.3 Social Forces Within the UK 
Environmental sustainability has become a prominent issue, with governments 
working to develop plans for the use and preservation of natural resources (Scerri, 
2009; Guerry et al., 2015).  Recognising that environmental systems play a 
fundamental role in societal well-being and economic development (MA, 2005c, EEA, 
2016), the concept of Natural Capital, that is, the living and non-living components 
that contribute to the generation of goods and services which are of value for people 
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integration of natural capital and ecosystem services into everyday decision-making 
in order to secure a broader set of desirable outcomes is promoted and contained 
within legislation (Guerry et al., 2015), thus, such a move to the use of ecosystem 
services ought to be identifiable in policy reports. 
 
Figure 1.1. The components of Natural Capital (EEA, 2016)  
Scholars of social movements have long argued the importance of self-organizing 
grassroots movements which drive social change (Chetkovich & Kunreuthr, 2006).   
Environmental volunteering is one such movement: reports identify the key role 
volunteering has in building community resilience and encouraging individuals and 
community groups to improve their own surrounds, impacting health, education and 
skill creation (Clifton, 2014; Rivers Trust, 2017).  Between 2000 and 2015, there has 
been a slight overall rise in the number of people volunteering: participation rates 
have increased from 39 percent to 41 percent, with a significant rise in youth 
volunteering (Ainsworth, 2017). The high level of younger people volunteering is 
believed to be linked to employment, as 58 per cent of students undertake voluntary 
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The use of social networking sites and web-platform IT applications has increased 
opportunities for citizen involvement in monitoring environmental attributes including 
biodiversity and invasive species (Blaney et al., 2016; Welvaert & Caley, 2016).  
There is further potential for volunteers to become more involved and to encourage 
their greater participation as local stewards of their environment (Blaney et al., 2016), 
acting upon opportunities presented by changing policy delivery requirements to 
deliver environmental improvements driven by, and for the benefit of, the local 
community.   
1.4 Policy Implementation Impact 
Following the 2008 economic crash, the UK Government addressed severe fiscal 
challenges in which departmental administration budgets were cut and the then 
Prime Minister (the Rt Hon David Cameron MP) advertised public-service reform and 
decentralisation via the ‘Big Society’ in his speech to the Civil Service Live, 8 July 
2010 (Hallsworth, 2011), seeking to unlock the potential present within society.  
While the phrase was not used beyond 2013 (Butler, 2015), areas of public policy 
delivery now involve a complex set of interactions among actors who range from 
Ministers and Government departments, through government agencies, businesses, 
NGOs and academics, to individual private citizens (Howard et al., 2012).  
Consequently, policy implementation is now a complex mechanism, involving public 
and private bodies, and local community volunteers, in activities which occur across 
multiple scales and timeframes.  Reforms have led to the involvement of multiple 
actors with varying priorities and methods of implementing the overall policy 
requirements, that is, governance through networks and collaborative partnerships 
(Carey & Friel, 2015; Goodwin & Grix, 2011).   
1.5 Impact on Environmental Management  
In response to the overall context, changes in the management responsibilities of key 
government delivery bodies are under consideration.  UK Government, through the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), has supported the 
involvement of alternative management bodies which aim to strengthen local 
decision-making and improve the environment for both people and wildlife (ADEPT, 
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landowners and the wider community are now actively involved in pilot projects which 
explore the re-designation of waterbodies from ‘main’ to ‘ordinary’ watercourse, a 
process known as de-maining, which will allow assets to be transferred from EA 
management to the wider community (ADEPT, 2017).  Where there is mutual 
agreement, a local generated appetite and benefit, the EA will permanently pass river 
maintenance and operational activity to the designated body (ADA, 2017).  Similarly, 
alternative bodies are also pro-actively seeking the transfer of assets to non-
governmental management, for example, the transfer of the management of 
navigable waterways from the EA to the Canal & Rivers Trust (WA, 2015).  The lines 
of responsibility for policy delivery are thus becoming blurred as multiple-agents with 
multiple aims are involved. 
1.6 Study Relevance 
All governments in European Union countries are facing the challenge of managing 
freshwater through an increasingly complex planning process covering diverse 
social, economic and political areas (GWP, 2012).  Outcomes from this study will add 
to the body of knowledge on policy implementation and inform freshwater 
management with particular relevance to catchment based policy and partnership 
development, where minimal studies exist.  By illuminating the implementation of 
public policy via a system stewardship approach, the results contained in this study 
yield insights in the design of control and steering mechanisms for policymakers and 
stakeholders working in co-management structures.  Future trends in governance 
placement are provided. 
1.7 Thesis Focus 
So how has the devolution of responsibilities to new agents been fulfilled?  How are 
local implementing agents connecting with the environment and among themselves?  
Although the challenges of collaborating agents in policy implementation are 
recognized in the literature (further examined in Chapter 2), there is less focus on 
how collaborating teams are shaped at the micro-level and how steerage from the 
accountable body is manifest at a whole system level in a novel, unincorporated 
partnership.   The research contained in this thesis critically analyses these areas by 
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1.8 Thesis Structure  
A more detailed review of the theory of policy implementation with a focus on natural 
resource management and an introduction to the ecosystem services concept is 
contained in Chapter 2. Within the literature review, policy implementation in the 
natural resource area is considered utilising synthesis-based methodology to identify 
those political, economic and social aspects which act to assist or prevent policy 
implementation.  The over-arching EU policy background and water framework 
directive provide context to the introduction of the catchment-based implementation 
model and Chapter 2 contains the review of the current knowledge on catchment 
partnerships in England & Wales: knowledge gaps and opportunities are identified in 
Chapter 3  The contents of Chapter 4 present the methodology, including 
consideration of the application of complexity science tools, identification of the 
mixed-method approach and examination of the selected tools.  Chapter 5 considers 
the methods applied to investigate current catchment partnership issues, including 
ecosystem service prioritisation, and to examine internal relationships.  The rationale 
for the catchment partnership selection is described, together with data collection 
methods and the contact strategy for primary data collection.   The results of those 
investigations are contained in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 contains the resultant 
discussions, identifying factors impacting the implementation of environmental policy 
within the collaborative partnerships (micro level), the output from the whole network 
system review which exposes a dual-steerage mechanism where both statutory and 
non-statutory actors are present, and contains suggestions to address accountability 
deficits in the current catchment policy framework. The impact of the current Localism 
devolution debate on the governance of catchment partnerships is identified and 
future options considered. Conclusions are contained in Chapter 8 of this thesis.    


















Figure 1.2  Flow diagram of thesis structure, chapter content and relationship (sheet 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Policy Implementation   
Policy implementation is recognised as a distinct stage in a complex change process 
whereby government decisions are transformed into regulations, programmes, 
procedures or practices (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009).  Policy implementation research 
involves the study of how policy decision-making organisations may overcome the 
policy-delivery challenges associated with ambitious aspirations, complex 
approaches and organisational relationships (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Moulton & 
Sandfort, 2017), reflecting the dominant political, economic and social factors present 
at a point in time (Kelly & Dodds, 2012).  The following literature review explores 
these socio-political aspects and evaluates their role in the success or failure of 
natural resource policy implementation.   
The literature review approach was informed by synthesis-based methodology that 
seeks to identity, appraise and synthesise comprehensively all the relevant studies 
on a given topic, avoiding intentional or unintentional bias in the selection of data 
(Petticrew & Roberts, 2006).  To focus on studies published after the endorsement of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity operation guidance, searches were restricted 
to 2000 onward (Korn et al., 2003).  Within the result, searches were performed to 
isolate those items referring to policy implementation.  Only those items in English 
were considered.  A search of the Scopus database was conducted in July 2015 to 
include all publications (conference proceedings, published articles, books, legal and 
technical papers) from January 2000.   Scopus is advertised as the largest abstract 
and citation database of peer-reviewed research literature and quality web sources 
and currently covers 21,500 titles including journals, trade publications, book series, 
and conference papers (Elsevier, 2016, p3) versus 12,000 in Web of Science (WoS) 
core collection (Thomson Reuters, 2015).  Both databases are curated bibliometric 
tools with only a slight difference in coverage (Jacso, 2011).  Titles in Scopus are 
classified under four main headings of health sciences (32% of content), physical 
sciences (29% of content), social sciences (24% of content) and life sciences (15% 
of content).  Scopus has a European, Elsevier-publisher bias versus the American 
bias found in WoS (HSL, 2015). Google Scholar is larger than the two other main 
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browsing and discovery tool.  SCOPUS is noted to have a more versatile search tool 
than WoS, with greater international coverage and contains an abstract for nearly 
70% of its records (HSL, 2015).  This is a useful aspect in resource discovery and a 
key aspect of the initial literature review.  Consequently, SCOPUS was the chosen 
search database.  Key search terms used in the search protocol were “ecosystem*” 
or “natural resource man*” and “implementation management” or “implement co*”;  * 
was included as a wildcard character to ensure the search returned as many related 
items as possible.   
The search retrieved 269 documents including articles, books and conference 
proceedings.  Each title and abstract were examined to identify whether the studies 
dealt with practical implementation and the presence of socio-political facets. Where 
no criteria were found or where an abstract only made reference to implementation 
as a ‘recommendation’, the paper was excluded from further analysis. The majority of 
the studies were in the environmental and biological sciences (75%), with a lesser 
percentage from social science, economic and business management areas.    
 
Figure 2.1 Publication by year extracted from SCOPUS search engine for 2000 to 
2017 (updated results 07/2018).  Peak in 2009 reflects a large number of publications 
in the Environmental Science area across a range of journals.  By 2015 there is an 
extended subject area scope being reported, not only environmental science but also 
Agricultural and Biological Sciences. 2017 reports are an increased number of 
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Since 2008, the number of publications per year has continued to grow (Figure 2.1), 
with a rise in publications from the United States across a range of subject areas and 
journals.  The final selected documents are presented within the following review of 
the impact of political, social and economic factors upon policy implementation. 
2.2 Political Factor Impact  
2.2.1 Policy Implementation Perspectives 
Since the early 1970s, three main schools of theoretical perspectives have 
developed, hierarchical domination – a top-down approach; devolution domination – 
a bottom-up approach; and system stewardship – a network approach.  These three 
perspectives will be considered in the following review. 
In Pressman and Wildavsky’s 1973 classic study of hierarchical implementation, they 
defined implementation as the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so 
as to obtain the desired results (pxxiii), that is, a complex process of putting a policy 
into practice by a variety of mechanisms and procedures involving a wide and 
diverse range of actors.  Their case study examined a development programme in 
the USA which was mandated by the federal government and depended upon 
linkages between different organisations.  By defining the process as a link of 
institutional actors, they are assuming a ‘top-down’ control perspective.  They found 
that if action depends upon a number of links in an implementation chain, then total 
co-operation between agencies must occur, otherwise small discrepancies at each 
level aggregate to form a large disparity between the original intention and the end 
result (Hill & Hupe, 2002).  Multiple actors were presented as part of a top-down, 
cascade approach, however, by the late 1970s the relationship between policy 
formation and implementation was also regarded as an interactive process.  Bardach 
(1977) suggested implementation mechanisms were successful when a top-down 
process was supported with additional actions to remove obstacles, however it is 
argued that such support should be provided to facilitate a ‘shared’ approach to 
problem resolution rather than imposing a single top-down view (Hill & Hupe, 2002).  
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) also outlined a top-down approach, but by 1986 
theorists advocated the incorporation of feedback on the implementation process and 
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During the 1980s the process of policy implementation was influenced by changes in 
public administration towards decentralisation, partnerships and the devolution of 
both responsibilities and accountability (Kaul, 1997); consequently, public policies are 
increasingly implemented through co-operative or collaborative partnerships.  Martin 
Lipsky (1980) presented an alternative view of implementation theory, where the 
decisions of those Lipsky termed ‘at the street-level’, that is, those coping with the 
pressures of work-loads and possibly restricted resources to carry out the work, 
establish the mechanisms which deliver the policy.  Thus, discretionary freedom, 
together with autonomy, act to implement the policy, but, it is noted, the 
implementation mechanism may take a different format than originally envisaged by 
policy makers (Hill & Hupe, 2002).  Hjern and Porter (1981) studied interactions 
between different organisations via the decision-making actors who interact and 
carry-out actions beyond their own formal hierarchy, so forming an implementation 
network.  However, the prioritisation of different interests and strategies among 
actors may result in contention between participants and differences in the 
interpretation of policy goals (Scharpf, 1978).  Barrett and Fudge (1981) also 
considered the network structure, questioning how the nature of the relationships 
between the participants impacted the implementation mechanism, in particular, how 
individual connections influence policy adoption and interpretation. The variety of 
participants in collaborative networks influence the bottom-up choices of the street-
level implementers, as each partner brings different knowledge and experience to the 
network, thus policy implementation becomes fluid and dynamic (Hill & Hupe, 2002).  
Each policy, however, cannot be considered in isolation and Elmore (1978) 
recognised that those implementing actions are forced to make choices between 
interacting and often conflicting programmes and directives.   
From 2000, policy-makers sought to integrate managerial approaches from the 
private sector into the public organisations responsible for delivering policy, namely, 
contracting out, a greater client-orientation and the introduction of market 
mechanisms (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).  Governments are now experimenting with 
innovative ways of delivering their services through new forms of bureaucratic 
collaboration, involvement from more community and voluntary organizations, and 
across networks which interact in the vertical (up and down hierarchies) and 
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Jan, 2017).  Stewardship theory has been introduced as a means of defining 
management relationships based on behavioural principals, in situations where 
individuals are not motivated by individual reward but by the alignment with common 
principals and objectives (Davis et al., 1997).  Stewardship theory fundamentally 
requires participant interests and motivations to be directed to organisational rather 
than personal objectives: trust, risk perception and freedom to implement are valued 
rather than individual control and limitation, consequently, structures which facilitate 
and empower are favoured by theorists over those structures which are based on 
monitoring and control (Davis et al, 1997).  Allowing for the potential of multiple 
objectives which may exist within heterogeneous groups, stewardship theory 
proposes stewards are motivated to make decisions which are perceived to be in the 
best interest of the group (Davis et al., 1997).   
 
Figure 2.2: System stewardship model – adapted from Hallsworth, 2011  
Central policy-makers are moving from a top-down implementation model with fixed 
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steward of the overall implementation system within an overall framework, the 
governance network (Romolini et al., 2016; Schneider et al, 2003) (Figure 2.2).  
There is a blending of hierarchical and bottom-up approaches, and rather than a flat, 
self-determining implementation structure, there is a lead organisation which acts as 
a system controller to reduce the complexity of self-management at the local level 
and to provide legitimacy to the network where Government is still ultimately held 
accountable for the delivery of policy (Hallsworth, 2011; McGuire, 2006), but how 
does accountability operate throughout such a governance structure? 
2.2.2 Accountability 
Accountability in the policy discourse is commonly equated with democracy and 
responsibility (Abels, 2007), combining the various perspectives and motivations of 
all the actors involved to ensure overall compliance to legal standards (Mills & Koliba, 
2015).  Accountability is typically a control mechanism that constrains those wielding 
power, which in the traditional democratic governing form has been recognised as a 
hierarchical, linear feedback mechanism, however, the prevalence of more 
interactive and horizontal governance models, which involve diverse actors, has led 
to different, multiple relationships (Papadopoulos, 2016).  As more implementing, and 
monitoring, agents have been involved at arm’s length of the political core, oversight 
is lost due to the myriad of implementers involved which impact democratic control 
and accountability at the policy level, at the central governing body level and at the 
participating actor level (Kassim & Menon, 2003).   
Democratic accountability is fundamental to those elected to public positions who are 
obliged to provide an account of their performance (Farrell et al, 2017), however, with 
the shift to system network governance there are concerns that a lack of visibility of 
the actions taken by implementation agents may erode traditional, formal democratic 
accountability (vertical accountability). To combat this vertical accountability deficit, 
governing organisations have sought to retain power and leadership through a 
steering mechanism, imposing control over implementation agents through statutory 
and financial means (Arts & van Tatenhove, 2004; Cairney, 2012a; Goodwin and 
Grix, 2011).  However, the retention of power and leadership at this intermediate, 
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at the implementing level. Those implementing agents form an expert panel who are 
accountable to their professional, peer community (horizontal accountability), thus, 
peer accountability is considered to be an outgrowth of trust, respect and 
commitment within such teams (Lencioni, 2002; Papadopoulos, 2016) and where 
actions are deemed detrimental to co-operating partners there may ultimately be a 
risk of loss of professional reputation. Conflicting policy mandates where participants 
do not agree on the common aim (Roux et al., 2011), adoption of adversarial 
positions where power distribution within the network is unequal (Larson et al., 2013) 
and a lack of consideration of alternative stakeholder perspectives (Fernandez-
Gimenez et al., 2008; Foran et al., 2015) can all be detrimental, reducing trust within 
a group and, if left unaddressed, may lead some to withdraw from collaborative 
activity (McGuire, 2006). 
Goodwin and Grix (2011) outlined an asymmetrical network concept, identifying the 
paradox in policy sectors where there is an outward sign of a shift from government 
to governance through agencies and partnership networks, yet power relations and 
leadership remain with the state via central steering mechanisms, thus, governing 
bodies continue to impose their control (Cairney, 2012a).    
The literature on complexity provides some advice about how governments should 
operate within such complex systems. Guidance from the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) proposes accountable administrations should support implementing 
networks through facilitative leadership as there is minimal opportunity for the 
governing hierarchy to directly impact policy implementation processes and 
outcomes (Jones, 2011). Thus, collaborative forms of policy implementation call for a 
new model for holding decision makers to account, as the traditional post-
implementation, bureaucratic system of standardized performance assessments and 
evaluation procedures based on a best practice model, is not considered flexible 
enough to accommodate the outcomes from a self-determined framework (Boyne & 
O'Toole, 2006).  Where interventions are necessary, it is recommended steering 
mechanisms are delivered through an existing network (Jones, 2011), with feedback 
on performance directed to those elements involved in directing actions at each 
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Options proposed for a new accountability perspective include: 
a) learning, that is, the development of knowledge and competence 
required to deliver what is promised through dialogue with accountability 
fora (Bovens et al., 2008);  
b) the introduction of a 3600 perspective whereby an implementing authority 
is held to account by more than one standard, those standards being 
inherent to the organisations involved in implementation (Behn, 2001);  
c) accountable autonomy -  that is, where delegation and evaluation are 
part of a close, interactive dialogue - links collaborating parties (Fung, 
2004);  
d) the representation perspective proposed by Esmark (2007) incorporates 
the views of those involved in the implementation and draws on the 
participants different accountability standards to provide an accountability 
framework for the unit which is not imposed by a different entity;   
e) accountability to an outside audience established for such a purpose is 
considered by March and Olsen (1995) in their collective accountability 
approach, which requires the implementing body to produce an account 
of the problem, the strategies applied and activities launched to 
implement the strategy in order to present a collective assessment.   
The theoretical views highlight the potential mix of accountability standards, 
dependent upon who is participating in implementation and also the dual role which 
may be held by the collaborative group (Sorensen, 2012).  
In the system stewardship model, the central policy agents retain influence, 
preventing implementing agents from deviating too far away from the high-level, 
policy goals, as government is still ultimately held accountable for the delivery of the 
policy (Hallsworth, 2011; McGuire, 2006).  Policy implementation methods such as 
system stewardship, together with complexity theory, have a common focus on 
monitoring and feedback in steering the behaviour of organisational systems 
(Blackman, 2001), however, the accountability of the participating actors, to each 
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Questions remain as to whether accountability standards are reflected in policy 
guidance documentation which promotes a stewardship model and how are 
collaborative groups responding to implementation duality.  
2.2.3 Political Barriers / Enablers 
Cooperation is an important mechanism in the environmental policy context (Chion et 
al., 2011), consequently, governance networks which connect local management to 
wider planning and policy-making actors are an examined concept (Cohen et al., 
2012; Everard, 2013; van Oosterzee et al., 2014).   
Many environmental issues impact across the globe, for example climate change, 
however, Stoddart et al. (2011) report the ceding of authority to a supra-national 
institution to address such global issues is a fundamental obstacle to progress.  
Although no comprehensive policy or law for ecosystem management exists on a 
world-wide status (Clarke & Cherney, 2013; Gherasim, 2012; Stoddart et al., 2011), 
there are legal statutes which impact at different scales. National and trans-boundary 
environmental laws exist which frame policies and legitimise the need to act to 
restore or maintain ecosystems (Brody & Highfield, 2005; Efroymson et al., 2004), 
including those of global heritage value (Bertzky & Stoll-Kleemann, 2009). However, 
it is proposed that ecosystem managers must first determine the appropriate balance 
between societal and ecosystem needs, when considering legal directions to either 
restore or maintain a given ecosystem (Adler, 2013; Baron et al., 2002).  Statutory 
requirements catalyse environmental action in two aspects, prevention of loss and 
protection of ecological systems (Hamill & Melis, 2012; Tarlock, 2012).  In either 
case, action may arise as a result of development pressures and be led by those 
stakeholders most impacted by ecosystem change (LosChiavos et al., 2013; 
Maynard et al., 2011; Pearsall et al., 2005).  Legal statutes are noted to have a 
crucial role in shaping the scope and form of social-ecological management 
structures, which themselves direct implementation approaches (Benson & 
Garmestani, 2011; Carlman, 2005).  Legal structures drive the agenda for credible 
transparency and accountability including the need for measures and monitoring.  By 
defining protocols and procedures, together with target standards, stakeholders 
achieve a shared understanding of statutory requirements (Adamus 2004; Keene & 
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structures may also be constrained by those same regulations (Bernazzani et al., 
2012), particularly where multiple priorities and planning contention exist across a 
range of legal directives (Adler, 2013; Brooks & Chambers, 2013; Stringer et al., 
2009).  Many legal statutes direct the preservation of known, current, ecological 
states which may not reflect global influencing factors, such as climate change 
(Craig, 2010, Kaushik & Sharma, 2015), and so to avoid issues of non-compliance 
with legal mandates, activity may be restricted to the ‘must do’ and not ‘wish to do’ 
actions (Franklin et al., 2011).   
The introduction of a different organisational culture, such as a move from a flexible 
organisation to one where there is a top-down control, has been noted to influence 
implementation practices and processes, particularly in the areas of logistics and 
communications (Jacobson et al., 2006; Koontz & Bodine, 2008).  An acceptance of 
governing structures is necessary to avoid feelings of exclusion and a lack of trust 
(Fabricius & Collins, 2007; Fabricius et al., 2007).  It is often necessary to establish 
trust via institutional networks (Davies & White, 2012), however, government led 
initiatives may actually weaken traditional, flexible institutions, so reducing trust 
among newly formed stakeholder groups (Gelcich et al., 2006).  Interacting with 
diverse stakeholders to achieve collaborative aims has been reported to increase 
group trust levels (Butler & Koontz, 2005; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008), but poor 
institutional design can lead to powerful interests dominating (Layzer, 2012; Lynch et 
al., 2008).  Poor design may allow an initiative to be ‘captured’ by vested interests 
and asymmetric power relations can dominate the collaborative processes commonly 
advocated for successful implementation (Beyrner-Farris et al., 2010; Brock & 
Carpenter, 2007; Layzer, 2012). Management by assertion has been shown to 
undermine long-term prospects as stakeholder contributions are ignored or under-
valued and, together with the existence of sub-groups within an institution, may 
explain why unsustainable practices continue beyond the formation stage of multi-
stakeholder teams (Crona & Bodin, 2011; Longcore et al., 2007).  Conversely, when 
processes are too flexible and commitment low there may be an evasion of 
responsibilities (Layzer, 2012) and subsequent legal statutes may result in a stringent 
regulatory framework acting against the implementation process. The adoption of 
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reduce flexible responsiveness in the light of new knowledge until the legal 
‘restriction’ is either modified or removed (Adamus, 2004; Reid & Brooks, 2000). 
Institutional, political, and complexity challenges which result in contention may 
produce inconsistent management aims and objectives (Brooks & Chambers, 2013; 
Hatfield-Dodds, 2006), due to a lack of clearly defined objectives and misjudged 
scientific information (Chapple et al., 2011) and the continuing influence of controlling 
state agencies in a collaborative partnership process (Davies & White, 2012; Petty et 
al., 2015).  Gratton and Erikson (2007) identified the importance of role definition 
without constraining the approach to be adopted – ‘role clarity and task ambiguity’.  
Where there are a large number of participants in the network, the lack of opportunity 
to identify task ownership, together with shortage of skills, may drive a ‘lead-
organisational’ approach which aims to facilitate integration and co-ordination 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008), however, this may be at the cost of individual autonomy and 
decision-making participation (Hummelbrunner & Jones, 2013).  To address such 
contention, Brunckhorst (2002, 2004) identifies a need for new organisational forms 
and institutional arrangements which are relevant at broader levels and across scales 
(Berkes, 2003; Hansen, 2014). 
As ‘assertion and control’ strategies are less useful in conditions with inherent 
complexity and uncertainty of outcomes, such as are found in ecological systems due 
to climate change (Alexandra, 2012), and where such top-down strategies are at 
odds with indigenous community values (Exton & Smith, 2012) or lacking ecosystem 
knowledge (Longcore et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2000), there is a move to consider 
alternatives to conventional management and governance (Berkes, 2003; Davis et 
al., 2015).   
Central policy-makers in the USA and Europe have thus moved away from a top-
down implementation model with fixed ‘rules’ of implementation to a network model 
where they instigate an overall framework, the governance network (Romolini et al., 
2016; Schneider et al, 2003).   Governments are now experimenting with innovative 
ways of delivering their services through new forms of bureaucratic collaboration, 
involvement from more community and voluntary organizations, and across networks 
which interact in the vertical (up and down hierarchies) and horizontal (mix across 
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Governance solutions such as co-management – the practice of managing 
something jointly (Camargo et al., 2009; Elmqvist et al., 2004; Granek & Brown, 
2005; Matsuda et al., 2009), adaptive governance – the evolution of the rules and 
norms in a changing context (Angelstam et al., 2013), collaborative governance -  
bringing multiple stakeholders from different sectors together in common forum to 
engage in consensus-oriented solution seeking, problem solving and decision-
making in order to leverage and build on the unique attributes and resources of each 
(Butler & Koontz, 2005; Davies & White, 2012; Friedlander et al., 2014), partnership 
frameworks - a collaborative relationship between organizations (Boyd & Svejcar, 
2009; Hillman et al., 2005) and polycentric institutions - many centres of decision-
making which are formally independent of each other at differing scales (Fabricius et 
al., 2007; Falk et al., 2009) are all offered as solutions. Collaborative governance is 
now common in the implementation of public policy and is presented as a new 
paradigm for governing in democratic systems, through the involvement of the public 
so increasing civic engagement (Emerson et al., 2012), although questions remain as 
to whether the reality matches the rhetoric (O’Flynn & Wanna, 2008).  
Goodwin and Grix (2011) consider the introduction of network policy implementation 
models result in a paradox: there is an increased dependence to deliver state-set 
goals and operating models by independent actors outside the central government 
organisation, yet to do so reduces the autonomy of those ‘independent’ actors.  As 
more implementing, and monitoring, agents have been involved, albeit at arm’s 
length of the political core, oversight is considered to be lost due to the myriad of 
implementers involved which impact democratic control and accountability at the 
policy level (Kassim & Menon, 2003).  Huxham (2003) considered the negative 
aspects to be so detrimental that unless the potential for real collaborative advantage 
is clear, it is generally best, if there is a choice, to avoid collaboration (p421). 
 2.3 Economic Factor Impact 
The ability to comply with statutory requirements is impacted by the socio-economic 
development status of a state, which influences the time-scales and the relevance of 
environmental-focussed activity (Cristina-Violeta et al., 2014).  Two areas of 
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supporting implementation and the second to payments for ecosystem services 
(PES). 
2.3.1 Policy Implementation Perspective: Support  
To encourage compliance with legal directives, legislative and regulatory authorities 
may find it necessary to offer financial incentives to establish management 
frameworks and to maintain institutional structures (Erickson, 2015; LosChiavo et al., 
2013).  Key stakeholders may respond positively to environmental goals through the 
provision of a tangible incentive for meeting commitments (Fabricius & Collins, 2007; 
Susskind et al., 2012), which Keough and Blahna (2006) note may not be economic 
benefits but may involve recreational and environmental benefits.   Whatever the 
form, benefits need to be equitable and agreed to by the stakeholders impacted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010).   
Budget constraints, variability of funding levels and uncertainty over continuation are 
challenges.  The success of environmental protection or restoration activity is noted 
to be dependent on securing sufficient and persistent funding (Quon et al., 2001).  
Long-term funding is reported to influence the commitment of natural resource 
agencies and their involvement is noted to be a problem where there is a lack of 
funding security (McLain et al., 2008; Moir & Block, 2001).   
Marshall (2013) notes structuring an organisation, or introducing a new management 
structure, is not without cost: systems need to be flexible, responding to scientific and 
local knowledge, which often conflicts with terms and conditions of funding (Gregory 
et al., 2013; Sims et al., 2014).  Building relationship ties to a large number of new 
actors is costly in terms of both time and resources deployed, but reliance on a small 
number of key links can result in over-dependence on one potentially weak actor 
(Angst & Hirschi, 2017).  Consequently, there is a requirement for strong relationship 
management to strengthen links between participants to facilitate collaboration and 
effective co-ordination of team activities, preferably based on shared principals, 
values and aims, rather than contractual arrangements (Hummelbrunner & Jones, 
2013).   The design and implementation of initial modelling developments need to be 
economically viable and justifiable to funders seeking low start-up cost at initiation 
and also cost-effective on-going developments (Brasanac-Bosanac et al., 2011; 
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made on a ‘best-cost’ priority where scientific knowledge is weaker and may be time-
restricted to a specific project (Stocker, 2004).  The application of sanctions to non-
compliant states may not assist progress toward delivery of desired environmental 
outcomes.  There may be occasions for the use of less adversarial conservation 
strategies (Nie, 2008) and consideration of redress where legal mandates favour one 
group over another, such as noted by Gelcich et al., (2006) where a government-led 
management policy was at odds with an existing community-based system.   
2.3.2 Economic Barriers / Enablers: PES 
The inclusion of market logic has given natural capital a financial value, that is the 
Green Economy (Corson et al., 2013), and the second area of economic influence 
identified considers the market based instruments introduced to encourage saleable 
ecosystem services (Radcliffe, 2005).  Ecosystem services are recognised as 
possessing a value, yet the range of services contained within an ecosystem may be 
valued differently by various stakeholder groups, consequently the application of 
ecosystem service valuation within the decision-making process may challenge 
previous assumptions about which services are most important and have greatest 
‘value’ (Everard, 2013).  The payments for ecosystem services (PES) concept 
contributes to the sustainability of collaborative management where the 
diversification of economic streams is encouraged and stakeholder involvement is 
high (Lopes et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2010), however, PES 
valuation often favours one aspect over another.  Reed et al. (2017) found negative 
trade-offs between ecosystem services were minimised when PES schemes were 
identified with specific places or types of ecosystems, so more effectively including 
cultural ecosystem services and engaging with and empowering diverse stakeholders 
in scheme design and governance.  Alternatively, where commoditisation is fixed 
over a defined period by a powerful buyer, tensions arise as PES are not 
decentralised and decision making on ‘worth’ may restrict the choices of ecosystem 
resource managers, so excluding actions beneficial to other services and benefits 
(Hayes et al., 2014).  Often investment is required to restore an ecosystem, 
addressing for example, a disservice such as that caused by non-native invasive 
species (Lu et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2005; Stockwell et al., 2012).  In this case, the 
benefit may not be immediate and the return on investment view ought to include 
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Stockwell et al. (2012) report target attainment some four years after the project 
commencement.   
2.4 Social Factor Impact 
2.4.1 Policy Implementation Perspective 
Empowerment of stakeholders through effective collaboration (Crona & Bodin, 2011) 
has been shown to legitimise governance actions in the areas of procedures, 
planning and decision-making through learning (Armitage, 2003; Cowling et al., 
2008), as participation contributes to the formation of networks facilitating diverse, 
information sharing (Davies & White, 2012; Pratt-Miles, 2013; Thompson et al., 
2010).  However, where co-operative networks have been reviewed, a number of 
risks have been recorded: for example, there may be a  negative impact on 
responsiveness where closed subgroups or state agencies have influence (Crona & 
Bodin, 2011; Davies & White, 2012; Habron, 2003; Hamlet, 2011; Knuppe & Pahl-
Wostl, 2013; Rogers et al., 2000); mid-scale managers may be poorly connected 
(Cohen et al., 2012) and unable to influence collective decision making; highly 
connected  networks may show similar behaviours and decisions, whereas greater 
scope and consideration may result in networks which are low or moderately 
connected (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Sandström & Rova, 2010); and low resource 
investment, including financial, becomes a constraint when not clearly identified  
(Davies & White, 2012; McLain et al., 2008; Weeks & Jupiter, 2013).  Jupiter et al. 
(2014) conclude that to work holistically across governance scales, institutions 
should be nested in the policy and planning structure yet with sufficient decentralized 
autonomy to suit the relevant context.  These presence or absence of these key 
policy implementation factors will be assessed within the investigation reported in this 
thesis. 
2.4.2 Ecosystem Services Concept & Application 
Ecosystem services have received continuous international attention since the 
publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) in 2003 and the TEEB 
(The Economics of Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity) study of 2008.  The 
classification of benefits and services identified by MA (2003) consists of four 
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• Provisioning services, comprising tangible, extractable and often tradable 
assets derived from ecosystems including, for example, food, fibre, natural 
medicines, fresh water and energy.  
• Regulatory services, referring to natural processes that regulate factors such 
as air quality, climate and microclimate, water purification, storm and natural 
hazard protection, disease and pest regulation, etc. 
• Cultural services which provide less tangible benefits such as aesthetics and 
regional character, educational, tourism and recreational opportunities, artistic 
inspiration, etc. These non-material benefits are intrinsically linked with human 
health and well-being but are less tangible than the provision of water or flood 
regulation (Guo et al., 2010).   
• Supporting services which comprise a range of processes maintaining 
ecosystem integrity, functioning and capacity to supply other services, such as 
soil formation, habitats for wildlife, nutrient cycling and primary production. 
The definitions offered by the overall MA Report (2003), supported by MA Synthesis 
Reports which, inter alia, highlight specific freshwater ecosystem services (MA, 
2005a; MA, 2005b), form the backbone of further ecosystem service analysis 
contained in this thesis, identifying the purpose and values attributed to freshwater: 
the expanded categories which underpin analysis are identified in Table 2.1.   
In 2014, the UK National Ecosystem Assessment reported on the importance of 
valuing cultural ecosystem services, that is, the environmental setting that give rise to 
the cultural goods and benefits that people obtain from ecosystems.  Such settings 
are not only natural features, but include the legacies of past and current societies, 
technologies and cultures.  Continual changes in these settings involve complex and 
variable human responses involving memories, emotions and aesthetic appreciation 
(Church et al., 2014). Consequently, aspects relating to recreational experiences, 
cognitive skill and capabilities development derived from riverine existence, plus 
social bequest actions, are cultural sub-categories considered within ecosystem 
services analysis.  Definitions offered by Boyd & Banzhaf (2007) distinguish between 
the ecological components directly consumed by humans and those benefits which 
are a combination of human, social and built capital inputs.  However, as the MA 
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goods, that is, the non-material benefits people obtain from ecosystems through 
spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation and aesthetic 
experiences, it is considered that the benefits defined by Boyd are also included in 
the MA definitions.   
Table 2.1: Ecosystem service categories of Provisioning (P), Regulating (R), and Cultural (C) 
as identified in major mapping typologies, focussing on riverine goods and services.  Cultural 
ecosystem services category incorporates recommendations outlined in the UK National 




Riverine Goods Riverine Services 
P Provisioning Food nutrition source for human (fish, waterfowl) 
nutrition source for animal 
Drinking Water human use 
animal use 
Clean Water agricultural use, irrigation 
provision of habitat supporting biodiversity 
Non-Drinking Water resource for washing, industrial processes 
resource for mechanical power (water) 
resource for mechanical power (steam) 
Fibres & Timber biomass power source, fuel supply. 
food source for animal-based power. 
Bio-medicinal products used in healthcare, medicinal uses. 
R Regulating Water Purification waste water cleansing – dilution service  
waste water cleansing – biotic waste assimilation 
waste water cleansing – reed beds, wetland 
filtration 
Water Flow mediation of flow, stable liquid flow rate and 
patterns 
moderation of extreme flow rate 
Erosion Regulation moderation of destructive flow rates 
Pest Regulation control of invasive species 
Habitat & Gene Pool lifecycle requirement (pollination, nursery, 
dispersal). 
C Cultural Recreation physical interactions, experiential opportunities, 
connectivity 
Knowledge & Skill 
development 
cognitive opportunities derived from riverine 
existence 
Bequest governance to ensure resource passed to 
descendants 
existence, sense of place, appreciative values 
Religious Values spiritual reflections 
Aesthetic Values art and appreciative opportunities 
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The explicit inclusion of ecosystem services in planning at the appropriate scale is 
suggested as a means of avoiding stakeholder contention (Karrasch et al., 2014; 
Shandas et al., 2008) as protecting and enhancing ecosystems contributes to the 
well-being of the local population (Maynard et al., 2011).  Inclusion of an ecosystem 
service approach in planning, ought to allow for consideration of social values within 
local policies (Shandas et al., 2008). 
In a review of an organisation which successfully transitioned to ecosystem-based 
management, Olsson et al. (2008) identified a critical role for leadership which 
supports management innovation, stakeholder integration and who possesses 
political skills.    
2.4.3 Social Barriers / Enablers 
Co-operation is central to the policy network approach and so explanations for the 
success, or failure, of policy processes are commonly based on co-operative 
assessments (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).  A number of aspects have been identified 
as critical in the delivery of environmental policy implementation, among which are 
leadership (Kenward et al., 2011; Olsson et al., 2004; Walters, 2007), flexible 
organisational frameworks (Dutra et al., 2015; Gorman et al., 2012), co-ordinated 
participation (Dutra et al., 2015), acceptance of governance structures (Fabricius & 
Collins, 2007) and clear accountability (Hall et al., 2006).  Environmental 
management problems have been noted when different structural and power levels 
among stakeholders result in low governability (Boyd, 2008; Camargo et al., 2009).  
Accountability in a complex governance structure will be examined within the 
research reported in this thesis. 
Barriers to successful implementation were initially linked to multiple participants and 
a lack of agreement on the actions to be taken; collaboration is not a certainty of 
success; participants may not agree on the common aim; power distribution within 
the network may be unequal and trust between individuals lacking (McGuire, 2006).  
Power and trust impact relationships within management institutions at three key 
phases of management team development, initiation, formation and sustainable 
continuation, in addition to influencing external perceptions. If left unaddressed, 
conflicting policy mandates (Foran et al., 2015; Roux et al., 2011), adoption of 
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stakeholder perspectives (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008) can all reduce trust 
within a group and lead some to withdraw from collaborative activity. 
Sharing knowledge is a key principal to build stakeholders capabilities and is vital to 
avoid reliance upon personal experience or valuing secondary sources above 
scientific information (Cvitanovic et al., 2015). Inclusive and improved communication 
is offered as a mechanism to increase trust between diverse stakeholders (Baron et 
al., 2009; McLain et al., 2008), particularly where the integration of scientific data 
needs to be made more understandable and accessible (Brooks & Chambers, 2013; 
Butler & Koontz, 2005; Chapple et al., 2011; Cvitanovic et al., 2015).  However 
critical information may be ignored if the trust level within a group is low when new 
knowledge bases are encountered and communication between members is weak, 
resulting in a lack of compliance (Butler & Koontz, 2005; Camargo et al., 2009; Fang 
et al., 2006).  Organisations which are structured to bridge between various 
disciplines are proposed in order to facilitate learning and responsiveness (Chapple 
et al., 2011; Crona & Bodin, 2011; Fabricius & Collins, 2007; Folke et al., 2002; Issac 
et al., 2014; Maynard et al., 2011; Olsson et al., 2004).  This is achieved either 
through legislation or co-operative agreement (Pratt-Miles, 2013; Roux et al., 2011), 
however, there are barriers within participating organisations which limit co-operation. 
To implement on the ground activity, stakeholders need to be empowered not just 
through collaboration but with clear articulation of roles and responsibilities (Cowling 
et al., 2008; Granek & Brown, 2005; Habron, 2003; LosChiavo et al., 2013).  
Unwelcome tension is created in complex ecological systems governance when 
there are different interpretations on levels of devolved autonomy and responsibilities 
across varying scales (Davies & White, 2012; Petty et al., 2015).   
A lack of external trust has been noted to detrimentally influence political and social 
support for ecological rehabilitation projects (Quon et al., 2001). External trust 
relationships may be influenced adversely by the communication of results which are 
over-reported, such as found by Alexander and Allan (2007) when standardised, 
cross-project evaluation criteria were applied, or where the report focuses solely on 
the goals of a specific project (Quon et al., 2001).   To address this issue, 
independent external peer-review has been suggested as a mechanism to provide 
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programmes (LosChiavo et al., 2013; Servos et al., 2013).  Institutions managing 
ecological systems are noted to be complex (Thompson et al., 2010; van Oosterzee 
et al., 2014) with partnering principals built on equity, transparency and mutual 
benefit (P.I., 2015), however Blumenthal & Jannink (2000) state there are no 
techniques for understanding these complex social institutions.  Complexity science 
may offer a mechanism for such investigation, and this concept will be reviewed in 
Chapter 4. 
2.5 Political, Economic and Social Factors Summary  
Political, economic and social factors have been identified and found to have a 
discernible impact on implementation development.   Water polices commonly span 
local political boundaries impacting a wide range of actors across the public, private 
and non-profit sectors.  Implementation mechanisms are characterised by network-
based structures of interdependent, multiple organisations, where formal lines of 
authority are minimised and actors focus on common problems (Schneider et al, 
2003). Networks are considered a mechanism to stimulate collaboration and 
cooperation, to develop a common perspective on policy issues and increase trust 
and reputation among participants though formal and informal interactions 
(Schneider et al, 2003).  However, there are constraints to participating in such a 
network.  Constraints include the costs of developing and maintaining appropriate 
contacts together with clearly identified structural support investment (Davies & 
White, 2012; McLain et al., 2008; Weeks & Jupiter, 2013).  Secondly, existing 
acrimonious or poorly connected relationships may impact the effectiveness of 
implementation actions (Cohen et al., 2012; Schneider et al, 2003).  Thirdly, there 
may be a  negative impact on goal choices where closed subgroups or state 
agencies have influence, forming  highly connected  networks which may show 
similar behaviours and decisions (Crona & Bodin, 2011; Davies & White, 2012; 
Habron, 2003; Hamlet, 2011; Knuppe & Pahl-Wostl, 2013; Rogers et al., 2000); there 
may in fact be greater scope and consideration of options within networks which are 
low or moderately connected (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Sandström & Rova, 2010).  
The political framework, within which policies are delivered, drives the overall 
approach, whether top-down, bottom-up or via collaborative public/private actor 
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literature.  Although risks to successful collaboration are reported, the mechanism to 
reduce such risks are not common in the environmental collaborative team literature.  
Consideration of variable accountability standards appropriate for complex policy-
delivery processes does not appear to be considered within legal statutes.  In 
particular, the lack of a control mechanism where internal working relationships are 
dominated by powerful interests leads to the exclusion of weaker collaborating 
actors, consequently, legitimisation of policy becomes dominated by key individuals.  
Economic power is expressed not only by support, or lack of support, for the 
collaborative mechanism, but importantly, in the adoption of market forces linked to 
the benefits humanity gains from their environment.  The impact of powerful, 
economically strong interests may override less dominant voices and influence the 
choice of environmental valuation.  The ecosystem service concept has been 
identified as a mechanism to address such weaknesses but organisations applying 
these concepts are not common in the literature. 
Gugu & Dal Molin (2016) propose a set of recommendations for collaborative policy 
implementers which cover stakeholder diversity, incentives, experience assessment, 
vision setting, roles and responsibility clarification and trust building actions.  
Specifically, they consider:  
(a) participating organizations should be drawn from diverse sectors, of varying size 
and financial resources to minimise inter-group power imbalances.  Key selection 
factors are the appropriate size and consequent manageability of the network, 
together with the resource-contribution and relevance of specific actors. 
(b) both organization-specific and network specific incentives may increase the 
motivation of a particular actor to participate in collaboration; 
(c) previous experience of collaboration should be favoured in order to facilitate the 
functioning of the whole collaborative process;  
(d) by defining a common vision at a collective meeting, all members have 
participated and enhanced commitment to the end vision;   
(e) to avoid uncertainty, clarify who is involved in the leadership of the network, their 
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(f) build trust through the identification of operational synergies, the development of a 
common vision and information sharing on collaborative outcomes. 
The application of these recommendations will be examined within the thesis study. 
Collaborative watershed partnerships have emerged with the aim of providing both 
environmental and economic benefits to stakeholders (Hardy & Koontz, 2009).  UK 
policy guidance (DEFRA, 2013) expressly requests freshwater collaborative 
partnerships address both water quality and ecological issues, and also consider 
ecosystem services impacts.  To tackle the concerns of stakeholders involved in 
landscape management, there is a requirement to understand how landscapes are, 
and have been, influenced by human actions across spatial and temporal scales 
(Schröter et al., 2014; UK National Ecosystem Assessment, 2011).   Consequently, 
any examination of a specific ecosystem, such as a river, may reflect the changing 
importance of the uses of freshwater by those who reside and work along the 
riverside.  Freshwater is noted to provide many different ecosystem service benefits 
to society, such as supplying drinking water, supporting fisheries, providing a 
resource for business and agriculture, transport routes and recreational well-being.  
To understand and respond to challenges to ecosystem benefits, there is an implied 
assumption that environmental policy implementation participants possess both a 
working knowledge of the ecosystem service concept, and also know how to apply 
such a framework.  The presence or absence of these implementation competencies 
are examined within this policy implementation study. 
The paradox identified by Goodwin and Grix (2011), whereby actor independence is 
compromised by state operating models, offers further opportunity for investigation 
by exploring the impact of political, economic and social influences upon policy 
implementing actors.  To this end, the collaborative UK (England and Wales) 
catchment based approach to Water Framework Directive policy delivery forms the 
focus of this thesis study and is now reviewed in detail. 
2.6 Natural Resource Policy 
In Europe, the first environmental action programme was set up by the European 
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present and future generations (EC, 2015, p1) and throughout the past forty years, 
action has evolved to prevent biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation, 
culminating in the EU Biodiversity Strategy (EU, 2011).  The UK’s membership of the 
EU has been a critical factor in shaping UK environmental policy (HoC, 2016). 
Currently, European countries who are members of the EU are subject to some 200 
environmental laws covering air pollution control, water protection and waste policy, 
the control of chemicals, biotechnology and industrial risks, together with nature 
conservation (EC, 2015). The EU is also a signatory to the UN Aarhus Convention, 
which entered into force on 30 October 2001, and gives the public key rights relating 
to the environment.  The Aarhus Convention gives the public the right to access 
environmental information held by public authorities, the right to participate in 
decision-making and challenge those public decisions which have been made 
without regard to environmental laws, and also requires authorities to actively 
disseminate environmental information (EC, 2015).  These facets underpin EU 
Directives and influence the way implementation occurs, however, witness reports to 
the 2016 review of EU and UK Environmental Policy undertaken by the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee identified concerns around EU policy 
implementation due to excessive complexity, lack of infrastructure investment and 
reliance on voluntary measures (HoC, 2016, p19).  The remainder of this chapter will 
consider the implementation issues in one specific area, that of freshwater, with a 
focus on the North West England River Basin. 
2.6.1 Freshwater Policy: The Water Framework Directive 
Since 2000, the management of freshwater resources in Europe, including the United 
Kingdom, has undergone a transformation following the adoption by EU Member 
States of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2000, establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy, otherwise known as the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (E.C., 2003).  The 
WFD is a wide-ranging directive addressing the previous piecemeal approach to 
water legislation by establishing a framework for the sustainable management of 
estuaries and coastal water, lakes and rivers, including urban river corridors (E.C., 
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The main objective of WFD is to achieve good ecological and chemical status for all 
surface waters and groundwater by 2027 and the primary aim is to improve and 
maintain the quality of waters, recognising that water is not a commercial product but 
a heritage to be protected, defended and treated as such (EC, 2000, page 2, para 
19).  Further objectives are specified for water ecological and chemical status to 
protect human health, water supply, natural ecosystems and biodiversity (EC, 2000; 
EC, 2016) and member states are expected to define and implement measures to 
achieve and maintain good water status for each river basin (EC, 2000, para 26).  
Current challenges to the attainment of these objectives include the extraction of 
natural mineral or spring water, 97% of European bottled water is from such sources, 
and the unknown impact of fracking upon this highly commercialised product (Arthur, 
2015).   
Table 2.2 Definitions of status in the Water Framework Directive 
Status Definition 
High Near natural conditions.  No restriction on the beneficial uses of the water body.  
No impacts on amenity, wildlife or fisheries 
Good Slight change from the natural conditions as a result of human activity. No 
restriction on the beneficial uses of the water body. No impact on amenity of 
fisheries. Protects all but the most sensitive wildlife 
Moderate Moderate change from natural conditions as a result of human activity.  Some 
restriction on the beneficial uses of the water body.  No impact on amenity.  
Some impact on wildlife and fisheries 
Poor Major change from natural conditions as a result of human activity.  Some 
restrictions on the beneficial uses of the water body.  Some impact on amenity.  
Moderate impact on wildlife and fisheries. 
Bad Severe change from natural conditions as a result of human activity.  Significant 
restriction on the beneficial uses of the water body.  Major impact on amenity.  
Major impact on wildlife and fisheries with many species not present. 
 
The WFD classification scheme for surface water ecological status range from high to 
bad (Table 2.2) and considers the abundance of aquatic flora and fish fauna, nutrient 
level, salinity, temperature and morphological features, while good chemical status is 
identified through achievement of quality standards for 53 chemical pollutants of high 
concern across the EU contained in EU legislation on chemicals, industrial emissions 
and pesticide regulations (EC, 2016).  The WFD extracts relating to aims and 
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The success of the Directive is noted to rely on information, consultation and 
involvement of the public, including users (E.C., 2003, p4) through the active 
involvement of all interested parties in the production of river basin plans (E.C., 2003, 
Article 14, p26).  Here participation is positioned as a tool to achieve the objectives of 
WFD, not a means of influencing goal setting (Newig & Koontz, 2014). 
Table 2.3: Water Framework Directive Aims and Objectives. Source: Directive 
2000/60/EC, EC 2003. 
Para Statement 
(1) Water is not a commercial product but a heritage which must be protected, 
defended and treated as such. 
(13) The diverse needs and conditions in the European Community should be 
taken into account in the planning and execution of measures to ensure 
protection and sustainable use of water in the framework of the river basin. 
(13) Decisions should be taken as close as possible to the locations where water 
is affected or used. 
(19) This Directive aims at maintaining and improving, primarily, the quality of 
waters.  Quantity control is an ancillary element to the objective of ensuring 
good quality water.   
(26) Member States should define and implement measures to achieve and 
maintain good water status for each river basin. 
(27) Aim to achieve the elimination of priority hazardous substances. 
(37) Water used for the abstraction of drinking water must comply with Directive 
80/778/EEC of 15 July 1980. 
(39) Measures with the aim of preventing or reducing the impact of incidents in 
which water is accidently polluted are required. 
Article 13.6 River basin management plans shall be published at the latest 9 years after 
the date of entry into force of this Directive 
Article 13.7 River basin management plans shall be reviewed and updated at the latest 
15 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive and every 6 years 
thereafter. 
Article 14.1 Member states shall encourage the active involvement of all interested 
parties in the implementation of the Directive, in particular in the production, 
review and updating of the river basin management plans.  For each river 
basin plan, states shall ensure they publish and make available for comment 
by the public. 
 
The Water Framework Directive is implemented by EU Member States who are 
required to establish river basin management plans and programmes of measures, 
incorporating environmental, ecological, economic and participatory aspects, but it 
does not explicitly promote the ecosystem services concept (HoL, 2012), even 
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and later Government guidance does explicitly refer to the use of an ecosystem 
service approach (DEFRA, 2013).   
2.6.2 WFD Implementation in England & Wales 
To ascertain how WFD aims are translated to action, the WFD implementation 
mechanism as applied in England and Wales is further reviewed. 
EU directives have provided the framework within which the UK’s devolved 
governments may develop different approaches to achieving the common 
environmental objectives (HoC, 2016).  The WFD was implemented in both England 
and Wales through The Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England 
and Wales) Regulations 2003, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) designated the Environment Agency (EA) as the competent 
authority, that is, the system steward acting on behalf of UK Ministry for realizing the 
WFD in England, plus Natural Resources Wales as the authority for Wales from 
2013.   
The EA is an executive non-departmental public body responsible for environmental 
regulation, which includes management of water quality and resources, conservation 
of fisheries and ecology, river navigation maintenance and climate change 
adaptation.   
The WFD does not contain guidance on implementation structures beyond the need 
to apply the directive at the river basin level.  To comply with WFD, the EA 
designated ten River Basin Districts (RBD) across England and Wales, instigating 
regional liaison panels which include representatives of co-delivery organisations, 
that is, those organisations who are perceived to directly assist the delivery of 
measures (Watson et al., 2009; Watson, 2014).  The river basin management (RBM) 
plan provides a framework for protecting and enhancing the benefits provided by the 
water environment (EA, 2016).  For example, the North West RBM plan (Table 2.4) 
provides a long-term framework for managing the issues that affect the quality of the 
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Table 2.4 NW River Basin Management Plan (adapted from EA, 2016). 
Information Set Content 
Baseline 
Classification 
Water quality baseline.   Deterioration from the baseline is not 
permitted except in very specific circumstances. 
Protected Areas – 
Statutory Objectives 
Areas used for drinking water, bathing, commercial shellfish 
harvesting and sustaining precious wildlife species and habitat 
are subject to legally binding objectives that protect areas of 
land and bodies of water from potentially harmful activities and 
new developments. 
Water Bodies – 
Statutory Objectives 
Water quality objectives where the default objective is good 
status.  Where natural conditions, technical feasibility or 
disproportionate cost to make improvement impractical are 
found less stringent objectives may be set. 
Objectives to be achieved by 2021 unless an extended 
deadline of 2027 is specified. 
Management 
Mechanisms 
Statutory and voluntary mechanisms are used to manage the 
quality of the water environment.  Actions and implementation 
owners to achieve the statutory objectives are given.  Detailed 
action plan is not provided. 




In a House of Commons review, a DEFRA spokesperson reported DEFRA focus on 
implementing directives in a way that is flexible, realistic, [and] brings the public with 
us (HoC, 2016, p20), yet the UK approach adopted by DEFRA was criticised by 
environment groups for lack of public engagement (HoL, 2012; Watson, 2015a).  UK 
Government responded by moving toward a more inclusive, partnership-led 
approach to the management of water resources at a sub-set of the river basin, that 
is, at the catchment level (Whaley & Weatherhead, 2016), an implementation scale 
also adopted by other EU states where some member states may have found the 
RBD level somewhat impractical and organized important management activities at 
lower levels instead (Boeuf and Fritsch, 2016, p9).  The Catchment Based Approach 
(CaBA) is a governance network initiated by the UK Department of Environment and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) with the aim of stimulating public participation and 
collaborative delivery of the EU Water Framework Directive (DEFRA, 2013), although 
it is noted, that in order to design and implement the WFD agenda, DEFRA relies on 
formal traditional government institutions, together with one, or more, types of non-
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2.6.3 The Catchment Argument for England & Wales  
An early review of the roles and influence of a catchment scale organisation, that is 
rivers trusts, by Cook et al. (2012) identified differences in actors at national, regional 
and catchment scales.  The lack of integration between various statutory and non-
statutory groups, as found in 2009 and identified in Cook et al.’s work, is highlighted.  
Findings indicate that statutory and non-statutory groups do not duplicate functions 
but do have complementary interests: this is not unexpected, given the organisation 
under review, rivers trusts, report aims similar those expressed in WFD goals and 
adopted by statutory bodies (Short, 2015).   Requirements for the integration of future 
‘institutional arrangements’ which enable the engagement of decentralised, multi, 
decision-making actors are made explicit, including the integration of ‘responsibilities 
and rights from higher-level regulators’ (Cook et al., 2012).   
England & Wales river basin management (RBM) (2007-2009) was examined by 
Watson et al. (2009) against the theoretical shift to collaborative networks, that is, a 
self-organising, inter-organisational policy network, where private and non-profit 
organisations are identified to have a policy making and implementation role.  RBM 
was found to have maintained a strong central government control of water policy 
and regulation, even though water delivery has been privatised.  WFD 
implementation is discussed from the perspective of the river basin scale, identifying 
the strong control of the EA in participant involvement, an information cascade 
approach to meetings with limited discussion and a lack of local scale (catchment) 
actors (Benson et al., 2014; Watson et al., 2009).  Watson et al. (2009) report little 
opportunity for those who are being charged with policy implementation at the street 
level to influence regional river basin plans and so, to address this omission, the 
catchment scale is considered most appropriate for water management: the 
conclusion calls for the EA and central government to relinquish decision making 
powers to the local scale.  
2.7 The Catchment Based Approach (England & Wales) 
In March 2011, the Minister for the Environment and the Chairs of the Environment 
Agency (EA), Natural England (NE) and the Forestry Commission (FC) launched the 
Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) programme, heralding the change in UK 
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The Natural Choice (June 2011) and The Water White Paper: Water for Life (Dec 
2011) (CIWEM, 2016).   By working at a catchment scale, it was anticipated that 
communities would be engaged and ownership of issues would be at a scale relevant 
to key stakeholders, plus new approaches to water management would be developed 
which deliver economic, social and environmental benefits in addition to the water 
quality improvement benefits contained in River Basin Management Plans (DEFRA, 
2013; Watson, 2015a).  The catchment partnerships working approach as proposed 
by DEFRA (2013) encourages a co-operative, networking structure, requiring 
linkages between individual members of different organisations who are collaborating 
partners (Berkes, 2009); however, the implementation of WFD has proved 
challenging (HoL, 2012).  The approach launched in England and Wales 2013, 
delivers a non-statutory, complementary body to support the formalised WFD 
implementation mechanism.  The catchment partnership as designated is a non-
statutory group, it is not hierarchically linked to the river boards and thus, is not under 
any legislative pressure to deliver WFD goals.  The UK solution has not delivered a 
statutory body at the catchment scale, thus divorcing the catchment partnerships 
from the legislative process which specifies stakeholder involvement (Article 14, EC, 
2000).   
At the same time as this legislative demand for stakeholder involvement, there is also 
a pull from the public to be more engaged in public-sector policy decision-making 
(OECD, 2015) and functional collaborative arrangements have emerged as a 
response to this policy environment (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).  The underlying 
rationale is that by involving different groups, participants who possess different 
knowledge will broaden the collective, shared knowledge base, and thereby increase 
the capacity for innovative solutions to natural resource issues as implementation 
powers are devolved.  WFD policy implementation therefore becomes dependent on 
local activists to engage in projects which support the river basin plan, even though 
there is no organisational responsibility toward the catchment partnerships from the 
river basin district boards. Thus, the non-statutory catchment partnerships are 
expected to fulfil the WFD policy demand for stakeholder inclusion in decision-
making  important in ensuring that there is a clearer link between river basin 
management planning, underpinned by stakeholders at a river basin scale and 
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ecosystem service approach to natural resource issues catchment partnerships look 
at the water environment in terms of all the ecosystems services connected to a 
healthy catchment (DEFRA, 2013, p5 ).  The CaBA experience, post launch, does 
enable the engagement of local citizen actors at the catchment scale, but lacks the 
devolution of statutory rights from regulatory bodies identified by Cook et al. (2012). 
2.7.1 Catchment Partnerships – Evaluation to Date 
The UK Government trialled the Catchment Based Management (CaBA) in 2011, via 
25 fully-supported pilots and 37 groups offered limited support and launched the 
approach across the whole of England and Wales in 2013 (DEFRA, 2013).  The 
launch statement noted CaBA to be a facilitation and collaboration approach to policy 
delivery which sits within a suite of statutory and voluntary actions and activities 
(DEFRA, 2013, p9) and broad intentions and expectations to support WFD goals 
were outlined through the promotion and development of more appropriate River 
Basin Management Plans (which underpin the delivery of the objectives of the Water 
Framework Directive) (DEFRA, 2013, p4).  No organisational structure was defined; 
however, each partnership would possess a lead organisation, who received limited 
funding to provide a ‘host’ function for the catchment partnership, and there is a 
requirement for a representative of the mandated organisation (EA) to act as a co-
ordinator between the partnership and the EA.  Consequently, collaborative 
approaches which develop at the local catchment level are expected to work in 
partnership with government agencies such as Natural England and the Environment 
Agency, but the implementation is noted to be significantly context dependent and so 
there are ambiguities in both the mechanism for implementation and the impact of 
collaborative working within each catchment.   
At the launch in 2013, there were 108 catchment areas, hosted by a range of 
organisations, but over 60% are hosted by rivers trusts, who are independent 
community-led organisations working to improve local rivers (Table 2.5).     
An examination of the stakeholder make-up at launch identified the EA and 
ecological conservation stakeholders to be present in all the catchment partnerships, 
with academic representatives being the least reported.  Water companies were not 
found to be present in all the partnerships which is concerning given their influence 








Table 2.5: CaBA Partnership & Host Organisations at Nov 2103 (Rickard, 2013). 
Host Organisation Count as % of total 
partnership 
Rivers Trust 68 63 
Wildlife Trust 32 30 
Other Community Groups 19 18 
Groundwork 7 6 
Water Cos 5 5 
EA 3 3 
FW Habitats Trust 3 3 
Academia 2 2 
National Park 2 2 
AONB 2 2 
FWAG 2 2 
Local Authority 1 1 
Nat NGO 1 1 
 
Table 2.6 CaBA Stakeholder Analysis: 69 partnerships details provided.  Data taken 





Regulatory Body 100 
Wildlife & Conservation 96 
River Conservation 91 
Water Business   84 
Local Authorities 75 
Other Public Service / Government al Bodies 74 
Agricultural 59 
Recreational 58 
Non-water Business  51 
Social Engagement Bodies 49 
Academic 29 
 
Evaluation of CaBA has been gathered through review by external consultants 
(Cascade Consulting, 2013; 2015) and supported by academic papers focussing on 
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The report on phase 2 of the Catchment-Based Approach on behalf of DEFRA 
(Cascade Consulting, 2015) considered the position in 2014. Overall, catchment 
partnerships were found to be developing and delivering environmental 
improvements, even though uncertainty regarding future funding was a key issue.  Of 
the delivery cases outlined, the focus is on WFD requirements even though it was 
found that 25% of the non-government organisations, such as Wildlife Trusts, 
considered water resources to have little relevant focus for themselves; there is 
negligible comment on aspects of recreation or heritage improvement.  Working 
relationships among the catchment partners are found to include landowners, local 
government and business representative, but links to environmental groups such as 
Nature Improvement Areas or Local Nature Partnerships are lacking.  The host and 
mandated organisation representatives consulted believe mergers with such 
organisations are unlikely due to difference in scope, scale and methods of working, 
however, examination of the view of the whole partnership is not considered. The 
method approach in this study will address this weakness (see Chapter 4).  
Through the examination of a fully supported pilot catchment partnership, Short 
(2015) identified the ‘crafting of institutions' by local actors associated with integrated 
catchment management.  In this case, integration is considered at the horizontal, 
internal catchment scale.  Outcomes identified areas of duplication of interest and 
opportunities to reduce overlap among deliverables to external government agencies 
who were seeking stakeholder input to their strategic plans.  Integration in the vertical 
aspect, that is linking into the hierarchical WFD implementation structure, is not 
considered.  Given the short time the pilot had been operating and the focus on 
developing the partnership itself, the potential for further development (and 
examination) of networks beyond the catchment partnership is noted.  The influence 
of ‘leaders’ within the partnership and the strategic evolution of partnerships remain 
unaddressed (section 3.3, objective 3 Influencing Participants). 
A 2012 review of the pilot stage focussed on those 37 secondary pilots who did not 
receive the full pilot support but only received limited monetary funding (Watson, 
2015b).  The report highlighted the key influence the host organisation brought to the 
management of the catchment partnership, in particular participation selection, 
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considered interviews with the host organisation representative, the assumed leader 
of the partnership, and does not consider whether there are other influencers present 
within the collaborative group.   Much of the questioning focussed on how and why 
the host organisations structured the formation of the partnership in the limited period 
since the launch. There is little information on how collaborative interactions may 
have changed since the early formation stage, nor how the prioritisation of actions, 
directed by the host to address the known and immediate river conservation priorities 
of water quality and WFD goals, may expand to consider the wider ecosystem 
considerations outlined in the launch document.  Consequently, there is a possibility 
for catchment actions and aims to develop and focus on aspects which have great 
significance for the local actors involved in the partnerships but are not priority WFD 
goals, an aspect currently unexplored.   The non-statutory nature of the CaBA 
approach is noted to impact the control of the partnerships via the development of 
formal rules and regulations; participants are unwilling to adopt such protocols, there 
being no formal links into the WFD implementation mechanism at the river board plan 
level and, apart from the mandated organisation and the catchment host, 
participation at the catchment level is entirely voluntary.  Who is participating and 
how they are developing alternative formal linkages is unaddressed (section 3.3, 
objective 1 Network System Dynamics). 
An evaluation of catchment pilot partnerships through the concept of collaborating 
networks of actors is presented by Watson (2015a): collaboration is defined in that 
paper as ‘an interactive, social form of decision making in which a diverse group of 
autonomous actors’ search for agreement on a collective issue or problem in which 
they all have stakes’.  The evaluation considered the pilot stage (2011-2013) prior to 
the full launch of CaBA in 2013.  The impact of two key power relationships are 
highlighted: (i) those of the government agency who retain controlling interests and 
so limit devolution of decision-making, and (ii) the influential power of the host 
organisation at the commencement and in the continuing development of 
partnerships.  Participating actors were found to have initially viewed CaBA as an 
approach to implement WFD, even though there is no statutory requirement to do so, 
but over time, partnerships have widened the scope of their interest to consider 
heritage and recreation, an aspect not found in the phase 2 report produced by 
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relevant to note, building a network is not considered sufficient to address 
collaborative activity, networks should be functional, purpose driven and provide a 
sense of solidarity, but network analysis exploring this aspect is absent from the 
report.  Also lacking is analysis which considers whether participants approaches to 
‘risk’ and ‘agreement’ are impacting collaboration and the deliverability of catchment 
improvement actions.  This thesis will address both these aspects through network 
analysis and critical evaluation of partnership members’ approach to collaboration via 
risk and agreement to act assessment (section 3.3, objective 3 Influencing 
Participants). 
The lack of constitutional power and inability to directly influence river basin plans is 
noted by Watson (2015a) and the potential for integration of power and authority 
horizontally into the decision-making process of other jurisdictions outlined. For 
catchment groups, the creation of positions and niches within wider institutional 
arrangements are envisaged.  Exploration of this aspect is not presented and there 
are opportunities for further research to address how ‘integration’ is manifesting itself 
within a partnership (section 3.3, objective 1 Network System Dynamics). 
To resolve the disconnection between the top-down WFD approach and the 
catchment scale, Watson (2014) considers the adoption of legislative supported 
bridging institutions to facilitate cross-scale interaction and deliver successful 
integrated water resources management.  CaBA is noted to sit as an addition to the 
legitimised WFD implementation mechanism, the lack of an explicit process or 
mechanism to link the two levels of water planning being highlighted as an issue in 
CaBA pilot evaluation (Cascade Consulting, 2015).  Watson’s 2014 study of the 
catchment scale implementation mechanism in England calls for the development of 
a formally recognised body at the catchment scale to bridge the implementation gap; 
however, this body would require power shifts and is likely to be resisted from both 
national and local agents.  At the moment, it is unclear which of the participating 
actors have influence either within or beyond the catchment partnerships or whether 
there is a development of a bridging or boundary-spanning organisation already at 
play in the implementation system.  The research contained in this thesis will 
consider such developments within the current partnership relationships (section 3.3, 
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CHAPTER 3 OPPORTUNITY IDENTIFICATION 
3.1 Literature Gap  
3.1.1 Political, Economic and Social Factors Gaps 
A large body of research exists which examines the political, economic and social 
factors which influence environmental policy implementation and which have led to 
the current application of the network, system stewardship model in the UK policy 
area.  The existing research reviewed in Chapter 2 will be used in this thesis to 
construct a priori coding tables in order to ascertain whether, following the 
introduction of a non-statutory, unincorporated implementation model by UK 
Government, there is a new aspect which influences policy delivery or whether there 
is an absence of a previously identified influencing factor.  Also, the implementation 
structure has been examined by earlier researchers from both a top-down 
perspective and from a bottom-up construct, however, an examination of the novel 
system stewardship model introduced as the delivery model for catchment based 
management in England & Wales has not been found to be an examined concept. 
The research contained in this thesis will address this theoretical model gap. 
3.1.2 Natural Resource: Catchment Partnerships Gaps 
The adoption of a non-statutory, unincorporated collaborative group approach to 
deliver a statutory (WFD) directive appears counter-intuitive. Given the time which 
has passed since pilot evaluation reports were completed, a further review may 
clarify two aspects: Firstly, whether WFD is a major issue of relevance to all the 
stakeholders within the catchment or is there a local issue which is of greater 
importance (section 3.3, objective 2 Ecosystem Service Focus).  Secondly, are the 
hosts continuing to act as ‘authority’ figures, controlling the participation of actors and 
direction-setting of activity which may be compatible with the goals of WFD but which 
may alienate non-WFD interested stakeholders? Host organisations report a shift to a 
more inclusive, less WFD led focus at the end of the pilot period, 2012, but analysis 
at the whole partnership level would enable the views of all participants to be 
considered.  This study will address this gap by capturing the views of all members of 
a partnership and critically evaluating the whole network structure to identify the 
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Influencing Participants) and seek to address how the unincorporated nature of the 
group impacts the overall structure and performance. 
3.2 Opportunity Identification 
In their comprehensive review of network research in public administration, Kapucu 
et al. (2017), found common recommendations concerning future research which 
sought to overcome the challenges associated with network scholarship.  
Recommendations covered distinguishing informal social networks from contractual 
relationships, plus research on the influence collaborative networks have on the 
policy implementation process and how this relationship changes over time (Angst & 
Hirschi, 2017). 
Lester and Goggin (1998) also argue that in order to understand more fully the 
strategic choices of implementers and to be able to explain and predict 
implementation outcomes, we also need to consider the individual implementers and 
their roles within networks. Further, Bazeley (2004) outlined four key areas to be 
assessed by implementation investigation which are presented below, together with 
the opportunity area relating to catchment partnerships: 
1. To identify variation across implementation sites through the 
documentation of existing social structures to identify the socially 
engaged actors 
Opportunity: Catchment partnerships have been found to be context dependent and 
vary in participant make-up, goal content and prioritisation, and integration with 
statutory bodies. Hence, adopting a case study across more than one site is 
proposed.  Published reports to date have focussed on the pilot experience and there 
remain opportunities for research now partnerships are maturing and developing 
post-pilot.  Opportunity therefore exists for the examination of catchment 
partnerships, beyond the set-up and initiation phase which has been considered by 
earlier research.  
2. To consider the historic and current conditions which influence 
the likelihood that actors will coordinate and adopt new practices 
Opportunity: Identifying the historic change in ecosystem services embedded in 
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management awareness and appreciation of ecosystem services may be considered.  
The outcome will identify whether the preferences of ecosystem management are 
reflective of the current social values or are expressing preferences at odds with the 
current focus and promoting alternative EsS through policy implementation goals.   
3. To identify latent sources of authority which mobilize or may 
impede new practices 
Opportunity: Network dynamics are of pivotal importance in the governance of 
natural resources. This has been recognized by a number of studies that have 
investigated how the structure of social networks affects the effectiveness of natural 
resource policy implementation and governance (e.g., Bodin & Crona, 2009; 
Carlsson & Sandstrom, 2008; Kowalski & Jenkins, 2015; Marin & Berkes, 2010; 
Sandstrom & Rova, 2010). Through identifying the influential actors within the 
implementation network, the research contained in this thesis will consider whether 
the techniques of control and steering considered necessary to achieve policy goals, 
is discernible.    
4. To identify factors which shape an individual’s approach to policy 
implementation and which influence actions, and where are such 
influencing factors found within a system.   
Opportunity:  In response to a House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
(2016), written evidence submitted by the Wildlife Trusts identified the effectiveness 
of the catchment based approach in bringing partners together to address WFD 
strategic issues but raised concerns with the lack of ambition in the UK 
implementation of the Directive, an over-complicated process and a failure to capture 
public support (WT, 2016 AEP0018, In: HoC, 2016).  Through the responsible agent, 
the EA, UK Government has adopted a network implementation model for WFD 
delivery which has been made complex by the inclusion of non-statutory bodies. The 
CaBA model is noted by DEFRA (2013) to be a new focus on institutional 
arrangements and processes, impacted by the external political environment and 
also by the way street-level actors bring their own affiliations and demands to the 
catchment partnerships.  Analysis of personal risk values and the approach to 
agreement will therefore be critically analysed to identify where such influence factors 
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In summary, controversy has resulted between those who believe in control, planning 
and hierarchy versus those who believe in spontaneity, learning and adaptation as 
implementation techniques.  However, it is noted that within the body of work 
considering implementation theory, theorists differ in their views, identifying a top-
down, bottom-up or a synthesis of both aspects as found in the stewardship model, 
but they are consistent in identifying formal connecting linkages between all levels of 
activity.  This connection provides legitimacy to the actions and decisions of 
implementing actors and also places a responsibility on those in hierarchical control 
to oversee the implementation stages.  The mix of implementing bodies, conditions to 
be met and use of collaborating partners has led to a high level of complex 
implementation interactions and expectations which will be examined by adopting a 
complex system approach, detailed in the following Chapter. 
3.3 Aim & Objectives 
The aim of the research contained in this thesis is to provide critical insight about the 
way in which influence may be expressed to either facilitate, or constrain, policy 
implementation in an unincorporated collaborative partnership. This will be achieved 
through adopting a case-study approach to compare stakeholder partners involved in 
catchment based management.  Specific objectives are: 
 Network System Dynamics:  How is the implementation system developing? Is 
there a discernible impact due to the Localism Agenda? 
 Ecosystem Service Focus: What is the temporal shift and trade-off within 
catchments and is this comparable? Have catchment partnerships developed 
their own unique agenda based on an Ecosystem Service (EsS) approach or 
retained a focus on statutory goals? 
 Influential Participants: Which actors are involved and what are their 
collaborative relationships within catchment partnerships? Which stakeholder 
groups play an influential role? Do all the collaborating partners possess 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Personal Approach 
Research paradigms are the set of assumptions and beliefs relating to the 
researchers’ perception of the world which thus serves as a ‘thinking framework’ 
(Wahyuni, 2012).  The researcher involved in the work contained in this thesis, 
supports the pragmatic approach, this is, the research question determines the 
research framework, as the philosophy considers objectivist and subjective 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive but are end points of one continuum.  Hence 
a mixture of approaches and methods is an acceptable framework, with emphasis on 
what works best to address the research problem at hand, employing both qualitative 
and quantitative data to better understand social reality (Burke Johnson et al., 2007; 
Feilzer, 2010; Wahyuni, 2012).  A comparison of theoretical research paradigms is 
contained at Appendix A. 
Various research methods are available to address multi-scale dimensions, but 
Bazeley (2004) considered no one method is more valid than any other approach, 
however, the context, data availability and the nature of the questions to be 
answered implies that research is likely to employ mixed methods to enrich 
understanding (Bazeley, 2004; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).  
4.2 Complex System Approach 
Policy makers and implementers who seek to understand adaptive interactions in 
social, ecological or economic systems utilise complexity systems science to focus 
attention on dynamic connections and policy evolution (OECD, 2009). The complex 
system view considers interfaces between participants that interact and adapt to 
each other, across various scales, spaces and times (Furtado et al, 2015; OECD, 
2009).    
4.2.1 Complexity: A Whole System Perspective 
Organisation processes are complex due to characteristics such as uncertainty, 
unpredictability and multiple interactions among a number of otherwise autonomous 
agents, thus theorists consider there is a need to understand characteristics and 
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(Meyer Junior et al., 2012).  Action to address multi-scale environmental issues in the 
21st century may now involve local, national and international policies, delivered 
across a mix of diverse participants who include governmental departments, private 
business and voluntary NGOs (EC, 2015).  The environmental policy area is thus 
considered complex (HoC, 2016) and so is a suitable exemplar for investigation by a 
complexity science approach.  
To aid the understanding of network structures, researchers have applied theories of 
complexity (Bohórquez Arévalo & Espinosa, 2015; Meyer Junior et al., 2012; Stacey, 
1995).  Complexity science is a set of ideas and principles which describe the 
nuances which underpin the processes and dynamics of change (Ramalingam et al., 
2008), that is, the logical properties of nonlinear behaviour and network feedback 
systems that create themselves over time through reflection and learning, while 
seeking to understand instabilities which lead to new forms through sudden changes 
(Bohórquez Arévalo & Espinosa, 2015; Stacey, 1996).  Informal, spontaneous 
relationships co-exist amid organisational structures (Stacey, 1996), hence personal 
relationships and group relationships are important to deliver implementation actions.  
Consequently, management based on complexity theory is a whole system approach 
defined by relationships and networks, where control and co-operation are 
considered necessary to prevent network collapse, together with a uniting, common 
purpose (Blackman, 2001).    
Fuentes (2015) considers complex systems analysis is not reliant upon any particular 
method or tool, but a combination of those tools and methods that best answer the 
questions are most appropriate. Kapucu et al. (2017) recommendations cover the 
use of appropriate network analysis methods and tools in the analysis of the 
implementation systems, bearing in mind the difficulties in defining network 
boundaries and collecting network data (Isett et al, 2011); the need to address the 
integration of qualitative with quantitative studies; and to conduct comparative 
network analysis. 
4.3 Policy Implementation Research  
One of the main goals in applying complexity research methods is to facilitate the 




          Page 63 of 267 
 
 
level (Ghorbani et al., 2014), thereby providing data to better understand the policy 
mechanism through exploring non-linear, network features at both the broadest and 
more detailed levels (Johnson, 2015).   
4.3.1 Macro-level Analysis: Implementation Model Analysis: 
To analyse policy implementation mechanisms, Van Meter and Van Horne (1975) 
outlined a model which was guided by organisation theory, and studies considering 
the impact of public policy, judicial decisions and inter-government relationships.  The 
model considered the level of the change required and also policy aim consensus; 
so, they hypothesised, implementation is most successful where only marginal 
change is required and goal consensus is high. To achieve success requires multiple 
parties to be linked from an initial policy decision through longitudinal stages, that is a 
top-down model, but with the input of ‘subordinates’ who also participate in the policy 
formulation (Hill & Hupe, 2002).   
However, the inclusion of multi-actors has been noted to be a concern as the context, 
institutional arrangements and behaviour of actors’ impact upon the transparency 
and accountability of decision-making (Mabillard & Zumofen, 2016).  Policy 
implementation mechanisms now possess greater complexity (Johnson, 2015; 
Kapucu et al., 2017; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).  Increasing diversity leads to greater 
complexity in collaborative systems as different needs, expectations and individual 
goals correspondingly increase: conflicts may result, reducing trust between 
stakeholders, less-integration across competing commercial, non-profit or community 
sectors and fragmented accountability (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009; Gugu & Dal Molin, 
2016).   
Consequently, Matland (1995) built upon Van Meter and Van Horne’s earlier model, 
identifying how factors considered critical to the implementation process are 
identified as varyingly dependent on the levels of policy ambiguity and conflict viz the 
Ambiguity-Conflict Model.  Levels of conflict impact accessibility to the 
implementation process: at low levels of conflict access is relatively straight forward, 
but at high levels of conflict, barriers to entry are high through incompatibility of 
interests and perceived threats to self-interests, resulting in aggressive behaviours.  
Conflict resolution mechanisms also vary with conflict intensity: persuasion or 
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are common at higher levels of conflict.  Similarly, the degree of ambiguity impacts 
the implementation process.  It influences the ability to monitor activities through 
formal reporting routes, uniformity of understanding across implementation sites, 
and, in conjunction with local contextual factors, influences the variation in 
participating, local, implementation actors.  Four paradigms were identified: (i) low 
conflict-low ambiguity or administrative implementation, in essence the marginal 
change model outlined by Van Meter and Van Horne; (ii) high conflict-low ambiguity 
or political implementation; (iii) high conflict-high ambiguity or symbolic 
implementation; and (iv) low conflict-high ambiguity or experimental implementation. 
Such models are useful in understanding the policy implementation system and 
identifying issues which detract from policy delivery. Contemporary developments 
have built an approach based on complexity theory, whose proponents advocate a 
shift in analysis from the individual parts of a system, to the system as a whole, that 
is, the network of elements that interact (Cairney, 2012b). This research will examine 
the overall WFD policy mechanism to ascertain the policy paradigm and to assess 
the level of complexity in the applied implementation model (section 6.1; 7.4.1). 
4.3.2 Micro-level Analysis: Participant Complexity 
Collaborative implementation mechanisms are often characterized by the inclusion of 
non-state stakeholders, together with horizontal interactions between public, private, 
and non-profit organisations who may act at different geographic scales, across 
different planning time-frames and possess different areas of responsibility (Kapucu 
et al., 2017).  By facilitating public and private interests, policy implementation is 
believed to be more efficient, reducing duplication, improving standards within the 
partnership members and allowing organisations to extend activities to new 
geographies, services or clients (Hall, 2011; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Roberts & 
Marshall, 2008), yet there are risks to participation.   
In deciding to participate in a network, actors consider a number of factors (Angst & 
Hirschi, 2017).  Where a problem is complex, decisions on participation rely on the 
credibility of information provided by other participants or their willingness to 
contribute to the overall goal. There is often an incentive for a participant to 
misrepresent their own commitment in order to gain credibility based on the 
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2008).   A key argument for improving networking among the actors and institutions 
in the system is that the tasks required are so complex, no one actor has sufficient 
knowledge to complete them, so an exchange of ideas contributes to enhancing the 
innovative capacity of agencies to deal with complexity (Sorensen, 2012; Sorensen & 
Torfing, 2012).  Efficient means of exchanging information overcome actor 
weakness, and so networks which rely on a few central actors to bond the network 
can facilitate information flow among all collaborative participants (Angst & Hirschi, 
2017).   Network models are noted to be reliant upon mutual dependence and 
negotiation and yet decisions may not always be legally enforceable on those 
members of the partnership who do not wish to abide by a facilitated decision 
(Marcussen & Torfing, 2003).  To be successful, trust and an equal contribution to 
common goals are required (Kemp & Martens, 2007).  The evolution of the internal 
team working as found in the case study examined, is reported in section 7.2.3.   
Public policy implementation approaches which involve large numbers of diverse 
interacting parts are characterised by complexity (Cerna, 2013), consequently the 
methods and methodologies which study complex systems (e.g. 4.5.1 & 4.5.2) are 
also applied to analysis of public policy implementation (Furtado et al, 2015).  
In their study of public administration Kapucu et al. (2017) found of the 81 articles 
examined, 35% used both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect network 
data, that is, a mixed method approach (see 4.4.1).  Mixed methods are deemed no 
less valid than other approaches to research (Bazeley, 2004) and data is often 
sourced through document review, survey responses and / or interview (Kapucu et 
al., 2017).   Kapucu et al. (2017) recommend future research designs should 
continue to use multiple types of data collection methods, thereby overcoming the 
constraints of one particular method and to enhance the reliability and validity of 
network research in public administration.  Validity is noted to stem from the 
appropriateness, thoroughness and effectiveness with which methods are applied 
and the thoughtful weighing of evidence, rather than from the application of a fixed 
set of rules and procedures (Bazeley, 2004). 
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• The use of multiple regression techniques (O’Toole, 2004) to identify those 
key variables that significantly influence implementation performance, both 
positively and negatively; such an approach is stated to be an improvement on 
best-practice research which may suffer from problems of reliability and 
validity.  However, to enable such a comparison, a substantial number of 
examples are required, together with researcher time and skills.  
• Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is often used in complex systems 
research for public policy evaluation. It provides a unified way of describing 
complex spatial data (Heppenstall et al., 2012). However, to combine different 
data sets, spatial coordinates are commonly used and so must be identifiable 
to produce patterns of data.    
• Agent based modelling enables the examination of the emergent properties 
from a bottom-up perspective across the individual, population or 
organisational scales within complex networks (Fuentes, 2015).  However, to 
do so requires computer modelling skills and appropriate resources.  
• A tool often used by complex systems researchers, is social network analysis 
(SNA) which describes the system of interactions that occur within the system 
(Fuentes, 2015). See 5.4.1 for further details 
4.4 Design 
The research presented in this thesis covers three main areas: - 
     - Implementation typology assessment via qualitative analysis, a priori coding  
     - Historic ecosystem service analysis via qualitative analysis, a priori coding  
     - Catchment partnership investigation via mixed methods analysis, case study 
4.4.1 Mixed Method Concept 
Mixed methods research Is not a new concept: Campbell and Fiske (1959) 
formalized the application of multiple research methods, introducing the idea of 
triangulation where more than one method is used as part of a validating process to 
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research contained in this thesis, a Concurrent Triangulation Design has been 
selected.  The design uses separate quantitative and qualitative methods where data 
collection is concurrent, priority is given to the quantitative approach recognising that 
qualitative data will significantly enhance the insights gained from the quantitative 
studies through elaborating main concepts (Jackson & Trochim, 2002), and 
integration of the results occurs during the interpretive, discussion phase (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 2003). The design visualization is shown in Figure 4.1.  This methodology 
is considered advantageous as it is familiar to most researchers, can result in 
validated and substantial findings, requires a shorter data collection time and there is 
certainty that the phenomena under investigation has not varied between the 
application of differing approaches. 
 
Figure 4.1: Visualisation of the Concurrent Triangulation Design applied in this 
research 
4.4.2 Case Study Concept 
Case studies allow researchers to explore individuals or organisations, simple or 
complex relationships, using a variety of data sources to reveal and understand 
multiple facets (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2014).  George and Bennett (2004) identify 
several advantages of case studies that make them valuable in testing and 
developing theory, including: 
(a) their use in achieving high levels of concept validity through the identification and 
measurement of indicators representing the theoretical concept,  
(b) as a useful means to examine closely the hypothesized role of causal 
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(c) for addressing causal complexity.  
Case study methodologies are influenced by the approach and the topic under 
investigation (Baxter & Jack, 2008; George & Bennett, 2004; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014); 
a case study may describe a case, explore a case or compare between cases, and 
involve single or multiple cases.  Case studies are often undertaken in the natural 
resource management area to clarify theories and explore situations (e.g. Baird et al., 
2016).  The catchment partnership case study undertaken complies with the 
suitability criteria laid out by Yin (2014), in that ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions relating to 
the implementation of public policy are being asked, the researcher is not able to 
manipulate the participants or bring any pressure to bear and the context of the 
catchment partnerships under review is relevant. 
Designed as a case study, the research presented will examine the overarching 
implementation framework, which allows tracing the effects of feedback and direction 
steering in the collaborative process as a whole, and the micro-level dimensions of 
selected, collaborative catchment partnerships (England & Wales) which are 
concerned with the delivery of the EU Water Framework Directive.  The research 
presented adopts Angst and Hirschi (2017) recommendations to adopt interpersonal 
relationships or interactions between individuals as the unit of analysis and critically 
analyse the nature of risk among diverse participants in a collaborative network 
system by means of complexity science tools.   
4.5 Research Tool Selection 
In order to answer the research questions, the mixed-method approach applied in 
this study leads the collection of quantitative data collection via survey instruments, 
analysed by social network analysis, Stacey’s participant complexity matrix and 
evaluation of goals against the ecosystem services framework, plus qualitative data 
collected from survey instrument commentary and supported by semi-structured 
interview from a smaller number of participants.  Definitions of quantitative and 
qualitative data collection are as used by DeFranco (2011). The tools were chosen 
as they:  
• Are grounded in a real-world context (Acayo & Schwanbeck, 2015)  
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• Address relationship interactions 
• Provide answers to the who and how questions 
• Prior knowledge on the application and success in identification of 
implementation barriers was known to the researcher 
• Supporting software is available and accessible by the researcher 
Each of the quantitative tools applied to survey data is detailed in the following 
sections, together with the qualitative approach to the identification of ecosystem 
services.  
4.5.1 Social Network Analysis Tool 
Social network analysis (SNA) has been used for analysing the structural and 
relational aspects of complex networks in public administration (Kapucu et al., 2017). 
Unlike conventional statistical analysis, SNA allows researchers to examine the 
dynamic interactions between individuals (actors) and the complexity of social 
systems (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). It has been widely used in sociology, 
psychology, and anthropology to analyse social structures in various contexts (Knoke 
& Yang, 2008; Scott, 2013; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  A search of the Scopus 
document database performed in April 2015, using the term “social network analysis” 
returned over 35,000 documents covering computer sciences, mathematics, 
engineering (55% of the listed documents), medicine, psychology and biochemistry 
(36%) and business and management (11%).  SNA was not a common analysis tool 
until the late 1990s when computing hardware and software became commonplace.  
Since then, SNA has developed into an inter-disciplinary tool, applied in 
organisational behaviour, social support and diffusion of information research.   SNA 
is found to be commonly applied to complex network analysis to identify structural 
relationships, supported by qualitative data to provide rich information about the 
networks (Kapucu et al., 2017).   
SNA Theory 
A focus on patterns of relationships distinguishes SNA from other analysis 
techniques (Haythornthwaite, 1996).  Krebs (2002) defines SNA as “the mapping and 
measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, organisations, 
computers or other information/knowledge processing entities”.  Social networks can 
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(Carolan, 2014).  SNA tools examine how members of a network work with each 
other, directly or indirectly.  The technique is used to visualise relationships which are 
mapped via quantitative reports of relational ties based on the principles of graph 
theory (Haythornthwaite, 1996), presented pictorially (sociogram), so facilitating the 
identification of who knows who and who may act as thought leaders or a central 
broker in an organisation (Butts, 2008).  Analysis may lead to the identification of 
isolated groups or bottlenecks and identify where there may be a risk to the 
sustainability of an organisation due to the loss of key personnel or functions 
(Haythornthwaite, 1996). Data are usually gathered through questionnaires or 
interviews.  Questions may include “Who do you work with?”, “Who do you go to for 
advice” or “Who do you go to for information about…?” (Haythornthwaite, 1996).  
Responses are transferred to binary data grids which are input to software analysis 
packages. 
Individual measures theory: An individual (actor) in a network may possess greater or 
lesser prominence compared to the other members of the group due to the number 
of relationships they possess among the group (Haythornthwaite, 1996).  Centrality is 
important to understand an individual’s power, influence and brokerage within a 
specific network; individuals with high centrality possess greater choice opportunity 
and are less dependent upon any one specific actor in the network (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005).  The centrality of actors in terms of the overall structure is reported by 
eigenvector values; an eigenvector approach detects the most central actor in terms 
of the overall structure, through identification of the ‘distance’ among actors i.e. the 
most efficient pathway (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  Higher scores indicate actors 
are ‘more central’ to the main pattern and lower values indicate the actors are more 
peripheral.  Where actors receive many ties from other network members they are 
deemed prominent or prestige actors measured by in-degree centrality.  Out-degree 
actors have many links away but receive few; consequently, they are designated as 
influencers as their views are exchanged with others.  
Actors may connect otherwise disconnected elements by acting as an intermediary 
position and these brokerage, or bridging, links, are considered important to the 
transfer of information between others (Haythornthwaite, 1996).   Betweeness 
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being shared with others in the network.  Where connections have to be made 
through a key actor, that is, one who contributes most to linking the network, that 
individuals’ betweeness measure is high, while for those at the end of communication 
lines it is low (Scott et al., 2005). 
Network measures theory: Cohesiveness is an attribute of the whole network 
indicating the presence of strong ties among network members who are therefore 
likely to have equal access to the same information or other resource.  Overall 
measures of cohesion, e.g. density and centralisation, identify the extent to which all 
members of a group interact with all the other members (Haythornthwaite, 1996).  
Results range from 0 to 1, usually reported as a percentage.  Network sub-structures, 
such as cliques, may be found where sub-sets of actors report strong ties among 
themselves, measured by cohesion. 
Density is the relative number of connections; the number of links divided by the 
number of nodes in the network. Individuals in high density networks are more 
directly connected to each other than a low-density network (Scott et al., 2005).  It is 
postulated information flows along direct connections and so in high density networks 
information can flow to and from a number of individuals by different routes.  
However, in low density networks there are a limited number of routes and 
information may not transfer across the entire network. 
Centralisation measures the extent to which a network unifies to a central point.  That 
is, the degree to which a network approaches a symmetric star.  The value is 
expressed as a percentage: 0% indicates every member (partner) is connected to 
every other member, 100% indicates all members are connected to one member 
only.  In-degree centralisation indicates a small number of members are consulted by 
the rest of the members; out-degree indicates a small number of members do most of 
the consulting of others (Scott et al., 2005). The arrangement affects how quickly and 
easily information can be distributed, either through minimal contacts as indicated in 
a ‘star’ network where information is directed to or from the central point to all 
recipients at the same time, or via longer delivery routes which may restrict the speed 
and impact the accuracy of transfer.  The evaluation of centrality of actors in terms of 
the overall structure is reported by Eigenvector values.  Higher scores indicate actors 
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are more peripheral.  Data are directed, and both Freeman’s in-degree centrality 
(indicator of prominence) and out-degree centrality (indicator of influence) are 
reported. 
Application of SNA in the natural resource area. 
While SNA is common in computing, medicine and business areas, this does not 
seem to be the case in natural resource management.  A search of the Scopus 
database limited to the key words ‘social network analysis’ and ‘natural resource 
management’ was undertaken in January 2016.  The search was restricted to post 
2000 and environmental journals, i.e. Ecology and Society (SJR rank in 2014 = 1.46), 
Journal of Environmental Management (SJR rank in 2014 = 1.12) and Environmental 
Management (SJR rank in 2014 = 0.77), to identify current areas of research in the 
natural resource area.  Fifty-three papers were returned, of which thirty-one made 
explicit reference to SNA.  Eleven (35%) were addressing social capital and learning 
links (e.g. Carien De Villiers et al., 2014).  Kreakie et al. (2016) considered the use of 
internet links to identify social networks, while other researchers focussed on the 
identification of key network members in order to ensure resilience of management 
structures (e.g. Beilin et al., 2013).  Twelve (40%) of the papers were investigating 
the social network of specific case studies, of which 4 were in the EU, 2 in South 
America, 2 in North America, 2 in Africa and 2 in Australia/Asia.  Research interests 
considered actor dominance, centrality and power influence upon trust and 
governance issues, and the importance of bridging organisations within diffuse 
information networks (e.g. Calvet-Mir et al., 2015; Fliervoet et al., 2016; Isaac et al., 
2014).  Guerrero et al. (2013) considered how social network analyses can be 
applied to issues of conservation planning, including challenges of implementation 
which arise from a disjointed planning process. In addition to network structure 
identification, they also highlight a requirement to consider the influence of personal 
values such as trust, legitimacy, reliability and institutional limitations upon the 
effectiveness of conservation planning. 
A network analysis approach to studying collaborative (aka co-management) 
arrangements has been adopted by several researchers in the natural resource area.  
Carlsson and Sandström (2008) found that well-performing co-management systems 
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co-management networks consisting of diverse actors who are closely connected are 
able to perform better than those not having these qualities.  Similarly, Bodin and 
Crona (2009) also examined governance processes and outcomes through the 
application of social network analysis and concluded that density, cohesiveness and 
subgroup structures do differ between different governance outcomes.  However, 
they propose that one particular aspect (measure) should not be favoured over 
others and a mix of network characteristics are considered most desirable. 
Sandstrom and Rova (2010) sought to understand the influence of different 
management structures upon a common goods resource (fishery) and applied SNA 
to explore the hypothesis of centrality and densely integrated actor networks outlined 
by Carlsson and Sandström (2008).  Their hypothesis is somewhat supported by the 
SNA result, but restricted empirical material, an inability to control hidden variables 
and a lack of causality are highlighted as concerns by the researchers.  Kowalski and 
Jenkins (2015) applied SNA to a non-profit organisation which provides a bridge 
between ocean scientists and management.  Their study aimed to examine 
cohesiveness in working group structures and relate this to goal achievement.  In this 
case, greater cohesiveness was not found to deliver more goal achievement and 
consequently, the researchers identified leadership to be a critical aspect to goal 
achievement.  However, SNA did successfully report upon the diversity of the 
working groups, a key aspect of the bridging organisation.  In their study of co-
management, Marin and Berkes (2010) explored the distribution of power and 
influence, identifying a greater number of influential functional groups than defined in 
policy implementation documentation.  In their study, conflict and power differences 
were identified and welcomed as drivers of change and adaptation.  In an 
examination of a network consisting of non-governmental organisations, government 
agencies and local communities, Cohen et al. (2012) use centrality measures to 
identify collaborative relationships among stakeholders, identifying important 
partners, but also recognised conflicting mandates between the various functional 
groups, together with constraints on finances, time and trust, result in trade-offs 
between partners. 
SNA is not a common tool in the environmental management field, but growing in its 
application, and there are calls for further research in areas of collaborative 
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2014; Sandström & Rova, 2010).  Participants in the environmental policy area form 
a collection of ‘actors’ tied through behavioural interaction, association and formal 
relationships (Carolan, 2014), aspects which have proved suitable for examination by 
SNA. 
In summary, SNA permits the identification of those actors who hold key positions, 
either formally or informally, and where behavioural issues, such as trust and 
agreement, may impact the functioning of a collaborative, diverse partnership and on 
policy implementation.  Thus, the use of social network analysis is considered a 
suitable tool for the evaluation of the behavioural-led stewardship network. 
Analysis details are given at 5.6.4  
4.5.2 Interpersonal Relationship Tool: Stacey’s Matrix 
More network research is called for to explore interpersonal relationships or 
interactions between individuals as the unit of analysis, including the nature of risk, 
as a greater preference for risk-aversion has been identified among those employed 
in public sector than those employed in the private sector, with consequent impacts 
on the level of risk-taking innovation (Angst & Hirschi, 2017; Dong, 2017).  
Zimmerman et al. (1998) suggests creative learning, adaptation and innovation occur 
with ‘just enough information flow, diversity, connectivity, power differential and 
anxiety among agents’.  To understand whether individuals feel there is ‘just enough’ 
tension to deliver a creative organisation, Ralph Stacey (1996) developed a model to 
identify the levels of uncertainty and disagreement between a team of people 
regarding a specific issue, such as may be found in collaborative implementation 
agents.  
Stacey’s Model is structured on two axes, the degree of certainty and the level of 
agreement.  Where an issue is classified as ‘close to certainty’ there are precedents 
for expectation of success, that is, past experience is used to predict the outcome of 
an action with a high degree of certainty.  The opposite, ‘far from certainty’, applies to 
those unique or new issues upon which a decision is to be made and there is no 
previous experience to predict an outcome, only assumptions.  The level of 
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each other.  Thus, aspects of ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do’ a collaborative task may be 
examined by application of Stacey’s matrix.   
 
 
Figure 4.2: Simplified Stacey Matrix identifying the influence of agreement on what to 
do and risk and trust on how decisions are made. Adapted from Stacey (1996). 
Stacey’s matrix identifies typical patterns of decision making behaviours ranging from 
the repeatable, certain outcomes (zone 1 in figure 4.2), to those where there is no 
agreement and there is an avoidance of action (zone 4 in figure 4.2).  Stacey 
identified the larger central region of the matrix as the zone of complexity (zone 5 in 
figure 4.2) in which traditional management approaches are not very effective, but it 
is often the area of high creativity, innovation and new method adoption. 
Application of Stacey’s Risk/Agreement Framework (matrix) in the natural resource 
management area. 
To understand the use of complexity theory analysis in natural resource management 
a literature search of the Scopus database limited to the key words ‘complexity 
theory’ or ‘Stacey theory’ and ‘natural resource management’ was undertaken in 
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which deal with management (Journal of Environmental Management, Environmental 
Management, and Ecology and Society), as it is the organisational aspect which is 
under investigation not ecological complexity.  Eighteen papers were returned by the 
search, of which thirteen identified the complexity of ecological systems and 
modelling issues (e.g. Bryan & Crossman, 2008) together with the difficulties 
associated with management techniques (e.g. McFadden et al., 2011).  Five papers 
reported upon the investigation of social aspects of teams involved in natural 
resource management, in particular personality types (Allison & Hobbs, 2010; 
Hagmann et al., 2002), cooperative organisations and interpersonal relations (Crona 
& Parker, 2012; Sternlieb et al., 2013) and the impact of trust and legitimacy on 
resource management success (Graham & Ernstson, 2012).  The application of 
complexity model analysis is not common and none of the returned papers made 
specific reference to Stacey’s complexity model.  
Analysis methods are shown at 5.6.5.  
4.5.3 EsS Framework Application  
Ecosystems are noted to be complex, and accounting for the full range of services, 
including synergies and trade-offs, is considered challenging (Dick et al., 2016; Hein 
et al., 2016; Primmer et al., 2015). Trade-offs occur when the provision of one EsS is 
reduced as a consequence of increased use of another but such trade-offs may 
occur as an explicit choice or arise without an awareness that such a trade-off is 
occurring (Dick et al., 2016). Various methods have been proposed to produce such 
assessments, however, in a review of 153 regional ecosystem service case studies 
Seppelt et al. (2011) found expert opinion was a viable technique to provide ground 
truthing of measurements and modelling.  Examination of change on the temporal 
scale has identified regulating, provisioning and cultural ecosystem services and 
found there is a change in UK focus from provisioning to cultural EsS in the early part 
of the 21st century (Dick et al., 2016), but EsS delivery is a long-term, continuous 
process and assessment over a greater time-span may provide further illumination 
regarding demand and service trade-off. The value of partnership working is 
identified when dealing with prioritisation and trade-offs between conflicting services 
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Understanding the effects of management decisions which can change the 
magnitude and relative mix of ecosystem services, is a core function of ecosystem 
service assessments (Dick et al., 2016).  Such assessments are called for in the 
catchment based approach, as catchment partnerships are tasked to look at the 
water environment in terms of all the ecosystems services connected to a healthy 
catchment (DEFRA, 2013).   Following the development of geographic information 
system software, tools exist to visualise spatial data or build decision support 
systems and consequently, many researchers have sought to present a visual picture 
of historical ecosystem changes, assessing the range of species, landscape type and 
anthropogenic impact (Swetnam et al., 1999; Zu Ermgassen et al., 2012).  Source 
material is assessed for area coverage and retrospective plotting of mapping ranges 
undertaken to present output as a series of maps (Hendrych et al., 2013; Swetnam et 
al., 1999).  However, to enable complex map visualisations, there is a requirement 
for data which possess high accuracy and resolution, together with professional, 
skilled computing operators and data translators (Andrienko et al., 2010; Wang et al., 
2006).  Where such high-quality data are lacking, alternative methods are necessary, 
and so an approach based on land-use captured in historical documents is explored.     
Plieninger et al., (2014) believe that conventional ecosystem services assessments 
ought to be complemented by aspects of socio-cultural attitudes, such as may be 
found in narratives.  Narratives generally present a series of events which may be 
examined by retrospective analysis to gain an understanding of influencing factors 
and drivers of actions (Sandleowski, 1991).  Historical landscape narratives, which 
highlight natural events and occurrences, are linked to the social values and 
experiences which were deemed substantial and noteworthy at that particular point in 
time.  So, the historical landscape perspective provides a frame of reference for 
building an understanding of landscape and ecosystem change (Swetnam et al., 
1999; UK NEA, 2014).  By uncovering the ecosystem services identified from 
historical narratives, the method links to the socio-cultural values contained within the 
ecosystem services approach.   
Ecosystem identification 
To identify the ecosystem services, the process followed the proposal suggested by 
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services linked to freshwater (Table 2.1), consequently a qualitative, deductive 
framework analysis approach based on pre-conceived, a priori coding and categories 
is adopted for this temporal study (Gale et al., 2013).  The coding table is important 
as it serves as a data management tool for organising segments of similar or related 
text to assist in interpretation and the template provides a clear trail of evidence for 
the credibility of the study (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
Theme identification is a fundamental task in qualitative research (Ryan & Bernard, 
2003) and the identification requires exclusivity and exhaustive analysis.  Coding 
categories must be mutually exclusive, that is each unit of analysis should fit into one 
category only and also exhaustive where every response ought to fit into a category, 
with only a few being classified as other (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996).   
− A code is the label attached to a phrase or other short sequence of the text, 
for example, in the study reported, non-drinking water use is identified where 
there is a record in the text of any aspect of mechanical power linked to the 
river. 
− Category is the grouping imposed on the coded segments in order to reduce 
the number of different pieces of data in the analysis, for example, 
provisioning ecosystem services covers text coded as clean water use, non-
drinking water use or food source.  
− A theme is a higher level of categorisation used to identify a major element for 
example, freshwater ecosystem services. 
The content of narrative material will be examined through the application of a coding 
table to identify the key ecosystem services present in the catchments studied in this 
thesis, and to consider the aims and aspirations of the catchment partnership against 
these key services. Detail of the methods applied are found at 5.6.2. 
4.6 Research Sources Approach 
4.6.1 Archive Material / Public Records 
Archive material forms the basis for the historical ecosystem services assessment 
and also provides a snap-shot of catchment management policy and development at 
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published by EU and UK Government, catchment partnerships and organisations 
which form the partnerships are easily accessible via the internet and not subject to 
restricted access. These formal publications are deemed to be factual, possess 
credibility and be impartial; however, it is noted that bias may be present due to 
recording methods and content selection (Denscome, 2008).  Where documentary 
sources relating to the catchment based approach development, the membership 
and goals of the partnerships which form the comparative case study have been 
used, appropriate referencing is noted in this thesis. 
4.6.2 Primary Data Collection 
Primary data capture may be achieved via a variety of methods; through interviews, 
observations, survey or experimentation.  In this study, due to the large geographic 
spread of all the potential participants it was not viable to directly observe interactive 
behaviours and random sampling of the catchment partnership members would not 
satisfy the requirement for a whole-network investigation.  Interviews would require 
both the time and availability of interviewees and a skilled researcher to avoid leading 
the interview and introducing bias and so were discounted as a primary data capture 
method for the whole network investigation forming a key element of this research.  
Consequently, a survey approach, supported by a small number of semi-structured 
interviews, was adopted. 
4.6.3 Survey Instrument Approach 
Surveys may be either self-completion questionnaires, returned either by traditional 
post or via e-mail or completed face to face.  Face to face surveys are used where 
detailed information is sought and allow the researcher to question and validate 
responses: response rates are usually good and appropriate numbers of population 
demographics can be selected, however, there are considerable time and travel 
costs which have to be considered and skill is required not to lead the respondent 
and introduce bias into the results (Denscombe, 2008).  Self-completion surveys are 
often most convenient for the recipients, interviewer bias is not found in the answers, 
and less time and cost are expanded on data collection by the researcher.  However, 
responses are restricted to the data requirements as laid out in the survey instrument 
and there is no opportunity for clarification if required. Nonetheless, bearing in mind 
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surveys, the geographic spread and limited availability of catchment partners, for the 
study reported in this thesis, a structured, self-completion, questionnaire survey was 
constructed. The questionnaire focused on the specific areas under investigation by 
capturing quantitative and qualitative data. 
It has been noted that in general, survey response rates are falling; rates of over 50% 
are considered a success (Carr et al., 2017), and where surveys are targeted, for 
example within an organisation, response rates of 40% are common (Fryrear, 2015); 
nevertheless, surveys are a popular and common-place approach to research where 
there is a wide coverage requirement, a snapshot at a set point in time is sought and 
there is a requirement for empirical data (Denscombe, 2008).   
4.6.4 Semi-structured Interview Approach 
Interviews are directed conversations where the discussion is directed by the 
researcher, there is an open consent to take part and the content of the interview can 
be reported (Denscombe, 2008).  Interviews are appropriate where in-depth detailed 
information is required, usually from a small number of interviewees, such as may be 
required from key people who can provide further insight (Denscombe,2008).   
Interviews may occur as a group activity, via a focus group, or on a one to one basis.  
Focus groups commonly explore non-controversial topics while group interviews are 
useful to gain consensus and debate views among participants, however, where 
opinions may be contentious or an individual may not wish to speak in public, one to 
one interviews are preferable (Denscome, 2008).  
Interview structures may be (a) structured, where large numbers of respondents 
answer identical questions, (b) semi-structured, where specific issues can be 
investigated and there is flexibility in both the questions and development of the 
conversation in response to issues raised, or (c) unstructured, where the responder 
develops the conversation.  Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews permit 
interviewees to use their own words and so facilitate discovery of their experiences 
(Denscombe, 2008). 
Following the mixed-method approach, a small number of semi-structured interviews, 
based on social constructionist epistemology, were conducted to permit early 
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process to investigate key aspects of collaborative partnership working identified 
from the quantitative research. The use of open-ended questions allowed relevant 
topics to develop as the interview progressed and provided an opportunity to identify 
new themes and understanding of the research area.  Interviewees expressed their 
views in their own words and the output can thus provide reliable, comparable 
qualitative data (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006).   
Initial guide questions will be prepared in advance to guide conversations. Interviews 
will be transcribed for analysis and text coded into the major themes identified in a 
priori coding tables.   
4.7 Timeline 
The overall approach to the research study and initial attendance at relevant 
environmental group meetings occurred during 2013.  Further key actions and stages 
in the study are outlined in the following paragraphs.  
Phase 1: The overall approach to this research and identification of an environmental 
policy implementation mechanism suitable for analysis occurred early 2013, fulfilling 
the requirements of university internal assessment standards.  Attendance at Irwell 
Catchment Partnership meetings commenced in early 2013 in order to understand 
the internal relationships and functioning of the voluntary groups and to participate in 
organisational development.  The partnership attendance period covered both the 
catchment based approach pilot stage, when the Irwell partnership was led by the 
EA, and also the transition phase following the launch of the UK wide catchment 
based approach in 2013 and the appointment of Groundwork Manchester, Salford, 
Stockport, Tameside and Trafford as the catchment host, November 2013.   
Relationships were established between the Irwell partners and the researcher 
through regular attendance at catchment partnership meetings and working-party 
involvement, plus, further relationships were established through introductions to UK 
CaBA support personnel, Rivers Trust members and Ribble catchment partnership 
members at the Rivers Trust Conference (Burnley, 26 March 2015) and CaBA 
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Phase 2: Primary data collection was preceded by a period of preparatory work 
which commenced in June 2014.  During this survey-pilot phase, catchment 
partnership key informants were identified and the logistics of the data collection, 
availability of participants and ethical procedures were finalised.  Data collected to 
test the survey instrument from both catchment partners and academics, were used 
to inform the final design and launch mechanism.   
Phase 3: Information gathering on historical ecosystem services, as presented in 
published archives, occurred from late 2013 to early 2014.    
Phase 4: The survey data collection occurred in two stages within a fourteen-month 
period from October 2014 to November 2015, capturing both the system dynamics 
and personal views of the selected catchment partnership participants.  Data analysis 
occurred following closure of the survey.  Following analysis of the results, feedback 
to the participating partnerships occurred at Catchment Partnership meetings in 2016 
and 2017. 
4.8 Post Exercise Review. 
The research presented in this thesis consists of a case study approach which 
illuminates both the ecosystem services embedded in historic narrative, plus an 
exploration of the choices and decisions being made by individual partners and their 
position within a collaborative network system, aka the catchment partnership. 
For the survey element, the same individuals provided both quantitative and 
qualitative reporting concurrently, and therefore were utilising the same base 
knowledge and experiences for both methods at the same period, so reducing 
temporal participant variation.  In this study the participants knew their own areas of 
operational interest well and provided specific area of concern regarding the 
catchment partnership functioning.  The dual design adopted in this study has tested 
a range of tools.  The quantitative tools of social network analysis, Stacey complexity 
matrix and stakeholder mapping provided a more structured approach compared with 
a priori code commentary analysis, however, the application of both methods was 
useful in revealing the specific concerns of catchment partners.  Stacey’s complexity 
matrix reports two dimensions affecting the agreement to act, that is, both risk and 
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is, where there are both low risk and high trust responses, and individuals who report 
high risk and low trust among the group.  The qualitative framework analysis also 
finds low trust values but does not report frequent reports of risk aversion. The 
qualitative findings support the group acceptance of risk as part of the CaBA 
approach and a willingness to consider unfamiliar approaches as part of the 
collaborative ‘greater good’, however, trust issues are a concern for participants. 
Thus, by considering the findings of both methods, a greater significance of trust 
influencing issues in day-to-day activity is highlighted.   
A key benefit of performing a small number of semi-structured interviews was the 
extraction of high-quality data from knowledgeable catchment partners.  This was key 
to the early exploration of the initial policy implementation issues and gathering data 
on preferences and perceptions.   Semi-structured interviewing was a flexible method 
of data identification, but there was the potential for in-built bias as interviewing only 
occurred with those individuals willing to participate. 
Within the literature, SNA is found to be a tool used for the analysis of collaborative 
team relationships but the additional application of Stacey complexity matrix, used in 
this research, has provided a mechanism for exploring participant values which future 
researchers in the environmental field may wish to adopt.    
Adopting a narrative-led approach to identifying temporal ecosystem service priorities 
has been possible for both a limited stretch of river and bankside and catchment-
wide where there are relevant publications.  It is acknowledged that the alignment to 
the ecosystem service framework requires knowledge of the ecosystem service 
concept, awareness that one event may impact more than one service and that both 
a positive impact and/or negative disservice may be assigned to the same event.  
This is not, therefore, a simple approach but is one which enables a top-level multi-
ecosystem service synopsis where the use of computing tools may not be viable.  
The approach has, however, identified the socio-value of a range of ecosystem 
services which provide benefits for human well-being and environmental 
sustainability, thus inclusion of such a review in environmental implementation plans 
would bring further prominence to the ecosystem concept. 
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CHAPTER 5 METHOD 
5.1 General Information  
The research aim and objectives (Chapter 3) were answered by adopting a complex 
science approach (Chapter 4), examining the theoretical constructs and conceptual 
models from implementation management and testing those ideas within a natural 
resource collaborative unit. The tools applicable in complex science research were 
reviewed in Chapter 4.  Activities undertaken include primary research through 
questionnaire; qualitative content analysis of river development histories; critical 
review of publications - both academic and professional reports; contacts made 
within the sector through membership of relevant catchment partnership networks 
and professional interaction via Rivers Trust and CaBA conferences.  
The study consisted of four phases:  
1. Determination of both the complex science approach to the inter-disciplinary 
research and the suitability of an environmental implementation mechanism as 
a policy exemplar.  
2. Determination of the scope of the comparative study and the overall data 
collection approach at the micro-level.  
3. Determination of the approach for the extraction and analysis of the 
ecosystem services (EsS) recorded within catchment narratives, including a 
detailed assessment along a selected river-length to evaluate the temporal 
EsS approach. 
4. Comparative data collection from participating catchment partners, analysis 
and evaluation.  For this phase, ethical approval was granted by the University 
of Salford on 22nd October 2014, prior to the collection of any information from 
the participating catchment partners.   
Research was undertaken on a part-time basis and complied with the University of 
Salford timeline and progression points for studies undertaken on such a basis. 
The following sections contain the selection criteria used to identify the catchment 




          Page 85 of 267 
 
 
research process, plus the specifics of the primary data capture strategy and analysis 
tools.  Results and discussions of the aspects under investigation are reported in 
Chapters 6 and 7.    
5.2 Selecting the Catchment Partnerships 
This study builds on earlier academic research examined in the literature review 
which studied the catchment based approach pilot stage (section 2.7) by examining 
the impact of longevity, that is, matured working relationships.  The implementation 
system case study is bounded with respect to participation (Baxter & Jack, 2008) 
mirroring the inclusion and exclusion criteria in ‘scientific’ studies; thus, the selected 
catchment partnerships have followed a similar development programme, that is, 
catchment partnerships were a pilot for the England & Wales Catchment Based 
Approach (CaBA), prior to May 2013, the partnership transferred from pilot 
management by the EA to post-2013 management by another organisation and the 
scale of interest is the entire catchment area.  To examine the influence of the host 
organisation upon the goals and direction of the group, as found in the literature 
review (section 2.7), different host actors are preferred.   
The network system implementation case study reported in this thesis is a 
comparative case study (Baxter & Jack, 2008; George & Bennett, 2004; Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 2014) and the unit of analysis is limited to English catchment partnership 
organisations and relationships which exist within partnerships between 2014 to 
2016, ensuring the scope is neither too broad, nor contains too many objectives for 
one study (Baxter & Jack, 2008).   
5.2.1 Catchment Partnership Selection Process 
All English and Welsh catchments were considered and evaluated against the 
following five criteria.   
1. Partnerships were a fully supported pilot, operating prior to the launch of the 
England & Wales Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) in May 2013.  Thus, 
participants are known to each other, initial building of relationships is deemed to 
have taken place and partnerships have shared goals and aims. 
o A total of 25 catchment pilot partnerships were fully supported between 
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2. To have been a pilot under the management of the Environment Agency (EA) 
prior to May 2013 and transferred from management by EA to another 
organisation.  This reflects the CaBA launch document aim, which does not see 
the EA as the most appropriate lead in the majority of the catchments (DEFRA, 
2013), thus the study considers the lead relationship following transition from the 
EA.  
o Ten pilot partnerships were hosted by the Environment Agency and fifteen 
hosted by a range of other organisations including Rivers Trusts, Wildlife 
Trusts, Groundwork, water companies, local authorities and park 
authorities (Corbelli & Conlan, 2013).   
3. To have retained the same geographic catchment area after launch of CaBA. To 
ensure stakeholder representation is consistent.  
o Five of the EA managed pilot partnerships have maintained the same 
geographic scope (Corbelli & Conlan, 2013; DEFRA, 2013) 
4. To be within the same river basin, to avoid differing influence from River Boards. 
o Four of the pilots which have retained the same geographic area are within 
the same river basin as another partnership viz New Forest and Aldur & 
Ouse are located in the South East river basin; The Ribble and Irwell are 
located in the North West river basin. 
5. To be managed by different types of organisations to explore the influence of the 
catchment host upon stakeholder diversity, as found in the literature review 
(section 2.7). 
o The New Forest and Aldur & Ouse are hosted by freshwater organisations; 
The Ribble is hosted by a freshwater organisation and the Irwell by a socio-
environmental organisation.  Thus, the Ribble and Irwell are selected for 
comparative study. 
Applying the filter criteria as specified, resulted in the selection of the River Irwell 
catchment and the Ribble River catchment for comparative study.  It is 
acknowledged, the selection of a limited number of partnerships may restrict the 
investigation of alternative operating developments, however, the two partnerships 
being studied have greater longevity than other partnerships and have progressed 
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longest existing partnership – and the selection also includes one of the most 
successful partnerships in accessing major funding, that is, the Ribble catchment 
partnership (Cascade Consulting, 2013; RRT, 2017).  Lessons learnt from the 
operating of these specific partnerships are therefore considered instructive for the 
development of the entire English catchment programme. Details of the selected 
catchment partnerships geography and organisational structures follow. 
5.2.2 Catchment Details 
The selected catchments are both found within England’s North West River Basin 
District (RBD), one of the ten RBDs designated by the EA which fulfil the WFD 
statutory reporting body.  The North West River Basin covers approx. 13,200km2 with 
a rich diversity of wildlife and habitats including migratory salmon rivers, with native 
white clawed crayfish (Austropotamobius pallipes) and pearl mussel (Margaritifera 
margaritifera) populations, plus lakes containing Arctic char (Salvelinus alpinus) and 
vendace (Coregonus vandesius) – a rare species found only in Derwentwater (EA, 
2016).  There are twelve management catchments that make up the river basin 
district (Figure 5.1). 
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Around 80% of the river basin is rural, with livestock farming the most common use.  
However, 7 million people live and work in the North West and the river basin 
includes large urban centres in the southern area, such as Liverpool and 
Manchester.  The Lake District and Lancashire coast are tourism centres and 
contribute significantly to the local economy, yet challenges exist where the 
extraction of too much water from freshwater rivers, lakes or groundwater may 
damage the environment, particularly Special Areas of Conservation; for example, 
water abstraction from Ennerdale (West Cumbria) is damaging the river Eden Special 
Area of Conservation freshwater mussel and salmon populations (EA, 2016).   
River Irwell Catchment  
Location:  The catchment lies to the north of Manchester, comprising a total area of 
777 km2 (James et al., 2012).  The main river length of the Irwell covers 63km (39 
miles) however, there are five main rivers within the catchment, which together with 
their network of tributaries, have a total length of almost 400km (EA, 2008).  The 
River Irwell flows into the Manchester Ship Canal, linking to the Mersey Estuary and 
the Irish Sea (James et al., 2012). 
The source of the River Irwell is at Deerplay Moor, 400m above sea-level.  The river 
flows south through a steep and largely rural area to where the topography levels out 
and major urbanisation commences at Bury.  The major tributaries join at Radcliffe 
(River Roch) and Kearsley (River Croal) and the Irwell then meanders through Lower 
Kersal and Lower Broughton, Salford, before merging with the Rivers Irk and 
Medlock at Manchester.  The river flows into the Manchester Ship Canal which forms 
the limit of the catchment partnership management area. 
Historic Background:  Much of the Irwell catchment has been severely impacted by 
the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century.   The industrialisation impacted the water 
quality and flow of previously unimpeded rivers.  Waters were used to power the 
looms of the first mills and following the invention of steam power, large factories 
were constructed.  The Irwell and its tributaries were one of the first to be polluted by 
industry and their waters continued to be the waste disposal mechanism into the 21st 
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River Ribble Catchment  
Location: The Ribble is one of the largest rivers in the North West, draining a 
catchment area of 2128km2, covering a distance of 110km from source to mouth at 
the Irish Sea.  The catchment has distinct areas of industrial and agricultural use.  
The Forest of Bowland, an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), is drained 
by the River Hodder which provides a large proportion of the drinking water supplies 
for Blackburn and Hyndburn.  Areas to the east lie within the boundary of the 
Yorkshire Dales National Park, which together with the grazing land of the middle 
reaches, are predominantly agricultural land (EA, 2009). 
The Ribble originates high in the Pennines at Newby Head Moss, 422m above sea-
level. The river cascades south to Clitheroe, with the Yorkshire Dales National Park 
to the east and the Forest of Bowland to the west.  The mid-Ribble is joined south of 
Clitheroe by two major tributaries, the River Hodder and the River Calder.  The 
Ribble then meanders through the natural flood plains around Ribchester toward 
Preston.  Downstream of the tidal limit, the River Darwen, which drains the major 
conurbations of Darwen and Blackburn, joins the main water body with further inflow 
from the River Douglas in the estuarial reach.  The river then widens and flows into 
the Irish Sea.  Major inland waterways within the catchment are the Leeds to 
Liverpool Canal and the Lancaster Canal both of which are recreational assets 
connecting the urban areas of Colne, Nelson, Blackburn and Burnley.  
Historic Background:  Industrial and agricultural pollution, water abstraction and 
sewage contamination have caused severe habitat damage to the Ribble and its 
tributaries. The River Calder exhibits many pollution residues e.g. mine-water 
discharge, contaminated land run-off and sewage discharges (RRT, 2016).  
5.3 Stakeholder Contact Strategy 
Catchment partnerships are identifiable groups who, together with central support 
personnel, will provide data, i.e. a non-probability, closed group sample, not requiring 
proportional population weighting (Denscombe, 2008)  Sampling strategies 
appropriate for non-probability groups include (a) purposive, where particular 
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snowball where one respondent refers the researcher to further individuals, and (c) 
convenience where those readily to hand are sampled.  Purposive sampling limitation 
was adopted to capture data from those individuals most involved in collaborative 
activity, following guidance from catchment hosts. All members of catchment 
partnerships who met the selection criteria were eligible and invited to participate in 
survey.   
A questionnaire was developed to obtain data from target individuals who formed an 
active part of the catchment partnership stakeholder group and were identified as 
such by the relevant Catchment Host.  To be considered an active member and not 
an ‘interest only’ member, representatives have to meet the following criteria: to have 
attended at least one meeting of the relevant partnership in the twelve months prior 
to the survey launch.  This definition was introduced as the catchment host identified 
a number of personnel who received information but were not otherwise involved in 
the debate on catchment goals or delivery of activities. Where stakeholder 
organisation had more than one representative who had attended meetings, all those 
individuals were identified as ‘active’ and so were eligible to participate.  All potential 
participants were contacted prior to receiving an invitation to complete the survey, 
following best practice principle noted by Denscome (2008), with the aim of 
encouraging a satisfactory response rate.  General information and the outline 
request to participate was presented to partnership members at one of their regular 
meetings and agreement to participate was subsequently referenced in distributed 
meeting minutes to ensure all individuals, including those who were not present, 
were aware of the legitimacy of the survey. 
All active members of the two selected river catchment partnerships were invited to 
complete a self-administered questionnaire.  Partnership members were invited to 
participate in the study by individual e-mail to ensure there was no influence from 
others as a result of group-wide e-mail responses (Pare et al., 2013).   E-mail 
addresses were obtained from the catchment host secretaries who acted as a 
gatekeeper for contact information.  Copies of the word survey were e-distributed to 
each individual at their organisational contacts, together with an information sheet 
and participation consent form.  The survey was distributed by e-mail during October 
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and consent form were requested to be returned directly to the researcher via e-mail, 
to comply with data protection act requirements regarding security of information and 
retention and ensure anonymity of responses within the catchment partnership.  E-
mails were sent from the researchers’ university e-mail account and all e-
correspondence was directed back to the same account.  Follow-up e-mails chasing 
responses were also sent to each non-respondent separately.  Where responders 
indicated that they did not wish to participate, no follow-up e-mails were sent.  
Individuals who agreed to be interviewed were also provided with an information 
sheet and participation consent form.   
Analysis by the researcher occurred with full knowledge of the individual, their role 
and their organisation function within the catchment partnership; however, in 
published results individual responders are anonymised in line with ethical 
requirements.  
5.4 Survey Instrument 
5.4.1 Survey Instrument Design 
The survey was designed as a stand-alone, single-use questionnaire consisting of 
factual data and semantic differential attitude rating requests, which form the basis of 
quantitative analysis, together with an open-ended question to capture personal 
views on partnership operations to provide qualitative analysis data. Open questions 
have been identified as a means to add richness to survey results, that cannot be 
achieved with closed questions, so the opportunity for responders to add their own 
explanatory comments as a follow-on to closed items was offered, in order to yield 
qualitative commentary. 
To develop an understanding of the opinions and attitude of the catchment 
partnership members toward the working of the collaborative partnership the 
semantic differential rating-capture format was selected in order to permit a 
comparison of attitudes.  There are two widely used devices: one, the Likert scale is 
a multi-dimensional attitude scaling method in which respondents indicate the extent 
of their agreement with each item on a scale (e.g., a five- or-seven-point scale). Likert 
scale question asked the customer to agree or disagree with, or respond neutrally to, 
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introducing bias into questionnaire.  To assess the impact of both positive and 
negative questions, a duplicate question must be inserted, so increasing the length of 
the questionnaire, potentially reducing the willingness of survey participants to 
complete survey forms.  
An alternative to Likert is the semantic differential, developed by Osgood and his 
associates (1957; In Friborg et al., 2006), in which the respondent is asked to 
indicate their rating, usually along a seven-point scale, where two polarized options 
are offered.  The two ends of the scale are defined by pairs of adjectives with 
opposite meanings (e.g. take risks/cautious, etc.), so guiding the respondents without 
introducing question bias. Responders can express individual feelings and attitudes 
for nuanced perceptions. Semantic-differentials can be a very simple way to gauge 
what people think or feel about objects 
In measuring positive psychological constructs, Likert-based response formats have 
been noted to sometimes introduce an acquiescence bias. To reduce this, items 
usually are transformed into negations of the concept. Such transformations may 
introduce errors, as negations of positive constructs may appear contra-intuitive. A 
semantic differential response format may be an alternative to negations for reducing 
the acquiescence bias. In work by Friborg et al. (2006), it was found that a semantic 
differential format may effectively reduce acquiescence bias without lowering 
psychometric quality. 
The questions were tested via pilot with ten responders, consisting of two volunteer 
representatives from the catchment participants, six academics and two unconnected 
individuals with no knowledge of survey methods or the catchment organisations 
(June 2014 to September 2014).  Isaac & Michael (1995) identify a sample size of 10 
to 30 as sufficient for pilot study research.  The range of pilot-testers facilitated a 
variety of responses  covering the question wording – to ensure clarity of the 
information requested, that is top 10 rather than a ranking of all ecosystem service 
options; a removal of numeric marking from the semantic differential rating scale and 
replacement with a series of smiley faces as the choice indicator, so removing any 
potential bias from responders on viewing one option as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on a 
value; introduction of an Other option on organisation demographics with an 
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layout and rating scales were adopted prior to the issue of the questionnaire to 
catchment partnership members. Those members of the partnership who participated 
in the pilot were offered an opportunity to resubmit utilising the amended formats. 
Throughout the survey, page headings were inserted to remind responders that all 
the results will be anonymised and no-one will see the names of any people listed 
and there are no right or wrong answers to any questions.  Such headings were in 
bold within a red box to draw responders’ eyes to the content.   
A copy of the survey instrument is included at Appendix B.  
Analysis methods are reviewed in section 5.6.3, 5.6.4, 5.6.5 and 5.6.6 
5.4.2 Survey Content  
The survey consisted of seven questions in order to investigate three areas of 
interest: Section 1: You and Your Organisation, Section 2: Your Frequent Contacts 
and Section 3: Your view on Catchment Management (Appendix B). 
Section 1 consisted of two questions and requested factual information covering 
demographics such as organisation type and knowledge of ecosystem services.  
Respondents were presented with a set of options and asked to choose the options 
representing their view by inserting a mark into the relevant check box.  
Organisational type options included academic, agricultural, local authority, 
regulatory body, river conservation, wildlife and conservation functions.   
Section 2 requested contacts within the partnerships.  Three data-capture questions 
were posed i.e. ‘who do you judge to be the key people in the partnership?’, ‘with 
whom do you collaborate the most?’ and ‘who would you go to if you required further 
information on Ecosystem Services?  To help respondents complete the question, a 
list of all the current people connected to the catchment partnership was sourced 
from the catchment host and included within the questionnaire.  Responders were 
asked to provide both an individual’s name and the organisation represented.  
Responders were able to offer up to seven nominations in the grid format provided in 
the survey instrument.  
Section 3 explored partnership working and the awareness of the ecological services 




          Page 94 of 267 
 
 
Stacey’s matrix, a semantic differential rating scale required responders to indicate a 
rating along a bipolar scale which was defined by contrasting aspects linked to 
collaborative working, for example, ‘partners always agree on what to do’ versus 
‘partners never agree on what to do’.  To avoid any form of bias introduced by either 
choice of word or numeric rating along this scale, a series of smiley faces were 
offered as the choice indicator.  The indicators were converted to a numerical value 
for use in analysis, with the understanding that the quantification does not imply that 
the distance between the categories is in fact equal (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996, p258).   
An open-ended question was included to allow respondents to elaborate on 
partnership working issues but it is acknowledged that such a question will not yield 
stand-alone qualitative research insights, but significantly enhance the insights 
gained from the quantitative studies through enriching main concepts (Jackson & 
Trochim, 2002).  
Responders were asked to identify various dimensions of riverine ecological goods 
and services important to themselves.  A list of riverine goods and services taken 
from the MA assessment reports (2003, 2005a, 2005b), which covered provision, 
regulation and cultural aspects, was provided.  The list was presented in alphabetical 
order to remove any bias in the ordering and responders requested to identify the top 
ten attributes most important to themselves. 
5.5 Semi-structured Interview 
Key members of the catchment partnerships and UK catchment support personnel 
have privileged information relating to the internal relationships between catchment 
partners and their influence on partner working development.  As such, they are key 
people who can add further insight to issues impacting catchment management 
development.  A one-to-one, semi-structured interview method was adopted as this 
enables the gathering of views and experiences of catchment management yet 
allows the researcher to direct the conversation to those areas under investigation 
without leading the interview. Face to face contact was preferred, but where this was 
not feasible due to either distance or availability, phone-based interviews were 
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hour, with phone interview lasting one hour. Interview participants were drawn from 
the key roles and structures found in the studied partnerships viz: 
Catchment Host (1 interviewee) 
Key Bridging Link (1 interviewee) 
Catchment Co-ordinator (1 interviewee) 
Key Support Personnel (2 interviewees) 
Prior to posing the pre-prepared questions, the interviewee was provided with an 
overview of the reason for the interview, the intended use of the data, and the 
confidentiality and anonymity rationale.  Interviewees were requested to complete the 
participation consent forms prior to the interview commencing.  It was explained that 
written notes would be taken during the interview. Initial background questions were 
asked to set the interviewee at ease and the structured questioning commenced with 
the main question:  
Q: Can you tell me about your experience of working with the catchment 
based approach? 
Additional questions were posed, guided by the role and context of the interviewee.  
The following list covers the supplementary questions but were not asked of every 
participant: 
Q: What is the view from a UK perspective? 
Q: How is your partnership organised? 
Q: Who are the stakeholders? 
Q: How does the partnership deliver activities? 
Q: What is central role in all this? 
Q: What is the scale of activity? 
Q: How is the partnership developing? 
Q: What was the model when first thought of – is it as it is now? 
Q: Who’s moving from young into mature status? 
Q: What may help up skill younger partnerships? 
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Q: Is there a lead organisation coming to the fore? 
Q: Are there links to other strategic initiatives within the partnership? 
Q: Is there a specific value in the catchment host role? 
Q: Which aspects give rise to complaints? 
Q: What makes CaBA progress from bad to good? 
 
Clarifying, probing questions were used to gain more in-depth answers or to follow-
up on points of interest, where this did not interrupt the flow of the conversation. For 
example:  
Q: Can you expand on this a little?  
Q: Can you tell me anything else?  
Q: Can you give me some examples? 
Hand-written notes were typed within 48 hours of the interview, and copies issued to 
participants for validation where requested. 
5.6 Analysis 
There are three main area of analysis  
a) assessing the WFD/system stewardship model against the theoretical 
implementation policy typologies identified by Matland (1995) through 
documentary comparison to a priori categories 
b) identifying the ecosystem services present in the catchment, historic and 
current, through documentary retrieval and interpretation to a priori categories 
c) in-depth investigation into the collaborative catchment partnership working 
through quantitative data analysis from survey, supported by qualitative 
commentary analysis to a priori categories 
5.6.1 Policy Typology Assessment 
To explore the EU and UK approach to the Water Framework Directive, Matland’s 
implementation analysis tool (Matland, 1995) was applied to the UK catchment based 
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mechanism to any of the four aspects of Matland’s framework identified in Chapter 2; 
the key aspects related to each of the four typologies are detailed in Table 5.1. 
Documents were searched for through generic web-search engines to cover statutory 
documents and through SCOPUS academic publication search engines to retrieve 
any papers specifically studying WFD, UK England & Wales catchment studies.  
Documents retrieved included the WFD Directive and Annexes, UK DEFRA CaBA 
Policy documents and academic papers specifically relating to policy implementation 
review.   
A grid containing the aspects which Matland (1995) identified as pertinent to each of 
the implementation typology was constructed prior to population (Table 5.1).  The 
retrieved documents were read and re-read, and critical aspects relating to the flow 
of information, participant inclusion, support structures and direction setting 
mechanisms were identified and placed in the typology grid as present (tick indicator) 
or absent (cross indicator). The allocation of a specific aspect was not restricted to 
one typology. Results are presented in the following chapter (section 6.1).   









a public administration top-down model   
the desired policy and information flows from the top-down in an 
ordered hierarchical manner  
 
an over-riding central authority has information, resources and 
capabilities 
 
policy is spelled out explicitly at each level  
clear responsibilities and tasks are allocated  
actors are stable across time  
standard, uniform operating procedures are developed at the lower 
levels 
 
there is an existing technology to deal with the policy implementation  





over-riding power of the policy maker is supported by judicial review 
and non-compliance is identifiable  
 
actor(s) have sufficient power to force their will on other participants  
bargaining is necessary to reach agreements through either coercion 
or remunerative mechanisms 
 
different actors to those who produced the overall policy participate in 
implementation 
 
polices are not decided at the lower level   












low ambiguity at all implementation levels  
requires the compliance of actors who control resources essential to 
the achievement of the policy aims 
 
protracted negotiations are common where implementing actors are 
not in a hierarchical (direct line) relationship to the policy maker 
 







there is competition between actors who have a vested interest in a 
key aspect and who wish to define the policy in their terms  
 
context conditions at each site influence the strength of competing 
views 
 
different coalitions of parties may result at each site  
outcomes may vary across sites  
protracted conflict resolution processes common  
ambiguity in the policy aim or goal  
professional actors may act as lynch-pins to the differing points of 
view 
 
coalition occurs at the lower level, not at the initial policy definition 
stage 
 
policy definition occurs at the lower level and there is no compliance 
control 
 
a strong political negotiation aspect  
Experimental 





broad variations in outcomes  
ambiguous goals due to differing preferences among the actors  
no pre-defined technology  
variable participation between the actors  
actors participate where they are in agreement with the policy aims 
but possess different views as to how such aims are to be achieved 
 
delivery programmes vary from site to site  
opportunities exist for those actors who have strong interests, and 
available resources, to shape policy deliverables to their agenda 
 
agendas may be left unchallenged  
policy has a clear goal, evaluation against those goals is achievable  
where such goals are lacking, evaluation of the process and the way 
outcomes are achieved provide valuable information 
 
Policies with clear and widely supported goals but with no clear 
means of implementation 
 
the programme may become more structured over time, as 




5.6.2 Ecosystem Service Assessment  
Grey literature, that is. literature produced by government, academics, business and 
industry but which is not controlled by commercial publishers nor formally published 
in academic sources, is an extensive, often complex, source of information (Godin et 
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the grey literature, due to a lack of standards and resources for how to complete 
these searches and characteristics of the grey literature: grey literature searches are 
often not as systematic at traditional searches of academic literature as information 
may be held in reports, books, fact sheets, websites and policy documents, 
commonly published on internet websites (Godin et al, 2015).  A grey literature 
search plan includes consultation with contact experts to inform searches of grey 
literature data bases, Google searches and targeted websites (Godin et al, 2015).  
Such a search plan was adopted (Figure 6.3) to identify which of the ecosystem 
services are valued by society over time. Initial contact with the Director of the 
Greater Manchester Archaeological Advisory Service and a Professor of Ecology, 
identified key publications covering the selected catchments.  These publications 
were supported by a structed Google search restricted to the geography under 
investigation to identify those on-line sources (e-book and web-page) which 
contained histories of the areas under study, plus targeted web searches on historic 
document repositories of public debates which referenced the rivers.  Publications 
were reviewed to identify temporal changes in the social valuation of an ecosystem 
and the ecosystem goods or benefits provided, following the process identified by 
James et al., (2016). The advantage of this approach is that the temporal change 
across the catchment aids stakeholder awareness of both the interconnectedness of 
ecosystem services and speed of change. The output provides a synopsis of 
services rather than an in-depth study of a particular facet. 
Prior to applying this identification method to the entire catchment geography, a 
preliminary study was undertaken relating to a specific stretch of a well-documented 
river: extant mapping produced during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, provided basic reference material against which qualitative content 
analysis of published narrative histories could be compared, so identifying the 
interplay of ecosystem service values within documentary records.     
Each narrative was examined in detail and a note made in Excel of any record which 
referenced a freshwater ecosystem service as identified in Table 2.1.  The year and 
short description were entered. Data were examined to ascertain whether each noted 
event was an ecosystem service or disservice and positive or negative code indicator 
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assigned if the event represented the service as a benefit, for example a flood event 
is a positive example of the moderation of extreme flow rates, and a negative factor 
was assigned if the event represented a reduction in the capacity of the river to 
deliver a service, for example pollution reduces the capacity to provide clean drinking 
water for human use.  Cultural ecosystem services were categorised as Recreational 
(R) – includes events identified as leisure and/or social benefits, Cognitive (C) – 
includes events which offer financial and/or industrial benefits or Governance (G) – 
includes events which deliver governance and / or infrastructure benefits.   





Food – nutrition source for human (fish, waterfowl).  
Food – nutrition source for animal.  
Drinking Water – human use.  
Drinking Water – animal use.  
Clean Water – agricultural use, irrigation.  
Clean Water – provision of habitat supporting biodiversity.  
Non-Drinking Water Use – resource for washing, industrial processes.
  
Non-Drinking Water Use – resource for mechanical power (water).  
Non-Drinking Water Use – resource for mechanical power (steam).
  
Fibres & Timber – biomass power source, fuel supply.  
Fibres & Timber – food source for animal based power.  
Bio-medicinal – products used in healthcare, medicinal uses.  
Water Purification – waste water cleansing – dilution service.  
Water Purification – waste water cleansing – biotic waste assimilation. 
Water Purification – waste water cleansing – reed beds, wetland 
filtration. 
Water Flow – mediation of flow, stable liquid flow rate and patterns. 
Water Flow – moderation of extreme flow rate.  
Erosion Regulation – moderation of destructive flow rates.  
Pest Regulation – control of invasive species.  
Habitat & Gene Pool – lifecycle requirement (pollination, nursery, 
dispersal). 
Recreation – physical interactions, experiential opportunities, 
connectivity. 
Knowledge & Skill development – cognitive opportunities derived from 
riverine existence  
Bequest – governance to ensure resource passed to descendants  
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Earlier research has identified the application of a ‘dependency’ factor when 
analysing socio-cultural aspects of water-related use (Feyzi et al., 2011), therefore, 
each entry was re-read to ascertain whether the activity was totally dependent upon 
the ecosystem, utilised a key aspect, or was independent of the ecosystem and a 
Yes or No indicator for each aspect was made in the Excel file.  The result of this 
process was to identify and select only those events either dependent upon, or 
utilising a key aspect, of the freshwater ecosystem for inclusion in further analysis.  
Where differing narratives reported the same event, for example a flood, duplicates 
were removed.   
No assessment was made by the researcher as to the magnitude of an impact, for 
example the level of flood destruction, as the focus of the exercise is to report the 
occurrence of an ecosystem service without including a subjective reporting bias; 
disservice events, for example, flooding, are more commonly found in reporting 
material than service events, for example, provision of clean drinking water, which is 
taken for granted by urban populations.  Such a bias was not captured as it is the 
occurrence in which the researcher is interested, not the scale of any given 
occurrence.  Future research could address this opportunity to assess the scale and 
impact of specific ecosystem service records. 
Following ecosystem service identification, the file was sorted by year to order those 
events into temporal periods of pre-industrial revolution, early industrial revolution, 
high industrialisation and post-industrialisation: this temporal classification was 
reviewed with a senior archaeologist as part of the evaluation exercise prior to 
completion of the catchment-wide review.  Simple bar charts were produced in Excel 
which report the count of positive and negative impact events by ecosystem service 
category (provisioning, regulating or cultural), within each development period.  
Results are presented in the following chapter. 
The evaluation exercise results were reviewed by an expert ecologist with knowledge 
of the selected stretch and by an archaeological expert to validate the approach.  The 
expert ecologist offered insight on the use and value of urban rivers to assist 
ecosystem service classification; the archaeologist challenged the identification of 
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suggestions on ordering the ecosystem services within specific historic develop time-
frames (e.g. pre-, early, high, post-industrial) were incorporated into the final report. 
Post evaluation, documents were again retrieved from grey/library sources following 
the previous search method, now identifying those publications which contained 
information on the whole catchment geography.  The ecosystem service identification 
exercise was repeated, with data captured in excel files, comparison drawn to a priori 
ecosystem services and disservices, events consolidated into pre-, early, high and 
post- industrial temporal periods, data counts charted in excel (simple bar charts) and 
results reported in the following chapter. 
The results of both the evaluation exercise and catchment ecosystem temporal 
change are reported in the following chapter. 
5.6.3 Stakeholder Analysis 
Attribute Data 
Attribute data about each respondent was captured.  Respondents were asked to 
identify which functional group their organisation belonged: options included 
academic, agricultural, local authority, regulatory body, river conservation and wildlife 
conservation.  Data were summarised in a simple Excel table to identify stakeholder 
diversity: one mark was entered in the appropriate functional group row to enable a 
simple count of participant diversity.  Further self-assessment data were captured 
relating to respondents’ knowledge of ecosystem service terms and use: options 
ranged from ‘never heard of the term’ to ‘fully understand the nuances of the term 
and frequently use the term in written work’ and similarly summarised in an excel 
table.  
Stakeholder Mapping 
To identify those stakeholders who have greatest interest and power, Mendelow’s 
matrix (Kaplan, 2012) was completed based on the following criteria: levels of 
financial investment, delivery of statutory requirements, social influence, 
environmental leadership and level of involvement in riverine actions. Information 
was sourced from catchment actor records and information gathered by the 
researcher at catchment meetings where discussions occurred regarding current and 
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those offered by the EA and water companies, and new approaches to resolve the 
issues affecting water quality, for example run-off prevention projects. The criteria 
were weighted based on stakeholder contribution to the delivery of catchment 
partnership goals and the ability of the stakeholder to influence outcomes (Table 5.2).  
Interest and Power values were consolidated and stakeholders identified as a high, 
medium or low interest and power actor, before mapping to Mendelow’s Matrix. 
Results are presented in the following chapter. 
Table 5.2 Stakeholder mapping weighted criteria. 
Mapping Criteria Weighting 
(points) 
Interest (I1) Active involvement in riverine work 3 
Interest (I2) Active involvement in wider environmental work 2 
Interest (I3) Active involvement in non-environmental work 1 
Power (P1) Financial investment in water improvement direct work 2 
Power (P2) Funding body for water improvement work 2 
Power (P3) General funder of wider environmental work 1 
Power (P4) Leadership of environmental group 2 
Power (P5) Leadership of non-environmental group 0 
Power (P6) Social influencer- environmental actions 2 
Power (P7) Social influencer – non-environmental actions 0 
 
Ecosystem Service Prioritisation 
Partner responses were consolidated in excel to provide a simple summation of the 
most commonly reported ecosystem services which are considered important to the 
responders.  Each nomination was allocated one point to allow identification by 
simple summation of the most frequently reported ’important’ ecosystem services 
within each catchment-actor group.  Each catchment was separately consolidated to 
enable a comparison between the two partnerships. 
Data were cross-referenced to the sociograms to explore prominent and influential 
actor attributes. 
5.6.4 Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis (SNA) is noted to be a valuable, albeit challenging, research 
method to examine the patterns of relationships beyond that of a purely hierarchical-
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The structure of the network may be described from both the perspective of an 
individual’s placement within that network and also from a structural whole-network 
view (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  For this study, all relationships are presented as 
directed, that is in visualisations with a pictorial arrow indicator identifying where one 
actor (the source) reports a relationship with another actor (the receiver).  Where two 
actors report a mutual tie, that is, two directed relationships between themselves, 
both are included in the analysis (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).   
SNA measurement method: Data matrices were constructed to identify how 
catchment partners interact.  Questionnaire responses were transferred to binary 
data grids (matrices) created in excel.  Where an individual has a relationship with 
another, this is represented in the matrix by 1, where no relationship is reported a 0 is 
inserted in the matrix.  The matrix must be symmetrical, so where an individual is 
shown to be ‘nominated’ a corresponding entry showed the individual as a 
‘responder’ even if no survey response had been received.  In such cases, all 
‘responder’ relationships were represented by 0.  Responders were identified by 
code numbers: all names were removed to comply with anonymity requirements in 
published analysis. 
Completed matrices were imported to the SNA software package Ucinet for Windows 
with NetDraw facility, version 6.528 (Borgatti et al., 2002), which was used to analyse 
responses in whole network, one-mode format following the instruction manual 
published on-line by Hanneman and Riddle (2005).  The software was downloaded 
from Analytic Technologies at https://ucinetsoftware/pricing-and-licensing-
information, October 2014.  Input formats and statistical calculations were performed 
following the instructions contained in Ucinet6 on-line instruction manual (Hanneman 
& Riddle, 2005).  Cliques were identified and density, centralisation (Freemans node 
betweenness) and both Freeman’s in-degree centrality (indicator of prominence) and 
out-degree centrality (indicator of influence) calculated, using Ucinet functions 
(Version 6.528).  
Network Comparisons were performed between the Key Personnel network and the 
Collaborative partners networks for each of the examined partnerships, to answer the 
question: are collaborating partners also key partners? To test the probability of a tie 
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particular actors is replicated in the alternative network, Jaccard’s coefficient 
(measure of similarity) suitable for asymmetric, binary data was performed in 
UCINET 6 (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The measure ranges from 0 to 1 and the 
similarity coefficient gives the proportion of agreement between the collaborative 
matrix and the key people matrix for the Irwell catchment partnership. Quadratic 
assignment procedure (QAP) was used to determine whether each Jaccard similarity 
coefficient was significantly larger than expected by chance. Network comparisons 
were obtained by constructing matched, symmetrical data matrices which contained 
all responders for the selected networks.   
Sociograms obtained via NetDraw facility identified those partners most central to the 
network, reported by the size of the partner node (eigenvector centrality value). Both 
mutual connection ties (red line), i.e. those where both responders identified the 
other as a key collaborative partner, and also asymmetric ties (blue line), that is, 
those where one responder identified a link to another collaborative partner but there 
is no corresponding returning tie, are displayed using NetDraw functions (version 
6.528). Example figure at 5.2. 
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To enable social network analysis, the rule of thumb is to seek a response rate >75% 
(Borgatti et al., 2006). Where response rates fall below this level, social network 
analysis measures such as in-degree centralisation and simple eigenvector may be 
used as they are robust at lower sample sizes:  Costenbader and Valente (2003) 
found at a 40% sample rate, simple eigenvector and in-degree centrality measures 
achieved >90% correlation to the total sample measurement.  Simple eigenvector is 
thus the main analysis measure presented in the result sociograms and in-degree 
centrality used to investigate prominence.  The problem of non-respondents may also 
be treated by including all network member data and using pre-specified conditions 
for members with missing data.  The non-response effect is reduced by including 
incoming ties to the non-respondent which have been provided by survey 
respondents in the analysis and captured in Excel summaries, otherwise known as 
available-case analysis (Stork & Richards, 1992).   Thus, partners who have not 
responded are not unrepresented in the network analysis, the implicit knowledge 
generated from other personal interactions is drawn upon to represent their position 
(Ward & Butler, 2016). Bernela and Levy (2017) explored the impact of adjusting for 
non-respondents when their survey only achieved a 39% response rate and found no 
significant difference in the density measure when missing respondent data is taken 
as zero and compared to the theoretical complete measure.   Both incoming ties and 
zero non-respondent values are the conditions applied to missing data adopted in the 
analysis contained in the following chapter.   
5.6.5 Risk / Trust / Agreement to Act Analysis 
The relevant survey section consisted of eight questions which investigated factors 
which influence the ability of a group to come to an agreement to act.  All questions 
recorded a response across both groups of respondents, there were no partially 
completed questions returned and the extremes of the value ratings were used by at 
least one respondent. 
Excel was used to manually code the Likert-scale respondent answers into numerical 
values in order to enable further statistical analysis (Fink, 1995).  Values of 1 were 
allocated to the most agreement orientated responses, with 7 allocated to the least 
agreement orientated responses.  Data for both catchment partnerships were 
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adequacy, principal component analysis, factor analysis, factor reliability and non-
parametric tests for correlation and difference: details follow.  To identify the 
components.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy represents 
‘the ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial 
correlation between variables’ (Field, 2009 p647) and Kaiser (1974, In Field, 2009) 
recommends accepting values 0.5; values between 0.5 and 0.7 are in the 
acceptable range, with >0.7 classed as ‘good’.  Prior to completing full analysis, 
factor analysis was run to reduce the complexity in the data set and identify the 
principal components within the survey instrument.  Principal component analysis 
establishes whether clusters of similar types of responses exist within the data and 
how a particular variable (question) contributes to that component (Field, 2009).  The 
validity of the extracted dimensions (reliability analysis) was examined using 
Cronbach’s alpha estimate (SPSS V20).  Bartlett’s test examined the independence 
of variables and whether correlation between variables existed.  If Bartlett’s test is 
significantly different from zero, correlation exists (Field, 2009).  Complexity theory 
suggests correlation exists between the levels of agreement and certainty, 
consequently, theory drove the choice of direct oblimin oblique rotation in the factor 
analysis, in order to maximise the loading of each variable on one of the extracted 
factors (Field, 2009).  Maximum iteration for convergence was set at 50.  No data 
were missing.  As the data were ordinal, non-parametric frequency analysis and non-
parametric tests for correlation and difference between the two partnerships under 
investigation were undertaken (SPSS V20). 
5.6.6 Qualitative Analysis 
Responses to the open-ended evaluation question and semi-structured interviews 
were transferred to a word summary file and saved in tabular form with sources 
anonymised before further analysis.  
Litchman (2013) states the goal of analysing text and words, collected from research 
participants, is to arrive at common themes through a process of organising and 
categorising data.  There are two approaches to the analysis of qualitative data and 
identification of themes; the inductive approach and the deductive approach 
(Thomas, 2006).  Inductive analysis is often referred to as bottom-up and deductive 
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of raw data to derive concepts, themes or models through interpretations which the 
researcher makes from the raw data, that is, a study is exploratory, there may be little 
theory to inform the researcher and there is no pre-existing coding frame (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Thomas, 2006).  The 
alternative approach of deductive analysis allows researchers to use theory to 
construct response categories (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996).   
Table 5.3 Qualitative content analysis a priori codes and categories developed from 
the literature review. 










Economic funding uncertainty 
Incentives 
Resource restriction Cost effective 
External policies 
Return on investment 

























Financial support (for 
CP) 
Economic supportive costs 















A qualitative, deductive framework (Gale et al., 2013) was constructed from the 
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2.4) which have been reported to influence policy implementation in the natural 
resource area, providing insights to the data gained from the quantitative study 
(Jackson and Trochim, 2002): the code-theme relationships are identified in Table 
5.3.  The responses were read several times before coding commenced.   
After coding was completed, the data were examined to consider how different codes 
combine to form the overarching derived code and theme, where each theme is 
meaningful to the data codes and there are identifiable distinctions between the 
themes.  A strong measure of reliability and thus quality assurance of the coding 
scheme is to examine whether others can interpret the data by coding in the same 
manner (Schreier, 2012, p169). 
Intercoder reliability was established by independent coding by an individual not 
engaged with the project: 98% agreement was obtained.   Consequently, it is 
concluded that the conceptual framework achieves reliability for further analysis. 
The following chapter presents the survey participation result, reports the macro-level 
policy paradigm investigation, the temporal ecosystem service change within each 
catchment and the micro-level catchment team analyses which compare and contrast 
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CHAPTER 6 RESULTS 
This chapter commences with the results of the macro-level policy paradigm 
investigation, then reports the ecosystem (dis)services present within the catchment 
and partnership priorities, concluding with the comparison of the micro-level 
catchment team analyses. The results presented in this chapter provide the data to 
evaluate critically and answer the questions identified regarding ecosystem service 
focus, influential participants and individual approaches to action.   
The EU legal system consists of two forms of legislation: regulations which apply to 
the whole EU immediately they are adopted into EU law, and directives which have 
to be converted by Member State parliaments in to national law.  Directives permit 
member states to decide how they will achieve the aims, contained in the directive, to 
deliver a common standard throughout EU.  The Water Framework Directive (Figure 
6.1) falls into this latter category and the flow diagram is constructed following 
examination of the narrative directives.  
 
Figure 6.1: Water Framework Directive policy implementation mechanism: timeline, 




POLICY IMPLEMENTATION & 
FEEDBACK LOOP YEAR
2000
The Water Environment (Water 







UK Govt Responsible Department: 
Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
Designated Competent Authority: 
Environment Agency (EA) 
England & 
Wales
River Basin District (RBD) 
* 10
Regional
Catchment Catchment Based Approach 
Partnership (CaBA)
* 100 at launch
2011 (Pilot)
2013 (UK)
KEY: Black line = statutory policy cascade mechanism
Green line = policy reporting feedback route
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6.1 Macro-level Policy Paradigm:  Placing WFD in the Ambiguity-Conflict 
Framework 
The WFD implementation structure as adopted in England and Wales is critically 
evaluated against Matland’s model (1995), (Table 5.1), to determine whether WFD 
implementation is a fit to any of the four model paradigms (section 5.6.1):  where a 
documentary source, for example, WFD or UK catchment directives or UK catchment 
review documents, contained a phrase or statement which could be matched to the 
typological criteria, a tick was placed in the relevant box.  The typology criteria are 
reported in Tables 6.1 to 6.4, followed by explanatory comments. 
 
Table 6.1: Evaluation of UK WFD implementation mechanism to Administrative 
Implementation typology.  Typology criteria extracted from Matland (1995). Presence 
of a phrase or statement in WFD or England & Wales Catchment management 
directives / documents which could be matched to the typological criteria is registered 









a public administration only, top-down model  
 
the desired policy and information flows from the top-down in an 
ordered hierarchical manner  ✓ 
an over-riding central authority has information, resources and 
capabilities  
policy is spelled out explicitly at each level 
✓ 
clear responsibilities and tasks are allocated 
✓ 
actors are stable across time 
 
standard, uniform operating procedures are developed at the 
lower levels  
there is an existing technology to deal with the policy 
implementation  
sets of rules exist on deployment and procurement 
 
 
~ The Water Framework Directive is outlined at the EU level and contains clear goals 
and objectives. However, by enacting the Directive within each member state, the 
means of implementing are variable, depending upon existing national structures 
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not delivered in a standard or uniform manner and technologies for dealing with 
reporting requirements are lacking, as may be seen by the difficulties some member 
states have in complying with initial adoption (Jager et al., 2016).  Thus, it may be 
argued, WFD implementation is not comparable to the administrative implementation 
paradigm. 
Table 6.2: Evaluation of UK WFD implementation mechanism to Political 
Implementation typology.  Typology criteria extracted from Matland (1995). Presence 
of a phrase or statement in WFD or England & Wales Catchment management 
directives / documents which could be matched to the typological criteria is registered 









over-riding power of the policy maker is supported by judicial review 
and non-compliance is identifiable  ✓ 
actor(s) have sufficient power to force their will on other participants 
✓ 
bargaining is necessary to reach agreements through either 
coercion or remunerative mechanisms ✓ 
different actors to those who produced the overall policy participate 
in implementation ✓ 
polices are not decided at the lower level  
 
policy contains ambiguous language which is resolved as actions 
occur ✓ 
low ambiguity at all implementation levels 
 
requires the compliance of actors who control resources essential 
to the achievement of the policy aims ✓ 
protracted negotiations are common where implementing actors are 
not in a hierarchical (direct line) relationship to the policy maker ✓ 
 
~ WFD implementation has some aspects that are comparable to the political 
implementation model, that is, the overriding requirement is led by the EU which 
member states were directed to adopt by 2003.   Compliance of the member states 
was monitored and future compliance standards are expressly stated in the WFD.  
However, the local conditions within each member state vary and there is no 
standard delivery model for all states. Within each state, compliance is achieved by 
relevant legislation, which in the case of UK Government (England & Wales) 
complies with the specified EU directive implementation and management structure, 
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(DEFRA) to the river board level. However, the introduction of the non-statutory 
catchment partnership approach, which is context dependent, has introduced a 
highly flexible delivery mechanism in the local situation, a characteristic of bottom-up 
models.  Thus, WFD implementation in England & Wales is found to mirror the 
political implementation model to the river basin level, but not to the catchment, i.e. 
street level actor, level. 
 
Table 6.3: Evaluation of UK WFD implementation mechanism to Symbolic 
Implementation typology.  Typology criteria extracted from Matland (1995). Presence 
of a phrase or statement in WFD or England & Wales Catchment management 
directives / documents which could be matched to the typological criteria is registered 












there is competition between actors who have a vested interest in a 
key aspect and who wish to define the policy in their terms   
context conditions at each site influence the strength of competing 
views ✓ 
different coalitions of parties may result at each site 
✓ 
outcomes may vary across sites 
✓ 
protracted conflict resolution processes common 
✓ 
ambiguity in the policy aim or goal 
 
professional actors may act as lynch-pins to the differing points of 
view ✓ 
coalition occurs at the lower level, not at the initial policy definition 
stage ✓ 
policy definition occurs at the lower level and there is no compliance 
control  
a strong political negotiation aspect 
 
~ The WFD is clearly defined at the EU level with measures, goals and timelines also 
confirmed in member state implementation legislature, thus a re-imagining of the 
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Table 6.4: Evaluation of UK WFD implementation mechanism to Experimental 
Implementation typology.  Typology criteria extracted from Matland (1995). Presence 
of a phrase or statement in WFD or England & Wales Catchment management 
directives / documents which could be matched to the typological criteria is registered 












broad variations in outcomes 
✓ 
ambiguous goals due to differing preferences among the actors 
✓ 
no pre-defined technology 
✓ 
variable participation between the actors 
✓ 
actors participate where they are in agreement with the policy 
aims but possess different views as to how such aims are to be 
achieved 
✓ 
delivery programmes vary from site to site 
✓ 
opportunities exist for those actors who have strong interests, 
and available resources, to shape policy deliverables to their 
agenda 
✓ 
agendas may be left unchallenged 
✓ 
policy has a clear goal, evaluation against those goals is 
achievable ✓ 
where such goals are lacking, evaluation of the process and the 
way outcomes are achieved provide valuable information ✓ 
Policies with clear and widely supported goals but with no clear 
means of implementation ✓ 
the programme may become more structured over time, as 




~ The central principal is ‘contextual conditions dominate the process’ (Matland, 
1995) and outcomes depend largely on which actors are active and most involved at 
the lower levels.  WFD implementation in England and Wales at the catchment level 
has a strong alignment to the experimental implementation framework.  As a non-
statutory delivery model, the catchment partnerships have an overall aim to support 
WFD goals but are free to produce programmes which suit their local context 
(DEFRA, 2013).  However, the formal EU-level reporting mechanism is via river basin 
plans focussed on water quality, and consequently the gathering of information on 
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outside of the public legislative process.  Support for catchment partnerships and 
capacity development sits with a separate body – the catchment support team.  
Catchment plans (where they exist) do not have to comply with any set form or 
content [DEFRA] are not requiring the production of a formal catchment plan … set 
out their priorities in a way that is meaningful for them (DEFRA, 2013, p15) and 
opportunities for local actors to dominate and drive local actions are prevalent.  There 
is also an implicit assumption that the participants have similar approaches to risk 
and agreement to act: competing positions are likely to arise, so impacting 
implementation processes. 
6.2 Ecosystem Services 
6.2.1 Actor EsS Awareness & Valuation 
Catchment partners self-reported their knowledge of ecosystem services.  
Responses ranged from ‘never heard of the term’ to ‘fully understand the nuances of 
the term and frequently use the term in written work’.   Respondents provided an 
evaluation and all ranges of the scale were used (Figure 6.2).   
 
Figure 6.2:  Ecosystem services self-evaluation as reported by Ribble and Irwell 
catchment partners. 
Respondents from the Irwell partnership reported the greatest range of knowledge 
awareness, from ‘never heard of the term’ to ‘fully understand the nuances of the 
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meaning’ to ‘fully understand’.  The majority of the responders categorised 
themselves ‘know how to use the term in conversation and able to respond to 
questions’. 
Aspects of provisioning, regulating and cultural ecosystem services relating to 
freshwater, as defined by MA (2003, 2005a, 2005b), are noted to be important by 
catchment partners.  Both catchment partnership members report the retention of the 
river as an asset for future generations and the provision of clean water as a habitat 
for plants and animals, as the most important ecosystem services (Table 6.5). 
The Irwell partnership report a higher count of importance for recreational use of the 
River, together with an increased sense of place through appreciation of the history 
of the river and its buildings, than the Ribble catchment partners.   The Ribble 
catchment partners report a higher importance for the provision of drinking water for 
human ecosystem benefit than the Irwell partnership. 
Table 6.5 Catchment Partners Ecosystem Services Priority Goals as identified by catchment 












P Clean water provides habitats for animals and plants 13 11 
P 
Seasonal, natural variations in flow provide a range of 
habitats   
10 8 
P Provides drinking water source for humans 2 7 
P 
Provides a habitat supporting young stages of biotic 
life cycles  
11 6 
P Provides a transportation link for species  8 6 
P Provides drinking water source for animals 1 5 
P Provides a food source for animals  7 3 
R Moderates floods, retaining water on flood plain 11 6 
R Natural landscape erosion & deposition mechanism 5 5 
C An asset to be retained for future generations 13 10 
C Provides recreation opportunities 13 6 
C 
The history of the river and its buildings adds to an 
individual’s sense of place and pride in their area. 
12 6 
C A reflective and spiritual asset 7 4 
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6.2.2 Temporal Ecosystem Change within Catchments 
Prior to reporting the temporal change and ecosystem service focus of the selected 
catchments, the result of the specific case study undertaken to assess the application 
of the narrative temporal ecosystem service approach is first presented. 
i) Evaluating the approach to identifying Temporal Ecosystem Services Change 
The collection and analysis of multi-dimensional, historical narrative data relating to 
freshwater ecosystem services within an urbanised area was undertaken in 
conjunction with GM Archaeology Unit. The results of this investigation were 
presented at UK conference and subsequently peer-reviewed and published May 
2016 (James et al, 2016).  Copyright is retained by contributing authors in 
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(Francis et al., 2016, frontispiece) and so material presented for publication is also 
reported in this thesis.  
Evaluation Study: Location & Result 
The River Irwell and its tributaries flow from the moors north and east of Manchester, 
through major urban conurbations of Bolton, Bury, Rochdale, Oldham and Salford to 
the Manchester Ship Canal, merging into the Mersey River Basin (James et al., 
2012).  The study area focussed on a 3.8km section of the River Irwell, running 
southwest from Wallness Bridge (53:29:39N, 02:16:13W), through the City of Salford 
to Victoria Bridge (53:29:06N, 02:14:46W). The section of the river under study has 
been formally recorded since 1794, in Green’s map of Manchester and Salford.   
A flow chart of the phases of the document review (see 5.6.2) and identification of 
relevant records is shown at Figure 6.3.  Publications examined included published 
histories by Bracegirdle (1973) and Corbett (1907), websites containing records of 
government proceedings (e.g. Greenwood, 1950), websites retrieved by customised 
geographic search which returned several relevant on-line records (e.g., Bergin et al., 
1989; Cooper, 2005; Dobkin, 1990; Greater Manchester Archaeological Unit, 1993; 
Manchester City Council [MCC], 2012; Nevell, 2008; Williams et al., 2010) in addition 








Fig. 6.3 Study flow diagram depicting the three phases of the review, including the 
number of records screened and subsequently included in the final synthesis. 
151 distinct event records within the area under consideration were recorded in 
Microsoft Excel, identified by the year, description of each event and ecosystem 
service.  Applying the criteria for inclusion resulted in 88 records being considered 
either dependent upon, or utilising a key aspect, of the ecosystem. The records are 
presented in tables (6.6 to 6.9), organised as pre-industrial, early-industrial, main-
industrial and post-industrial as per guidance from senior archaeologist with 
knowledge of this area.  
Captured narrative outputs were reviewed by an Ecologist with knowledge of the 
area to confirm the ecosystem service allocation and cross-referenced by a Senior 
Archaeologist to landscape mapping to resolve areas of uncertainty and to confirm 
the pre-, early-, main- and post-industrial categorisation. Full details of the work 
undertaken by the Senior Archaeologist and the relationship with ecosystem services 
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Data presented here are restricted to those records where the activity can be linked 
to the area under examination from downstream of Wallness/Frederick Road Bridge 
to Victoria Bridge, Manchester and where there is a dependency or impact on the 
ecosystem.   
Table 6.6.  Events influencing ecosystem service benefits from 1914 to 2011, Post Industrial 
Revolution.   Industry linked to water use declines, facilitating an aesthetic appreciation of the 
River Irwell.  Governance to address water issues in place. 
   effect of recorded event upon ecosystem service (upward arrow) or disservice (downward 
arrow) 
Cultural ecosystem services are categorised as:- 
R - Recreational – includes events identified as leisure and/or social benefits 
C - Cognitive – includes events which offer financial and/or industrial benefits 
G - Governance – includes events which deliver governance and /or infrastructure benefits  
  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
2011 Formation of Catchment Partnerships (pilot)      G 
2005 United Utilities (Water company) sewer filtration 
improvements throughout catchment 
   G 
1997 Lower Irwell Valley Flood Defence Scheme (Lower Kersal)     G 
1986 Mersey Basin Campaign announced      G 
1985 Croal - Irwell Valley Local Plan contains 187 improvement 
proposals 
   C 
1984 Charity fund-raising swim (Clifton to Manchester)         R 
1980 Riparian planting Broughton to Pomona Dock via 'Green 
Finger Scheme' 
      R 
1974 Formation of Regional Water Authorities (North West 
Water Authority) 
     G 
1974 Regional Water Authority (supply & sewage disposal 
responsibilities) 
    G 
1972 Reports of ducks breeding on river ('dirty not poisonous')        R 
1972 Small fish reported alive at Peel Park, Salford     
1972 Brewing ceased      C 
1971 Cotton manufacturing ceased    C 
1971 Government funds available to 'Clean Rivers'     C 
1970 Completion of Anaconda Cut     G 
1954 Flood event - victims petition to speed up flood defence 
works 
   G  C 
1953 Closure of copper works (west of Broughton Bridge)     C 
1951 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act     G 
1952 Flood defence works undertaken in Lower Broughton     G 
1951 Straightening of river at Strangeways Bend commenced 
(Anaconda Cut) 
    G 
1950 River pollution report prepared by British Field Sports 
records total catchment pollution and no biotic life 
    
1948 River Boards Act      G 
1946 Severe flood at Salford (Strangeways Bend) worst for 80 
years  
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  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
1945 Agecroft Rowing Club Regatta (first since 1939)         R 
1945 Synthetic textile effluent discharge into Irwell.      
1939 Coal mining ceased      
1939 Agecroft Rowing Club Regatta (one-off event)         R 
1939 Lancashire Rivers Board formation      G 
1938 Lancashire County Council (Rivers Board and General 
Purposes) Act  
     G 
1937 Flood event    C 
1930's The Great Depression: Economic Crisis    G    C 
1925 Decline of cotton manufacturing (imports from India, 
China, Japan) 
   C 
1923 Severe flood (worst in 20 years)     C 
 
 
Table 6.7. Events influencing ecosystem service benefits from 1852 to 1903, Main-Industrial, 
that is, the Height of the Industrial Revolution.  Regulating services are impacted by flood 
plain development and discharge of pollution from industry on the riverside.  Natural flood 
events are a common dis-service to the local population.  
  effect of recorded event upon ecosystem service (upward arrow) or disservice (downward 
arrow) 
Cultural ecosystem services are categorised as:- 
R - Recreational – includes events identified as leisure and/or social benefits 
C - Cognitive – includes events which offer financial and/or industrial benefits 
G - Governance – includes events which deliver governance and /or infrastructure benefits  
  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
1903 Re-build of Broughton Bridge        R 
1900 Water plants / moss recurring    
1899 Flood event    C 
1892 Mersey & Irwell Joint Committee Act to address pollution/ 
sewage issues 
   G 
1882 Prosecution of Chemical Manufacturer for pollution       R 
1881 Severe flood event    C 
1880 Industrial Diversification: rubber goods/cables    
1880 Opening of Wallness Bridge & Hough Lane Suspension 
Bridge 
       R 
1870s Abandonment of boating regattas     R 
1876 Rivers Pollution Prevention Act     G 
1872 Flood event    C 
1870 Wakes Week common practise- 1 week closure of mills for 
maintenance, unpaid holiday for workers 
   
1869 Rebuild of Broughton Bridge        R 
1869 Flood event     C 
1867 River Inspector appointed      G 
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  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
1866 ‘Great’ flood      C 
1862 River Conservancy Committee initiated through Act of 
Parliament 
    G 
1860-70 Terraced housing constructed on flood plain       
1860 Paper mills start-up   G   C 
1860  'Foulness of waters; receiving refuse for cotton factories, 
coal mines, print works, bleach works, dye works, chemical 
works, paper works' 
   
1858 Opening of Brass / Copper works (west of Broughton 
Bridge) 
   C 
1852 Flood event @ Peel Park    
 
 
Table 6.8. Events influencing ecosystem service benefits from 1791 to 1850, Early Industrial 
Revolution.  The river is integral to the siting of large, steam powered mills, while flood plains 
are encroached by factory and housing developments.  
  effect of recorded event upon ecosystem service (upward arrow) or disservice (downward 
arrow) 
Cultural ecosystem services are categorised as:- 
R - Recreational – includes events identified as leisure and/or social benefits 
C - Cognitive – includes events which offer financial and/or industrial benefits 
G - Governance – includes events which deliver governance and /or infrastructure benefits  
  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
1850 No fish stocks sighted in Irwell    R 
1848 West of Broughton Bridge: site of active  tannery, 
engineering works, old silk works and dye-works 
   C 
1846 Opening of Peel Park (Public Recreation site)      R 
1845 Chemical works operational    C 
1843 Flood event    C 
1840 Flood event    C 
1839 Victoria Bridge opened (connecting Salford to 
Manchester) 
      R 
1838 Manchester granted Borough Status – largest factory 
town in country, 1 of 6 largest towns in Britain 
   G 
1837 Severe flood recorded     C 
1833 Flood event    C 
1831 Terraced housing constructed on flood plain at Broughton 
Bridge 
   
1831 Dye works (West of Broughton Bridge) operational    C 
1829 Flood event    C 
1819 Fish shoals common - local food resource        R 
1817 Formation of Salford Friendly Angling Society: Friendly 
Societies Act 1817 
       R 
1816 Flood Event    C 
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  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
steam powered cotton spinning mills in Manchester 
1806 John Barge Print Works operational    C 
1806 Broughton Bridge Opening       R 
1804 Flood event    C 
1799 Flood event    C 
1791 Richard Arkwright Mill -  steam powered cotton spinning 
mill at Shude Hill. 
  G   C 
 
Table 6.9.  Events influencing ecosystem service benefits from 1720 to 1787, Pre Industrial 
Revolution.   The river is integral to the siting of water powered mills, limiting the scale of 
industrial development.  
  effect of recorded event upon ecosystem service (upward arrow) or disservice (downward 
arrow) 
Cultural ecosystem services are categorised as:- 
R - Recreational – includes events identified as leisure and/or social benefits 
C - Cognitive – includes events which offer financial and/or industrial benefits 
G - Governance – includes events which deliver governance and /or infrastructure benefits  
  ECOSYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORY 
YEAR EVENT REGULATION PROVISION CULTURAL 
    1787 Severe flood recorded - destroyed part of Salford Bridge    C 
1786 Ford across Irwell @ site of modern Broughton Bridge       R 
1786 Water powered cotton mill operational - change of use 
from bleachers. 
   C 
1781 Richard Arkwright Mill constructed -  water frame cotton 
spinning mill at Shude Hill 
   C 
1780 Water powered spinning mill construction  and associated  
Dyers present. 
   C 
1761 Opening of Blackfriars Bridge (access to Theatre)       R 
1755 Water-powered corn mill at Castle Irwell & Lower 
Broughton in operation 
   C 
1720 Cotton weaving established     C 
 
Temporal Ecosystem Service Analysis 
Provisioning services - Provisioning services were the least reported of the 
categories.  Expected ecosystem services and goods comprising agricultural water 
use, fibre extracts for use as biomass fuel and products used in human health 
treatment were not identified in the historical narratives.  Seven records of 
biodiversity and food benefit were found, along with five reports identifying the use of 
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reports were linked to the industrial use of the river, with reports on the absence of 
biodiversity and food goods. 
Between 1750 and 1820, narratives record the river as a source of food, with fish 
shoals common.  The river is also noted to be a key source of power, with water-
powered corn mills (1755) and textile mills (1780s), being remodelled to operate by 
steam powered engines which require water to operate (1810). 
Records of 1830 to 1860 contain reports of continuing industrialisation of the area, so 
by 1860 waters are contaminated with refuse from dye, chemical and paper works in 
addition to discharges from cotton factories.  The ecosystem impacts are classified 
as disservices due to a reduction in capacity re provision of clean water and food 
supply (1850).  There is little improvement in the level of biotic life until 1970s when 
small fish are reported alive in one stretch of the area and ducks are noted to be 
breeding.  The cessation of industrial processes increased the provision of clean 
water and supported riparian planting schemes in 1980s. 
Regulating services - A greater number of published events record aspects of 
regulating ecosystem services.  Regulating services linked to hydrological flow and 
the use of the river to mitigate hazards were well recorded in the published histories, 
with an equal number of service and disservice events.  The river flood plain is a 
natural feature which mitigates flood water and regulates the flow of water 
downstream and 18 reports of floods were found, covering the period from 1787 to 
1954.   
From 1750 to 1850 the hydrological flow of the river is altered by infrastructure 
developments such as the construction of weirs, water extraction to support industrial 
processes and the replacement of fords by bridges (1780, 1800, and 1840).  The 
ability of the river to act as a regulator of pollution and disease is compromised by 
effluent discharges, contributing to the severity of cholera epidemics in 1832 and 
1846. 
From 1860 to 1940 flood reports indicate that the river is acting as a natural 
regulating system and actions to address pollution discharge, in conjunction with the 
decline in heavy industry, enable an improvement in water purification capacity.  In 




          Page 124 of 267 
 
 
changed during the period of WWII (1939-45), synthetic textile effluents were 
discharged (1960s) and a major flood defence scheme was completed removing the 
capacity for the river to access the flood plain (1970s).  Most recently, a programme 
of sewage discharge improvements has facilitated increased purification capacity 
(2010s). 
Cultural service - The majority of the published records are aligned to the cultural 
ecosystem service framework.  Sufficient detail was present in the reports to assign 
events to the areas of recreational leisure activities, cognitive skill acquisition 
opportunities linked to industrial and financial growth driven by ecosystem use and 
bequest values identified through governance and infrastructure management.  The 
majority of leisure and social reports and bequest infrastructure reports are benefit 
focussed.  In contrast, cognitive skill (including economic) reports which are most 
frequent in the historical documents are twice as likely to be a disservice report rather 
than a benefit. 
Social leisure values can be attributed to the physical construction of connecting 
infrastructure.  In the study area, connectivity infrastructure transformed from fords 
and a medieval stone bridge to a series of road, rail, and foot bridges connecting 
residential and industrial sites to public parks and recreational sites beside the river.  
One of England’s first public parks, Peel Park was founded in 1846 along a major 
meander in the river.  Angling and rowing societies were also formed in early 1800s 
but by 1870 activities ceased due to the pollution level in the river water.  Recreation 
activities recur in the narratives from 1930s onward as the river water is less toxic, 
riparian planting schemes enhance angling and bird watching opportunities, and 
pollution controls facilitate a charity swim event (1980s). 
Bequest values are expressed in narratives through the reporting of legal acts and 
governance structures which aim to restore the resilience of the river, along with 
infrastructure developments which protect the local population from destructive flow 
rates.  A major flood defence investment was completed by 1970 ensuring the 
security of the surrounding commercial and residential developments into the 21st 
century.  The appointment of River Inspectors in 1867 were forerunners to formal 
Acts impacting river pollution; prosecutions for illegal discharges followed along with 
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formation of river boards (1948) and regional water boards with responsibilities to 
deal with water supply and sewage disposal (1974).  Following privatisation of water 
companies (1989), a non-ministerial government department (OFWAT) was 
established to act as an economic regulator and ensure water companies carry out 
statutory functions (Ofwat, 2006, 2017).   Bequest initiatives continue into the 21st 
century with the creation of Catchment Partnerships.   
From 1720 to 1860, as industrialisation and social mobility increased the population, 
cultural, cognitive skill acquisition opportunities linked to industrial and financial 
growth driven by ecosystem use are reported.  Disservices are frequently reported, 
as destructive flood events throughout the 1800s and early 1900s destroy industrial 
sites and subsequently drive redevelopment and land-use evolution.  The decline of 
the cotton industry from the 1920s onward, not only reduced provisioning ecosystem 
disservices but also had an impact on the opportunity for linked skills acquisition.  
Further industrial decline in the latter half of the 20th century shifted the social focus 
to regeneration activities, offering greater opportunities for skill development linked to 
the ecology of the river. 
The application of this novel approach in a test area has enabled identification of the 
temporal ecosystem services contained within narratives.  This new approach is now 
applied to a ‘whole’ catchment scale with the outcomes enabling a comparison to the 
key aims and objectives of each of the studies catchment partnerships; such 
outcomes are considered in the following Discussion chapter. 
ii) Irwell Catchment: 
Overview: The Irwell catchment consists of the River Irwell and its main tributaries 
the Roach and Croal which join the main river in its mid-reaches, plus the Medlock 
and Irk which join at Manchester, just before the Irwell feeds into the Manchester 
Ship Canal.  The rapid industrialisation in the 19th century has left many of the 
watercourses in a heavily modified condition, consisting of walled banks and culverts, 
bank-side mill buildings together with mill lodges throughout the mid and lower 
catchment, plus reservoirs in the upper catchment. The catchment drains a highly 
urbanised area of over two million people, with major settlements at Ramsbottom, 
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significant flood risk for local residents.  The catchment contains numerous nature 
conservation sites include 14 Sites of Special Scientific Interest, Special Areas of 
Conservation including canals, plus the South Pennine Moors Special Protection 
Area. 
The summary count of specific notable events extracted from published histories are 
classified by ecosystem service and by  pre-, early-, high(main-) and post-industrial 
time frames (Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4 Irwell catchment temporal ecosystem service change. Summation of 
simple count of ecosystem service occurrences within narrative documents relating to 
the identification of services categorised into provisioning (service and disservice), 
regulating (service and disservice) and cultural (service and disservice).  
Identification of cultural services as a bequest service, cognitive service or 
recreational service is as identified in previous section.  See also James et al., 2016. 
The River Irwell was impacted in the pre-industrial age through straightening and 
enlargement of the river channel at Manchester to facilitate the transfer of goods to 
Liverpool (regulating disservice), construction of warehouses on the river bank 
(regulating disservice) and construction of major weirs and canalisation which raised 
the water level upstream of the mills (regulating disservice).  The mills used water 
power to lift goods (provisioning service) but were the source of effluent discharges 
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employment and gaining of skills by the local population (cultural service).  
Recreational activities (cultural service) are linked to the use of footbridges 
constructed to access theatres outside of the city limits (Bracegirdle, 1973; Corbett, 
1907).  
The early industrial revolution period covered further weir construction along the river 
(regulating disservice) and narrowing of the river channel due to building 
encroachment to the low water line (regulating disservice).  A major period of canal 
building throughout the catchment changed the water flow in the river as reservoirs 
were built to feed the canals (provisioning service, regulating disservice, cultural 
service).  Heavy industry along the riverside discharged waste into the river reducing 
the water quality (provisioning disservice, regulating disservice), although 
employment opportunities increased (cultural service).  Accessibility across the river 
increased as major bridges were constructed to access new sites for residential 
development in the flood plain (cultural service, regulating disservice).  In the 1820s 
and 30s recreational boating activities were commonly recorded (cultural service), 
with formal regattas occurring on the River Irwell, and major public parklands were 
formally designated (cultural service). Boat hire and boat building were common in 
the mid-1800s (cultural service), but the locations of boating sites moved further 
upstream as pollution impacted the lower catchment (regulating disservice), although 
all boating activity ceased by 1910 due to river pollution (cultural disservice).   
Industrial processes continued to impact the water quality (provisioning service, 
regulating disservice, cultural service) and water flow was impacted by further bridge 
construction (regulating disservice).  The first legal statute to address water issues 
was enacted in 1862 (cultural service) and further legal acts appointing River 
inspectors lead to the prosecution of both public and private companies in the 1880s 
(cultural services) (Bracegirdle, 1973; Corbett, 1907).  
The Great Flood of 16th November 1866 impacted the North West of England, 
following a westerly storm and high rainfall throughout the catchment which raised 
water levels and destroyed buildings alongside the river and also those located upon 
the natural flood plain (regulating service, cultural disservice).  A major period of 
reconstruction after this flood event further restricted the river channel, and sand 
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strengthening and widening occurred in the late 1890s to 1900s as road traffic 
associated with the newly opening Manchester Ship Canal diverted traffic away from 
the river (regulating disservice) and further areas of the flood plain were opened for 
development (regulating disservice).  The first sewage farms were built in the mid 
catchment to process the waste from urban populations, with water discharged to the 
river increasing the flow (provisioning disservice, regulating service) (Bracegirdle, 
1973; Corbett, 1907).  
Post the industrial revolution a significant number of legal acts and authority bodies 
were in place to address the water quality (cultural services).  Together with the 
cessation of the heavy industries, power stations and further sewage farm 
investment, water quality improved (cultural disservice, provisioning service) and fish 
and wildlife are observed in the early 1970s (cultural service).  The notable temporal 
change across the catchment is from provisioning to cultural: the river is now a focus 
of regeneration and recreation (cultural service), although house building continues 
to occur on the flood plains (regulating disservice) and flood events are a major 
concern to local residents (cultural disservice) due to current and past encroachment 
on the riverbanks and flood plains (Bracegirdle, 1973).  
iii) Ribble Catchment: 
Overview: The Ribble catchment area consists of the River Ribble, along with its 
major tributaries the Hodder, Calder and Darwen, together with streams which drain 
the Fylde Peninsula.  The catchment area contains a number of nationally and 
internationally protected sites, for example, Bowland Fell Special Protection Area 
(SPA) and Long Preston Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) in the upper 
catchment and the Ribble Estuary SPA where the Ribble enters the Irish Sea.  Within 
the catchment are found locations where caving and pot-holing occur, long-distance 
walking routes (Pennine Way), plus salmon and trout fishing along the river length.  
Water is abstracted for drinking, agricultural and domestic irrigation which impacts 
the water quantity and flow throughout the catchment to the current day, although the 
creation of protected reservoir catchment areas has resulted in amenity / recreational 
areas such as Gisburn Forest and Stocks Reservoir Fishery.  The main river bisects 
the catchment; to the north are agricultural lands and to the south, where coal 
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Dispersed villages with larger towns such as Settle, Clitheroe and Ribchester are 
located in the middle to upper catchment.   Mature river meanders occur through flat, 
alluvial farmland which forms the majority of the lower catchment floodplain. 
Historically, the Ribble and tributaries have been impacted by sewage pollution from 
settlements along the Ribble and Hodder, plus run-off from leached waste from 
sheep on the high moors and fertilized pasture in the river flood plain. The catchment 
contains an extensive area of high quality agricultural land in the west where there is 
a history of agricultural drainage.   
The elevated area of the West Pennine Moors is close by the urban settlements of 
East Lancashire which include Burnley and Blackburn, where rivers were blocked by 
mill dams and weirs.  The nineteenth century use of water power in mills and 
factories and the associated water use in dyeworks, tanneries and other water 
dependant process resulted in high levels of industrial effluent and raw sewage being 
dispelled into the river.  Culvertisation in town centres was common and heavy 
industrialisation occurred along river banks in Burnley, Blackburn and Accrington. For 
example, in Accrington by the end of the 19th century there were 9 cotton mills, 3 
timber yards, a brass foundry, a corn mill, gasworks, dyeworks, tallow works, a 
sawmill and six other industrial premises plus a 300-yard culvert under the Market 
Hall (Greenhalgh, 2009).   
The summary count of specific notable events extracted from published histories are 
classified by ecosystem service and by  pre-, early-, high (main-) and post-industrial 
time frames (Figure 6.5).  During the pre-industrial period, the water flow of the lower 
Ribble was impacted by the construction of bridges (regulating disservice), the 
canalisation of river meanders within the catchment system (regulating disservice), 
and river dredging (regulating disservice) to facilitate the transfer of coal to Liverpool.  
The reduction in the capacity of the river to mediate flow rates resulted in floods in 
the main floodplain (regulating service) of sufficient severity to destroy bridges and 









Figure 6.5 Ribble catchment temporal ecosystem service change. Summation of 
simple count of ecosystem service occurrences within narrative documents relating to 
the identification of services categorised into provisioning (service and disservice), 
regulating (service and disservice) and cultural (service and disservice).  
Identification of cultural services as a bequest service, cognitive service or 
recreational service is as identified in previous section.   
The founding of the cotton industry in Preston marks the early-industrialisation phase 
along the Ribble with a consequent increased demand for water extraction 
(provisioning service) across the catchment, which thus reduced the capacity of the 
river to function with stable flow rates and patterns (regulating disservice).  The 
demand for water led to the construction of reservoirs to service the local 
population’s needs (provisioning service, cultural service).  The first record of 
recreational activities in the catchment occurs as exploration of caves in the upper 
headwaters (cultural service).  Flooding (regulating service) continues to be recorded 
in the main floodplain resulting in bridge collapse (cultural disservice) as the river 
system acts to moderate extreme flow rates (Greenhalgh, 2009). 
At the height of the industrial revolution, further demands for water for bleach works 
and population demands are found (provisioning service).  The extraction of water 
from the system continue (provisioning service, regulating disservice) as reservoirs 
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major conurbations situated outside of the catchment area.  The reservoirs provide a 
place for relaxation and appreciative values linked to the river basin increase (cultural 
service).  A major flood event (1866) is noted to impact not only across the 
catchment but also throughout NW England.  The river acted to moderate the flow 
(regulating service) but widespread flooding of property and business was recorded 
(cultural disservice).  The designation of long distance paths (Pennine Way) offered 
additional recreation opportunities within the catchment (cultural services).  The new 
dock at Preston increased skill opportunities for the local population (cultural service), 
however the associated dredging disrupted the flow pattern of the Ribble estuary 
(regulating disservice).  The ability of the river to dilute and cleanse waste water was 
compromised by the level of industrial discharge in the southern catchment and 
pollution incidents (regulating disservice) were noted (Greenhalgh, 2009). 
The final phase of reservoir construction occurred in the post-industrialisation phase, 
with water flow disrupted (regulating disservice) to provide drinking water 
(provisioning service) for large recreational towns on the Fylde Coast. Reservoirs 
provide a recreational site for the local population (cultural service).  The river 
continued to act to moderate excessive flows (regulating service) however inundation 
of property located in the flood plain, and the overflow of canalised channels in town 
centres, resulted in further property damage (cultural disservice).  Floods occurred in 
both summer (flash storms) and winter (Atlantic gales); a recent major flood event 
occurred on Boxing Day 2015 throughout NW England.  However, a series of wet 
summers was noted to aid habitat requirements (regulating service) as pollution run-
off was diluted (regulating service) preventing a build-up of blanket weed 
(Filamentous algae).  The introduction of controls on salmon fishing (Salmo salar) 
resulted in an increase in fish population and the development of further recreational 
activities (cultural service), although it was noted there was a 20-year time lag 
between control regulation and catch-level improvements.  A similar time-lag is found 
between the local extinction of otters (Lutra lutra) and their repopulation. Further 
recreational opportunities occur as links between canals, the River Ribble and the 
estuary are developed in the 21st century (cultural service) (Greenhalgh, 2009). 
The notable temporal ecosystem service change in the urbanised areas of the Ribble 
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employment, through industrial decline, to an increase in recreation opportunities 
(post-industrial).  However, the major services continue to be provision of clean water 
as a result of large-scale reservoir construction throughout the catchment (early-, 
high- and post-industrial) and regulation of extreme water flows in the agricultural 
flood-plain, even though there is a recorded societal impact.    
6.2.3 What is the Agents Focus? 
Statutory goals are identified in both the Water Framework Directive and NW River 
Basin Management Plan (RBMP), with Catchment Partnership (CP) non-statutory 
aims contained in RBM plans, specific catchment plans and web-pages. While the 
WFD does not explicitly state an ecosystem service approach should be adopted, 
both the RBMP and CPs are directed to consider ecosystem services.  
NW River Basin Aims 
The priority river basin management issues, which encompass the catchment sub-
scale, are identified in the RBM plan (EA, 2016) as diffuse urban and rural pollution, 
physical modification and sewage contamination.  However, the contribution the 
catchment partnership has made to resolve these issues is not explicit, the 
achievement and future aims being presented in the RBM plan as distinct projects.  
The declared catchment objectives, reported achievements and current projects are 
compared to the RBM issues to highlight difference in catchment focus (Table 6.10).   
The Ribble partnership have a strong riverine and riparian enhancement focus, while 
the Irwell partners have greater focus on green infrastructure particularly in the urban 
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Table 6.10: Placement of catchment management actions in the NW River Basin 
Plan issues framework.  source: NW RBM Plan, EA, 2016 
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Although the RBM advocates the use of an ecosystem services approach viz: the 
purpose of a river basin management plan is to provide a framework for protecting 
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goals specified are not presented in such a framework and neither catchment have 
publicised an ecosystem service approach within the river basin plan.  
Local Catchment Aims:   
Issues worked on include, but are not restricted to, the water environment and river 
basin management.  Key Aims are presented in Table 6.11  
Table 6.11 Catchment Partnership Key Aims. 
 
Irwell Key Aims: [reviewed 2015] 
bold= major aim 
Ribble Key Aims: 
 
Delivering cleaner water Improved water quality: reducing diffuse 
pollution sources including faecal matter to 
improve coastal bathing waters. 
Working toward better functioning and 
resilient water bodies 
Improved biodiversity: increasing riverine & 
other habitats, connectivity and re-naturalisation. 
Better managed, more joined up habitats Reduced flood risk: using natural processes aid 
in reducing flood risk. 
Access and Recreation value enhancement Recreation: improving access and information 
for people to engage with rivers and streams. 
Catchment Knowledge enhancement Education: increasing awareness, engagement 
and understanding of riverine heritage. 
Culture and Heritage enhancement 
 
Social: providing training, volunteering and other 
opportunities for all to become involved in 
improving and celebrating their river heritage. 
Education, Skills and Training enhancement 
 
Economic: increasing use of the catchment for 
tourism & recreation, as well as working with 
local businesses. 
Public Engagement enhancement Climate change: increasing carbon 
sequestration and shading of streams. 
Flood Mitigation enhancement 
 
Partnerships: demonstrating how aligning 
partners’ activities can lead to a range of 
multiple benefits. 
Wildlife Habitat enhancement  
 
In published Catchment Plans (James et al, 2012; RRT, 2016) aspects of water 
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are prominent areas of focus.  The documents identify additional goals based on  
social development values, but are not presented in an ecosystem service benefits 
framework.   
6.3 Micro-level Implementing Agents – Catchment Partnerships 
6.3.1 Who are the Agents Involved? 
North West Level: 
The membership of the North West (NW) England River Basin liaison panel as at 
November 2013 is shown in Table 6.12.  A range of public, private and voluntary 
NGOs are present.  Government departments are represented via the Environment 
Agency and Natural England; major private business representation includes 
chemical companies and water utilities.  Local authority representation for both water 
providers in the north of the River Basin and urban water users in the south of the 
River Basin are present.  Catchment hosts are included along with riverine interests. 
Table 6.12: Membership of the NW River basin liaison panel at November 2013. Source: EA, 
2013 
Environment Agency United Utilities 
Natural England  Consumer Council for Water 
National Trust Mersey Ports 
Lake District National Park Authority Inshore Fisheries and Conservation 
Authority 
The Rivers Trust Ribble Fisheries Consultative 
Association 
Canal and River Trust Chemicals North West 
National Farmers Union INEOS (Chemical Co) 
Association of Greater Manchester 
Authorities 
Catchment Hosts 











According to the NW RBMP (EA, 2016), Catchment Partnerships are groups of 
organisations with an interest in improving the environment in their local area.  They 
inform the river basin management planning process and help implement measures 
by providing local evidence; targeting and coordinating action; identifying and 
accessing funding for improvements in the catchment; and incorporating river basin 
management into the wider environmental management of the catchment. 
Irwell Catchment Partnership aka The Rivers Return: 
The River Irwell Partnership, known as The Rivers Return to January 2017, acts as a 
facilitative body and is an unincorporated organisation which has a published 
constitution and terms of reference signed onto by each partner. All partner 
representatives have equal status within the partnership.  There are four formal 
positions in the Steering group, a Chair, vice-Chair, an EA representative - the 
catchment co-ordinator - and a Secretarial role fulfilled by the Catchment host 
organisation.  The partnership has been hosted by Groundwork Manchester, Salford, 
Stockport, Tameside and Trafford (MSSTT) from 2013 to date (early 2017).   
Table 6.13.  Irwell Catchment Partnership as at January 2016.  There are no direct 
representatives from Local Nature Partnerships, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty or 
farming representatives. 
Membership No of Organisations No of Partners 
Mandated authority (EA) 1 7 
Other Government Department 1 1 
Water Company 1 4 
Wildlife & Conservation Organisations 10 16 
Academic Institutions 3 5 
Local Authorities 10 14 
Angling & Recreational Organisations 2 3 
Forestry Organisations 1 1 
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The partnership developed two management groups (as at January 2016):  the first, 
the Steering body, meeting quarterly and the second, a Delivery body, which met as 
a minimum quarterly.  However, both groups were consolidated into one meeting 
body in November 2016.  At the time of the study, there were 55 partners or 
associates who represent 32 organisations, summarised in Table 6.13.  The Irwell 
has representation from a large number of local authorities reflecting the number of 
boroughs through which the river flows in addition to the large number of wildlife and 
conservation organisations represented. The mandated authority has a key 
presence, with a large number of individuals involved in the catchment including 
those involved in payment for ecosystem services valuation projects in addition to the 
catchment co-ordinator. There are no direct representatives from Local Nature 
Partnerships, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty or farming representatives such 
as are found in the Ribble Partnership. 
Where specific projects are identified, one of the partner members’ volunteers to lead 
on behalf of the partnership; the partnership itself does not lead on the development 
of specific projects as it is not a legally recognised body.  The Catchment host 
provides the secretarial function for the partnership but to date the host organisation 
has not led on the development of projects outside of its normal business. 
River Ribble Catchment Partnership aka Ribble Life: 
The group has been hosted by Ribble Rivers Trust (RRT) from CaBA launch to date 
(Jan 2017), working under the ‘Ribble Life’ banner.  The Ribble Rivers Trust provides 
the Secretarial role to the catchment partnership and also provides an impetus and 
focus for large project development where delivery is in partnership with other 
organisations operating within the catchment.  The RRT advocates the use of 
ecosystem services principals (Spees, 2015). 
As at January 2016, there were 37 partners and affiliates on the partnership board, 
representing 20 organisations, summarised in Table 6.14. Wildlife and conservation 
representatives form the greatest element of the partnerships and there is also a 
larger representation from the private water company.  Local community 
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Table 6.14: Ribble Catchment Partnership as at January 2016.  Local community 
organisations are not specified partners. 
Membership No of Organisations No of Partners 
Mandated authority (EA) 1 2 
Other Government Department 1 2 
Water Company 1 6 
Wildlife & Conservation Organisations 5 12 
Academic Institutions 1 1 
Local Authorities 3 5 
Angling & Recreational Organisations 1 2 
Forestry organisations 2 2 
AONB & National Parks Authorities 3 3 
Farming Organisations 2 2 
 
Both partnerships are similar in make up to the national picture (Table 2.6) with a 
representative of the regulatory body present, wildlife and river conservation 
representation.  The partnerships include water company and local authority agents, 
as per >75% of all partnerships, and include some agents from the less common 
academic stakeholder group.   
 
6.3.2 Stakeholder Mapping 
Interest & Power Criteria 
Stakeholder groups were mapped as per the criteria stated in section 5.6.3, that is, 
their weighted contribution to the delivery of catchment partnership goals and their 
ability to influence outcomes.  Stakeholders were identified as either interest (I) 
and/or power (P) as per their contribution to catchment goals and delivery of projects, 
and weighted 0 to 3 based on their level of catchment activity (I1 to I3, P1 to P7).  
The overall rating of high, medium or low is a simple summation of the individual 
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Table 6.15: Stakeholder mapping.  X indicates where the stakeholder has either 
interest (I) or power (P) as per their contribution to catchment goals and delivery of 
projects, weighted 0 to 3 based on their level of catchment activity (I1 to I3, P1 to 











I  /  P 
I1 I2 I3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
Mandated Authority 
(Environment Agency)  
X X  X X  X  X  H H 
Other Govt Department 
(Natural England) 
 X    X X  X  M M 
Water Company (United 
Utilities) 
X X  X X X  X X  H H 
Wildlife/Conservation 
organisations 
X X  X X  X  X  H H 
Academia   X     X  X L L 
Local Authorities  X X X  X  X  X M L 
Angling/Recreational 
organisations 
X      X  X  M M 
Forestry organisations  X    X X  X  L M 
Local Community & 
Business Groups 
 X X     X  X M L 
AONB & National Park 
Authorities 
X X  X    X X X H M 
Farming organisations X X    X  X  X H L 
 
The high, medium and low ratings are mapped into a matrix (Figure 6.5).  The 
organisations who have the greatest interest and power in the catchment are the 
Environment Agency, the mandated authority, the private water company, who 
adhere to specific discharge and abstraction limits, and those wildlife and 
conservation organisations active in the social sphere.  Although academic 
organisations are involved in the catchment, they are considered to have low power 
and interest as they are not wholly focussed on the catchment.  The completed 








Figure 6.6: Completed Mendelow’s Interest & Power Matrix: Catchment Partnership 
stakeholder map. 
6.3.3 Diversity of Respondents 
Demographic questions required respondents to identify their type of organisation 
from a provided list in order to ascertain the heterogeneity of the group.   The range 
of stakeholders within the partnerships cover social engagement organizations, 
wildlife and conservation charities, regulatory and authority bodies, academics and 
recreational service representatives (Table 6.16), however, the majority of the 
respondents have either a regulatory role or are river conservation focussed.  Those 
individuals who represent the catchment partnership management structure, i.e. the 
chair, vice-chairs, catchment co-ordinator and catchment host, are present in both 
response groups.   
Overall, catchment partnership activities are uniting a diverse group of actors and 
various stakeholders’ groups and interests are captured in the survey data. 
There is a slightly greater senior management representation in the Irwell responses 
than in the Ribble group responses (36% and 25% respectively), but there are no 
director level representatives for regulatory and authority bodies in either partnership. 
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Irwell (Total) 3 4 4 2 1 14 
Director/Chair 1 2 0 1 1 5 
Non-director 2 2 4 1 0 9 
       
Ribble(Total) 1 4 6 0 1 12 
Director/Chair 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Non-director 0 3 6 0 0 9 
 
The respondents represent a range of organisations, and are found to be comparable 
in their make-up to the national picture (Table 2.6) with all the key participating 
groups reported. 
6.3.4 Survey Participation & Response Rates 
The validity of complex system research is noted to stem from the appropriateness, 
thoroughness and effectiveness of applied methods (Bazeley, 2004). The 
appropriateness of the tools applied is presented in a previous chapter (Chapter 4) 
where the complex science approach was considered, thus it is the thoroughness 
and effectiveness of the survey data collection tool which is reviewed.   
The survey was open for eight weeks for each catchment partnership, Oct 2014 to 
Nov 2014 for the Irwell partnership and Oct 2015 to Nov 2015 for the Ribble 
partnership.  Individual reminders to participate were issued after four and six weeks 
from the date of first issue. No analysis was undertaken until after the closure of 
survey.  No returns were received after this point.   
The response rate from the targeted active participants was similar in both 
partnerships (Irwell partnership = 41%, Ribble partnership = 42%), however, when 
considering the most active partnership members (>1 meeting attendee), 67% of the 
most active are from the Irwell and 41% from the Ribble partnership – detail 




          Page 142 of 267 
 
 
in line with current response rates (Carr et al., 2017) and the group size is sufficient 
to allow for an 85% confidence level at a 10% margin of error.  





Total membership  55 37 
Active members (attended at least 1 meeting in previous 12 
months 
29 24 
Active members (attended >1 meetings in previous 12 months 18 17 
No of returns from active (1 meeting) members 12 10 
No of returns from active (>1 meeting) members 12 7 
No of returns from ’interested’ members 8 2 
No of ‘available case’ responses (based on collaboration network 
responses) 
23 19 
Response from active (1 meeting) members (%) 41 42 
Response from active (>1 meeting) members (%) 67 41 
Total response as percentage of 1 meeting members (%) 69 50 




In comparison to other surveys of natural resource management teams, the response 
rate achieved lies in the mid-range, being greater than the 27% achieved from a 
questionnaire format survey of global biosphere managers (Schultz et al., 2011) but 
less than the 67% maximum survey response reported in a survey of working groups 
led by a natural resource management organisation (Kowalski & Jenkins, 2015), 
when both catchment response rates are considered.   
6.3.5  Who is Influential in the Partnerships?   
The focus of this section is on how the interactions between partnership members 
are represented though social network analysis and whether variation exists between 
the selected catchment partnerships. The results presented will be analysed from the 
perspective of influential individuals within the dynamics of three networks, those 
identified as key to the catchment partnership, those who are collaborating partners 
and those reported to be ecosystem service knowledgeable.  A comparison between 
the key partners and collaborative partners’ networks will be drawn to identify 
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selected catchment partnerships, as at November 2014 and November 2015 
respectively, and describes the system and the structure of their networks.   
Evaluation prior to Social Network Analysis  
In addition to the targeted group, a small proportion of the returned surveys were 
from non-targeted respondents and these were also incorporated into the network 
analysis to gather as complete a picture as possible (Ward & Butler, 2016).  By 
including such available-case and interested actor responses, the percentage 
response rate achieved for social network analysis is 79% for both catchment 
partnerships (active-member target number).  This result compares with the adjusted 
response rates reported by Kowalski and Jenkins (2015) who also incorporated 
available-case data. In their study, response rates for their groups ranged from 56% 
to 67%: post adjustment their reported response rates range from 64% to 94%, the 
percentage improvements ranged from 5% to 27%.  The percentage point change 
reported in this thesis is at the lower end of this range. 
Social Networks Summary 
Both catchment partnerships report a slightly denser key people network than their 
collaborative network, and it is within the key people network that the only cliques are 
found (one per catchment).  Influencing (out-degree centrality) results are much 
greater in the Ribble partnership than the Irwell partnership for all three networks and 
the Ribble partnership reports a greater level of similarity between the collaborative 
and key people networks, being twice the result for the Irwell partnership; however, 
the Ribble partnership report the lowest density of the three networks examined for 
the ecosystem service knowledge network.  The density of the Irwell ecosystem 
services knowledge network is similar to that of the key people network.  The 
greatest levels of influence are reported in the ecosystem service knowledge network 
for both partnerships.  Details are shown in Table 6.18.   
In the collaborative networks, both partnerships report low level of cohesiveness, 
measured by density and centralisation, when compared to the theoretical maximum 
of 100%, however the Ribble partnership values of 15% and 28% respectively are 
three times those of the Irwell partnership (Table 6.18).    Mutual ties within the Irwell 
partnership are spread among the structure and do not show the high centralised 
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Table 6.18:  Ribble and Irwell catchment partnerships summary.  


























10.5 8.1 12.1 15.6 27.5 2.4 
Prominence    
(In-degree 
Centrality) (%) 
64.9 26.7 23.1 43.2 37.4 35.3 
Influence     
(Out-degree 
centrality) (%) 
3.1 4.1 8.9 26.6 31.5 45.8 
Mutual Ties (No.) 5 5 0 10 6 1 
Cliques (No.) 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Similarity of Key 
/ Collaborative 
networks (%) 
28  56  
 
The analysis of the Irwell partnership identified those partners involved in active river 
restoration projects in the catchment as less prominent within the collaborative 
network than those of the Ribble partnership, also they lack the mutual links with key 
prominent members which are found in the Ribble analysis.  The Ribble catchment 
partnership report less difference between prominence (in-degree centrality value) 
and influence (out degree centrality value) within the collaborative network than the 
Irwell partnership, that is, those Ribble partners who are prominent and who are 
consulted by the rest of the partnership are also key influencers with mutual tie links 
to other prominent actors in the network.    
Prominent Partner Comparison 
Figure 6.7 simplifies the actor analysis and compares the prominence of key 
functional groups found in both catchments. Both partnerships place the catchment 
host and catchment co-ordinator at the centre of the networks, together with well-
connect influencers representing riverine, wildlife and woodland interests.  The 
exception is the Irwell ESS knowledge network, where the catchment co-ordinator 
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stakeholders.  The Ribble networks give high prominence to representatives of large 
landscape management organisations who are well connected to the partnership 
management.  However, the Ribble networks do not include the range of diverse 
interests which are present in the Irwell collaborative network, lacking direct 
representation from academic or heritage interests.  The Irwell and its subsidiary 
rivers flow through a number of boroughs and the representatives from local 
authorities are least connected in the collaborative network. 
 
Figure 6.7: Prominent partners within Irwell & Ribble catchment partnerships.  Key 
personnel, collaborative partners and ecosystem service knowledgeable partners identified 
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The Irwell partnership lacks the support roles which the Ribble catchment host 
organisation dedicates to supporting the catchment partnership.  These roles provide 
scientific measurement, publicity and administrative support for catchment activities. 
From this analysis, it can be argued that greatest prominence is given to the political 
operation of the partnerships, secondary focus is given to the natural capital area and 
thirdly, to social organisations.   
Social Networks Visualisation 
The representation of the informal relationships in the organisation is the result of a 
social network analysis of data collected from individuals; Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) being a set of techniques for identifying and representing patterns of 
interaction among social entities, be it individuals, groups, organisations or social 
artefacts. It provides precise and specific insight in place of intuition and general 
hunches. Social network analysis predominantly employs graphical techniques, an 
application of the mathematics of graph theory. The program builds the graphic 
based on mathematical criteria, concerned with the actors’ centrality inside the 
network. 
Standard algorithms locate the most central nodes in a network in the centre of the 
visualisation. On opening the file, NETDRAW automatically generates a visualisation 
of the data using default options where a standard algorithm places the most 
connected nodes to the centre of the screen and the least connected nodes to the 
periphery. Eigenvector Centrality weights degree centrality by the degree-centrality of 
the nodes a node is connected to. The Eigenvector approach to measuring 
closeness uses a factor analytic procedure to discount closeness to small local 
subnetworks.  NETDRAW display gathers the most connected nodes into the core 
and places peripheral nodes in zones where they have some connections.  Within 
the approach social entities are represented as points, each known as a ‘node’ or 
vertex’ and relationships are represented by lines, known as ‘ties, ‘edges’ or ‘arcs’.  
For a presentation of the calculations of eigenvalues and eigenvectors from matrix 
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visualisation of the three examined networks drawn from the survey question 
responses and SNA measures, reviewed in section 5.6.4, follow. 
Key Personnel Network: 
Responses to the question ‘Who do you judge to be the key people in the catchment 
partnership?’ are reported for each catchment partnership before comparing the 
catchment results. 
Irwell catchment partnership: 
The social network analysis covered 23 members of the partnership, either as direct 
responders or as those identified as key partners, linked by 54 network ties. The 
sociogram (Figure 6.8) identifies five mutual connection ties (red) i.e. those where 
both responders identified the other as a key partner, the majority being asymmetric 
ties (blue) i.e. those where one responder identified a link to another partner but 
there is no corresponding returning tie.  Overall, 11% of all the possible ties are 
present (density = 0.107 ±0.0435) and the network centralization is low at 10.46%.  
Those partners who are most central to the key personnel network are shown in 
Figure 6.7 by the size of the partner node.  Overall in-degree centrality = 64.9%, out-
degree = 3.1%, of the theoretical maximums indicating a wide variation between 
prominence and influence within the network.  Out-degree supportive analysis 
(Bonacich) reports low results across all partners, indicating there is no key influencer 
in the network relationship. 
The most central and prominent actors (>30 eigenvector) are the catchment host, 
catchment co-ordinator and chairs of the partnership strategy and project groups.  
Further analysis also identifies these actors are a clique within the overall network.    
However, when supporting analysis is considered there are a further three actors 
who gain influence as they are connected to other high prominent actors (Bonacich 
Centrality measure with beta = 0.346, >400 degree of centrality); these actors include 









Figure 6.8: Social network of stakeholders in Irwell catchment partnership.  Actor node size 
weighted by centrality value (eigenvector). No of ties = 54 identifying key personnel.  Mutual 
(reciprocal) ties shown in red. Density = 0.107 ±0.0435.  Participant names have been 
removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which does not infer any 
value.  
The catchment host, Irwell Rivers Trust representative and catchment co-ordinator 
are found to be key structural links in the network (Freeman Betweeness>21) as they 
link between other pairs of actors in the network and so have people who depend 
upon them to make connections.  
Ribble Catchment Partnership 
The social network analysis covered 20 members of the partnership, either as direct 
responders or as those identified as key partners, linked through 64 differing 
connectedness of ties.  The sociogram (Figure 6.9) identifies 10 mutual connection 
ties (red) i.e. those where both responders identified the other as a key partner, the 
majority being asymmetric ties (blue) i.e. those where one responder identified a link 
to another partner but there is no corresponding returning tie.  
Overall 17% of all the possible ties are present (density = 0.168 ±0.374) and the 
network centralization is 15.6%. Those partners who are most central to the network 
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centrality = 43.2%, out-degree = 26.6%, of the theoretical maximums indicating 
variation between prominence and influence within the network.   
 
 
Figure 6.9. Social network of stakeholders in the Ribble Catchment partnership. Actor node 
size weighted by centrality value (eigenvector). No of ties = 64 identifying key personnel.  
Mutual (reciprocal) ties shown in red. Density = 0.168 ±0.374. Participant names have been 
removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which does not infer any 
value. 
The most central and prominent actors (>44 eigenvector, in-degree >7) are the 
catchment host, catchment co-ordinator, representatives from Ribble Fisheries, and a 
member of the catchment host organisation involved with capital works 
developments.  One clique was identified through analysis, which consists of the 
catchment host and co-ordinator together with representatives from major 
landowners (Yorkshire Dales and Forest of Bowland).  When supporting analysis is 
considered, (Bonacich Centrality measure with beta = 0.250, >500 degree of 
centrality) a further partnership member concerned with the Yorkshire Dales is 
identified as prominent as they are ‘connected’ to other high prominent actors.  Key 
influencers in the network are the catchment host and co-ordinator, representatives 
from the Forestry Commission, major land owners and Rivers Trust support 
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The catchment host, co-ordinator and Ribble Fisheries representative are key 
structural links as they link between other pairs of actors in the network and so have 
people who depend upon them to make connections (Freeman Betweeness>18). 
Collaboration Network: 
Responses to the question ‘with whom do you collaborate the most frequently’ are 
reported for each catchment partnership before comparing the results.  For this 
study, whole network analysis was desired to answer the objectives, consequently, 
collaboration activities were not pre-defined and it was left to each responder to 
consider how their organisation collaborates within the catchment partnership.  Thus, 
collaborative actors cover all interactions including data sharing, co-operative funding 
bids and working together on project delivery.  There was no request to identify the 
frequency of interactions and the question was left as ‘most’ acknowledging some 
organisations may collaborate less frequently than others.  The self-assessment of 
‘most collaborate’ places a limitation on the network model in that no weighting is 
placed on the quality or length of the collaborative episode.  The information to create 
a weighted network, such as duration, outcome or nature of collaboration, could be 
gathered in future research.  
Irwell Catchment Partnership 
The social network analysis considers 40 members of the partnership, either as direct 
responders or as those identified as key collaborative partners, linked by 57 network 
ties.  However only 5% of all the possible ties are present (density = 0.054 ±0.0162) 
and network centralization is low at 8.11%.  A wide variation between prominence 
and influence within the network is reported (in-degree centrality=26.7%, out-
degree=4.1% of the theoretical maximums).  Those partners who are most central 
within the collaborative network are identified by the size of the nodes reported in 
Figure 6.10.  The most central and prominent partners are the catchment host and 
catchment co-ordinator, together with a CaBA central support representative and 
organisation managers from both the host and co-ordinator organisations.  The 
prominent actors link between other pairs of actors in the network and so have 
people who depend upon them to make connections, in particular the catchment host 
actor (Freeman Betweeness=88.8).   Additional key structural linking actors are the 
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network are three partners engaged in the active delivery of river improvement 
projects (out-degree Bonacich>1000), two actors reporting a mutual tie (red); 
however, these actors report moderate centrality scores and are not as prominent 
within the network as the catchment host and catchment co-ordinator reducing their 
ability to directly influence other members of the partnership.   
 
Figure 6.10. Social network of stakeholders in the Irwell catchment partnership. Actor node 
size weighted by centrality value (eigenvector). No of ties = 57 identifying collaborative 
relationships.   Mutual (reciprocal) ties shown in red. Density = 0.054±0.0162. Participant 
names have been removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which 
does not infer any value. 
There are a further five actors who gain influence as they are connected to other high 
prominent scoring actors even though they are on the periphery of the network; these 
actors include further personnel employed by the mandated organisation, 
Manchester centric institutions and water company representatives (Bonacich 
Centrality measure with beta = 0.529, >500 degree of centrality).  Those actors 
representing local authorities associated with the main tributaries to the Irwell and 
heritage interests are least connected. Although no formal clique was identified by 
analysis, mutual ties exist between the catchment host and catchment co-ordinator 
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catchment partnership.  A further mutual tie exists between actors who are involved 
in collaborative volunteer-led conservation activity.   Neither of these actors reports 
high prominence or influence within the collaborative network, however, there are 
direct links into a prominent linker. A key bridging function, which links otherwise 
unconnected partners, is provided by actors representing the Greater Manchester 
Ecology Unit and recreational fishery interest. 
Ribble Catchment Partnership 
The social network analysis covered 19 members of the partnership, either as direct 
responders or as those identified as key collaborative partners, linked by 50 network 
ties of differing connectedness. 15% of all the possible ties are present (density = 
0.146 ±0.353) with 6 identified as mutual connection ties (red). The network 
centralization is 27.5%.   There is little variation between prominence and influence 
within the network (in-degree centrality=37.4%, out-degree=31.5% of the theoretical 
maximums).  Those partners who are most central to the collaborative network are 
identified by the size of the actor node shown in Figure 6.11. The most central and 
prominent partners are the catchment co-ordinator and catchment host (>50 
eigenvector).   These prominent actors link between other pairs of actors in the 
network and so have people who depend upon them to make connections, in 
particular the catchment host (Freeman Betweeness=92.4) who is also identified as a 
key influencer in the partnership.   Additional key structural linking and influencing 
actors are the representatives of forestry and fishery organisations (out-degree 
Bonacich>1000). There are a further three actors, representing large landscape and 
water management organisations, who gain influence as they are connected to other 
high prominent scoring actors even though they are on the periphery of the network 
(Bonacich Centrality measure with beta = 0.342, >500).  It is of interest to note 
several actors on the periphery include several personnel employed by the host 
organisation who link to prominent scoring individuals who represent forestry, fishery 
and farming interests.  No explicit academic or heritage interests are found within the 
collaborative network. 
Those actors representing major land owners and landscape management 
organisations are closely connected to each other within the structural diagram and 
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although no formal cliques were identified in the network.  Five of the six mutual ties 
are linked to the catchment host organisation. One further mutual tie exists between 
actors representing regulatory and authority organisations. No key bridging actors 
are found. 
Actors representing forestry and regulatory organisations are found toward the 
periphery of the network, however they do report direct links into a prominent 
influencer with connections to other members of the organisation. 
 
Figure 6.11.  Social network of stakeholders in Ribble catchment partnership, actor node size 
weighted by centrality value (eigenvector). No of ties = 50 identifying collaborative 
relationships.  Mutual (reciprocal) ties shown in red. Density = 0.146 ±0.3533.  Participant 
names have been removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which 
does not infer any value. 
Ecosystem Services Knowledge Network: 
Both partnerships were asked to identify those people within each relevant 
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networks are reported for both the Irwell and the Ribble partnerships in figures 6.12 
and 6.13 respectively where the size of the actor node reflects the centrality value 
(eigenvector). 
Irwell Catchment Partnership 
The social network analysis covered 16 members of the partnership, either as direct 
responders or as those identified as possessing ecosystem services knowledge, 
linked by 28 ties, none of which are mutual connections.  Overall, only 12% of all the 
possible ties are present (density = 0.117), however, centralisation is higher at 23%.   
 
Figure 6.12. Social network of stakeholders in the Irwell catchment partnership.  
Actor node size weighted by centrality value (eigenvector).  No of ties = 28 identifying 
ecosystem services knowledge network.  No mutual ties are reported.  Density = 
0.117 ± nc.  SD is not calculable for this network. Participant names have been 
removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which does not 
infer any value. 
The most central and prominent actors (>50 eigenvector, in-degree >5) include the 
key academic member of the partnership, project group chair representing urban 
woodland organisation and the catchment host and co-ordinator, however no clique 
was identified by statistical analysis.  Both the academic member and the urban 




          Page 155 of 267 
 
 
>5), both individuals assessing themselves at the highest level of ecosystem services 
knowledge.   
Partnership members representing riverine and wildlife organisations who also self-
reported the highest level of ecosystem service knowledge are not directly 
recognised by other members of the partnership as key contacts, however, these 
partners are sought as information sources by the catchment host so are linked into 
the overall network through an important actor. The academic member is also the 
key structural link in the network, linking between other actors (Freeman 
Betweenness>45).  Out degree (Bonacich) reports were low across all partners, 
indicting there is no key influencer in the ecosystem services knowledge network. 
Ribble Catchment Partnership 
The social network analysis covered 21 members of the Ribble partnership, either as 
direct responders or as those identified as key ecosystem service knowledgeable 
partners, linked by 27 ties, only one of which is mutual between the catchment 
coordinator and the Forest of Bowland representative.  Only 6% of the possible ties 
are present (density = 0.064) but centralisation is greater at 35.2%.  
The most central actors are the catchment host, catchment co-ordinator and the 
representative of the Ribble Fisheries (eigenvector >55).  The catchment host is the 
most prominent of those individuals self-reporting the highest level of ecosystem 
services knowledge, that is, the most sought by other partners looking for information 
on ecosystem services.  Other high knowledge partners representing Natural 
England and forestry organisations are found at the periphery of the network, with 
single connections to the catchment host, lacking direct linkages to other actors 








Figure 6.13. Social network of stakeholders in the Ribble catchment partnership.  
Actor node size weighted by centrality value (eigenvector).  No of ties = 27 identifying 
ecosystem services knowledge network.  One mutual tie (red) is reported.  Density = 
0.064 ± nc.  SD is not calculable for this network. Participant names have been 
removed in line with ethical requirements and replaced by numeric which does not 
infer any value. 
Prominent members of the partnership also include the Yorkshire Dales National 
Park representative, who is closely linked to Environment Agency personnel and 
further Yorkshire Dales representatives.  There is one key influencer (outdegree = 
10.0) within the network, Ribble Fisheries, as this actor has links out to several water 
company and mandated authority representatives, connecting a variety of views and 
information relating to ecosystem services across the partnership.  
Comparison of Key Personnel network and Collaborative partner networks. 
Irwell catchment partnership: 
The density of the collaborative network (5%) is half that of the key people network 
(11%).  To test whether this difference has not arisen by chance, a t-test bootstrap 
paired sample was performed using matched network matrices, that is, matrices 
adjusted to include all respondents to either question (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).    
The difference in density means for the adjusted matrices is 0.0027.  The standard 
error of the difference by the classical method is 0.0092; the standard error by 
bootstrap estimate (10,000) is 0.0245.  The conventional approach underestimates 
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consequently there is a probability the observed difference would arise by chance in 
random samples drawn from these networks. t=0.198, ±0.0135, CL [-0.0291, 0.0238], 
p=0.841.   
QAP compared the observed Jaccard similarly coefficient to an average value 
obtained as the result of simulations (10,000) where the rows and columns of the 
matrices are permuted randomly.  The result obtained is s= 0.276±0.019, p=0.000 i.e. 
if there is a tie in one network, there is a 28% chance there will be a tie in the 
alternative network.  The simulation (QAP) correlation if random actors were matched 
= 0.026 (average).  The observed measure is different from the random result, 
consequently the relationship observed is not due to chance and association exists 
between the two networks.   
Both tests indicate the collaborative and key people networks have similar strength of 
ties as there is no significant difference in the overall density, however the ties are 
different as only 28% of ties present in one network exist in the alternative network. 
Ribble catchment partnership: 
The density of the key people network (17%) is similar to that of the collaborative 
network (15%).  To test for difference, a t-test bootstrap paired sample was 
performed using matched network matrices, that is, matrices adjusted to include all 
respondents to either question (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).    The difference in 
density means for the adjusted matrices is 0.0303.  The standard error of the 
difference by the classical method is 0.0216; the standard error by bootstrap estimate 
(10,000) is 0.0491.  The conventional approach underestimates the true sampling 
variability.  By bootstrap method, two tailed probability is 0.160, consequently there is 
no significant difference between these networks. t=1.370, ±0.0221, CL [-0.0131, 
0.0737], p=0.160.   
QAP compared the observed Jaccard similarly coefficient to a mean value obtained 
as the result of simulations (5,000) where the rows and columns of the matrices are 
permuted randomly.  The result obtained is s= 0.562±0.031, p≤0.001 i.e. if there is a 
tie in one network, there is a 56% chance there will be a tie in the alternative network.  
The simulation (QAP) correlation if random actors were matched = 0.066 (mean).  
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relationship observed is not due to chance and association exists between the two 
networks.   
Both tests indicate the collaborative and key people networks have similar strength of 
ties as there is no significant difference in the overall density, and there is a strong 
similarity as 56% of ties present in one network exist in the alternative network. 
Limitations  
The results presented here are limited to those individuals who chose to respond to 
the survey.  Even though previous work has shown that the social network analysis 
measures used in this study provide an accurate portrayal of the whole network 
based on a partial network sample (Contender & Valente, 2003), it is acknowledged 
that these results may be restricted given that each working group network was only 
partially sampled.  However, by considering both the participants approach and 
placement within the social network of a co-operative group, the influence of leaders 
who possess skills useful in this environmental management setting is uncovered.   
6.3.6 Working Relationships - Risk / Trust / Agreement to Act    
Throughout this study, methods were used which developed the understanding of the 
catchment partnership concept, in particular the influence of social connections on 
the implementation of water policy.  The focus of this section is on how the 
interactions between partnership members are influenced by levels of complexity 
analysed from the perspective of trust and risk, and whether variation exists between 
the selected catchment partnerships.   
The results presented describe the principal components present in the survey 
responses together with the examination of factors that influence collaborative 
behaviour.  The analysis considers the comparison of two catchment partnerships, as 
at November 2014 and November 2015 respectively. 
The relevant survey section consisted of eight questions which investigated factors 
which influence the ability of a group to come to an agreement to act.  All questions 
recorded a response across both groups of respondents, there were no partially 
completed questions returned and the extremes of the value ratings were used by at 
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Evaluation prior to Statistical Analysis  
Prior to undertaking statistical analysis on the Likert-scale survey responses, Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was undertaken.  The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=0.500, 
meeting the threshold for sampling adequacy, with all KMO values for the individual 
items greater than the acceptable limit of 0.5 except for one item.  Individual 
variables identified from the anti-image correlation table (SPSS output) identified 
three variables as falling below the threshold, however these variables were not 
eliminated from the factor identification as the overall KMO met the threshold (Table 
4.19). 
Explanatory Factor Analysis 
Summary 
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 8 items with oblique 
rotation (Direct Oblimin).  Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2(28) = 74.55, p≤0.001, 
indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA.  Three 
components were identified which had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in 
combination explained 72.6% of the variance.  Table 4.20 shows the factor loadings.  
The items that cluster on the same component suggest factor 1 represents attitude to 
risk taking, factor 2 represents level of agreement and factor 3 represents trust 
values (Table 4.20).   
Factor Extraction 
The linear components within the data set were determined by calculating the 
eigenvalues for the R-matrix, the magnitude representing the importance of a 
particular vector.  Kaiser’s criteria is considered accurate when there are <30 
variables and after extraction communalities are >0.7 (Field, 2009, p660).  Kaiser’s 
criteria were applied to the 8 variables in the survey and eigenvalues greater than 1 
were displayed in SPSS V20.  Following extraction, only Q4 has a communality value 
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Table 6.19.  Sampling adequacy (KMO), communalities after extraction and corrected item 
correlation results. The full wording and semantic differential rating scale for the questions is 
found in Appendix B. 





Q1 0.423 0.716 0.567 
Q2 0.617 0.737 0.586 
Q3 0.572 0.728 0.567 
Q4 0.561 0.505 0.401 
Q5 0.572 0.723 0.638 
Q6 0.406 0.752 0.372 
Q7 0.503 0.863 0.619 
Q8 0.413 0.785 0.655 
 
While the Pattern matrix is preferable for interpretation, as it contains information 
representing the unique contribution of a variable to a factor, the structure matrix is a 
useful double check (Field, 2009). Consequently, both tables were considered in the 
identification of the alignment of components to the identified factors (Table 6.20). 
Three factors were identified, representing 37.3%, 22.7% and 12.6% of the 
eigenvalues respectively. 
 
Table 6.20.  Pattern matrix.  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation 
Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 7 iterations. The full 
wording and semantic differential rating scale for the questions is found in Appendix B 
Pattern matrix Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Q8 0.919   
Q2 0.826   
Q7 0.644   
Q3  0.850  
Q1  0.816  
Q4   0.327 
Q6   0.900 
Q5   0.760 
 
Factor Identification 
Factor 1 contains three questions (Table 6.21) which for analysis were scored along 
the range 1 to 7.  All the questions deal with certainty of deliverability of actions and 
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Table 6.21.  Risk Factor question components. The full semantic differential rating scale for 
the questions is found in Appendix B. 
Q8 Partners are willing to take risks Partners are always cautious 
Q2 Partners always base action on reliable 
facts 
Partners always base actions on 
assumptions 
Q7 Partners always explore novel methods of 
working 
Partners always stick to known 
methods of working 
 
Factor 2 contains two questions (Table 6.22) which identify agreement upon actions 
as a common theme. 
Table 6.22.  Agreement Factor question components. The full semantic differential rating 
scale for the questions is found in Appendix B. 
Q3 Partners are always in agreement on how 
to do it 
Partners never agree on how to do it 
Q1 Partners always agree on what to do Partners never agree on what to do 
 
Factor 3 again contains three questions (Table 6.23). All the questions again deal 
with certainty of deliverability of actions and have consideration of trust as a common 
theme.  Although Q4 has a communality value <0.7 and could be discarded from 
further analysis, the question has been included as sharing of information has been 
identified as a key aspect to trust building within a partnership (Dent, 2006). 
Table 6.23. Trust Factor question components. The full semantic differential rating scale for 
the questions is found in Appendix B. 
Q4 Partners always share all their information Partners never share all their 
information 
Q6 Partners always welcome new ideas Partners never welcome new ideas 
Q5 Partners always trust each other Partners never trust each 
 
Of the three factors identified, factor 1 contains questions relating to risk taking, 
factor 2 represents levels of agreement and factor 3 identifies elements of trust 
among partners.  Factor 2 alone aligns with the level of agreement complexity theory 
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certainty aspect of the complexity concept.  Consequently, factors 1 and 3 will be 
combined and considered as one factor in the following analysis. 
Reliability Analysis 
Questionnaire scales are tested for reliability that is, the ability to measure the 
construct under investigation.  Reliability analysis was tested by Cronbach’s  (SPSS 
V20) on each factor subscale as identified in Table 4.20.  Values of 0.7 to 0.8 are 
reported to be acceptable, although values below 0.7 are expected for various 
psychological constructs due to the diversity of factors being measured (Field, 2009, 
p 675).  Additionally, where there are a small number of components, the mean 
correlation between items in addition to the overall result are considered (Field, 
2009).  Individual components, as reported on the corrected item-total correlation 
(SPSS V20), are considered acceptable if the scores are >0.3 (Field, 2009, p678).  
All scores were >0.3 and are reported in Table 6.19. Cronbach’s  are reported in 
Table 6.24 
Table 6.24.  Reliability Scores for factor scales. 
Item Cronbach’s  
Risk Factor 0.775 
Trust Factor  0.650 
Certainty Factor  0.764 
Agreement Factor 0.721 
 
Attitude to certainty, sub-analysed at risk taking and trust value subscales of the 
questionnaire, achieved reasonable reliabilities, all Cronbach’s >0.65.  The level of 
agreement subscale also had an acceptable reliability at Cronbach’s >0.70. Both 
elements are, therefore, considered reliable for use in further complexity model 
analysis. 
Stacey’s Matrix Analysis  
The impact of complexity on the catchment partnership relationships is analysed 
through the application of the Stacey Model, reviewed in Chapter 2, section 2.9b(ii), 
which identifies the level of agreement about an issue or decision within the group, 
team or organisation and the degree of certainty within the group.  Themes of risk 
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plotted against the agreement factor in excel and scatter grams obtained for both 
catchment partnerships. 
Figure 6.14 contains a plot of all the responses.  The vertical y-axis identifies the 
degree of agreement on what should be done and the horizontal x-axis presents the 
degree of certainty, represented in this analysis by the mean of the variables forming 
the risk and trust factors.  Values of 1 represent those responses with the greatest 
level of agreement and certainty of action success; values of 7 represent responses 
with least levels of agreement or certainty of action success. Full circles represent 
responders from the Irwell catchment partnership and open circles represent 
responders from the Ribble catchment partnership. Large circles represent those 
who are the most senior representatives of their organisations, that is Chair, Vice-
chair or Director. 
 
Overall: 
Overall, the majority of the catchment partnership responders register levels of 
agreement and certainty which lie in the mid-range of the scales, with a slightly 
greater level of agreement compared to the level of certainty (Figure 6.14).  Those 
responders who are most senior representatives of their organisations also lie within 
the central region of the scatter gram, with the exception of one individual. 
Those responders reporting most certainty and most agreement (lowest scored) 
responses for the Irwell partnership, include a senior representative and mid-range 
manager both of whom are involved with volunteer management and cooperative 
working. Similarly, the Ribble partnership members report most certainty and most 
agreement scores from two responders who offer advisory services to clients and are 








Figure 6.14.  Complexity Matrix for Catchment Partnerships. Full circles represent 
responders from the Irwell catchment partnership; Open circles represent responders from 
the Ribble catchment partnership. Large circles represent those who are the most senior 
representatives of their organisations.  Data captured Nov 2014 (Irwell) and Nov 2015 
(Ribble). 
For both catchment partnerships, the lowest levels of agreement (higher scores) are 
the responses of mid-range managers of large government orientated organisations. 
Factor and Question Analysis: 
There is no significant difference in the mean responses at either the factor or the 
question level between the two partnerships (Table 6.25) and both partnerships 
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Table 6.25.  Between partnership test for difference at both factor and question level mean 
and standard error of mean reported.  Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for difference (H), 
p<0.05, df=1, n=26 (total).  nd= no significant difference reported. 






Test for difference 
 
Q1 2.93±0.25 3.25 ±0.35 H(1) = 0.38, nd 




3.21±0.23 3.29±0.27 H(1) = 0.07, nd 
Q2 3.64 ±0.36 3.58±0.31 H(1) = 0.03, nd 
Q7 3.93 ±0.38 3.42±0.40 H(1) = 1.13, nd 
Q8 4.21±0.42 4.08±0.50 H(1) = 0.03, nd 
Level of Risk 
(mean Q2+Q7+Q8) 
3.93±0.33 3.70±0.33 H(1) = 0.73, nd 
Q4 3.93±0.27 3.83±0.32 H(1) = 0.18, nd 
Q5 3.57±0.29 3.50±0.38 H(1) = 0.01, nd 
Q6 2.86±0.38 2.58±0.36 H(1) = 0.29, nd 
Level of Trust 
(mean Q4+Q5+Q6) 
3.45±0.26 3.31±0.25 H(1) = 0.15, nd 
Level of Certainty 
(mean Q2+Q7+Q8 
+Q4+Q5+Q6) 
3.69 ±0.23 3.50±0.27 H(1) = 0.24, nd 
 
Within the Irwell catchment partnership, the partners report reasonable levels of 
agreement to actions committed to by the partnership (mean 3.21±0.23) but the 
reported mean level of risk in achieving those outcomes is greater than the mean 
level of distrust within the group (3.93±0.33 and 3.45±0.26 respectively).  A low level 
of risk is reported by an individual most involved in volunteer activity and who has 
experience of working in a partnership concept (Fig 6.15a).  In contrast, those 
individuals representing large, multi-departmental organisations not involved with co-
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 (a)  
(b)  
Figure 6.15 Irwell Catchment Partnership Levels of Risk (a) and Trust (b) compared 
to level of Agreement scored responses. 
High levels of trust are reported by a group of individuals all of whom co-ordinate 
volunteer-led actions within the environmental arena (Fig 6.15b); by comparison, 
responders reporting higher levels of distrust are individuals whose organisations 
have been active in planning and funding large-scale conservation schemes.  This 
suggests that co-ordinating to deliver projects by the use of volunteers is considered 
to be trustworthy and a low risk action, but interacting with funding bodies and large 
organisations unfamiliar with collaboration to deliver a project has inherent risks and 
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Within the Ribble catchment, partners also appear to have reasonable levels of 
agreement to actions committed to by the partnership (3.29±0.27) and again report a 
higher level of risk in achieving those outcomes than the mean level of trust within 
the group (3.70±0.33 and 3.31±0.25 respectively).  The most risk averse are again 
mid-range managers of large government orientated organisations plus a key 
influencer within an association role (Fig 6.16a), while those who report most trust in 
the process work in partnership as normal role function (Fig 6.16b). 
(a)  
(b)  
Figure 6.16 Ribble Catchment Partnership Levels of Risk (a) and Trust (b) compared 
to level of Agreement scored responses. 
The highest levels of uncertainty are reported for Q8, that is, the question identifying 
the degree to which partners are believed to be willing to take risks versus being 
cautious; both the Irwell and Ribble partnerships report responses toward the 
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responses to Q4 indicate low levels of trust related to partner information sharing 
(3.93±0.27 and 3.83±0.32 respectively).    
While the overall level of agreement is reasonable for both partnerships, there is 
slightly less agreement on how to carry out an action rather than agreement on what 
the action ought to be, particularly in the Irwell partnership. A cautious approach, lack 
of information sharing and lower levels of agreement on how to deliver an action are 
the key traits reported. 
6.3.7 Coded Comments: Qualitative Findings 
Responders were offered an opportunity to expand upon their responses within the 
survey instrument, augmented by commentary obtained through semi-structured 
interview.  A total of 142 coded comments were extracted from the responses (Table 
6.26) – full details of the comment, developed coding and categorisation are 
contained in Appendix C.  To protect participant confidentiality names have been 
removed in line with ethical requirements.  All the a priori codes were used, no 
comments were left uncoded.   
Table 6.26 Count of Participant coded comments categorised from a priori developed 
coding.  Further details contained in Appendix C. 
 
Coding Category  
Stakeholder Power / Interest Category (No) Total No of Coded 
Comments 
High Medium Low 
  Competition 22 4 3 29 
  Leadership 76 8 16 100 
  Knowledge 8 1 4 13 
Total No of 
comments 
106 13 23 142 
 
Overall, 74% of the comments were provided by high interest and power 
stakeholders, with 70% of the comments pertinent to leadership issues. Further 
analysis of the leadership comments (Table 6.27) finds partnership relationships are 
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financial competition among high i/p partners also a frequent concern. Low interest 
and power stakeholder comments linked to the prioritisation of goals are most 
frequent (50%).    
Table 6.27 Count of Participant coded comments categorised as Leadership. 
Stakeholder 
Power / Interest 
Category 





Scale Total No of 
Comments 
High 12 19 25 10 4 6 76 
Medium 1 3 3 0 0 1 8 
Low 3 8 1 1 2 1 16 
 
Overall Findings: 
The participant comments demonstrated that the partnership members are able to 
reflect upon the working processes and relationships encountered in their 
participation in the collaborative group.  Their reported reflections are critical of the 
leadership of the partnerships, particularly the domination by larger, more powerful 
organisations.  Taken together with an apparent lack of appreciation for the additional 
demands placed on individuals by the act of participation, there is an overall 
negativity expressed in the value of the CaBA approach.  However, this is not a 
unanimous view; a few participants are positive in their outlook and view the 
partnership as a means of communication and an opportunity for expanding their 
scale and range of activities.  No formal governance mechanism concerns were 
raised, with the exception of one individual who is tasked with day to day running of 
the group.  Trust concerns are common, linked to frustrations with data sharing, 
financial competitive actions and avoidance of contention resolution, however, 
although trust issues are frequently raised, no suggestions for further internal or 
external accountability controls are found.  Recorded risk issues are limited to 
barriers to participation and the longer-term sustainability of the partnerships – but 
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Competition Category Findings: 
The majority of responders concerns with competing positions are expressed through 
a negative attitude to sharing financial resources, the impact of public sector 
responses to financial constraints and the impact of those decision on the viability of 
the multi-agent collaborative concept.  Operating structures are thus more complex 
and more difficult for organisations to manage.  These views are most common 
among those high interest and power stakeholders. 
 The evolution of catchment management has made the task of 
making improvements more difficult and more complicated than it 
used to be for our own organisation.  There are a lot more politics to 
navigate when applying for the little funding currently available .. 
those organisations/individuals equipped to manage funding and 
deliver on-the-ground are essentially all in competition with each 
other for the limited funding available. respondent ref #C35 High 
power / interest mapping (pim) 
Responders consider the lack of public-body capability to participate, and lead, 
actions to be detrimental to CaBA success, a view commonly expressed by low 
power/interest stakeholders.   
 Public sector spending cuts are continuing & increasing & will affect 
catchment management. #C06 High pim 
 Local authority cuts have had a negative impact – no budgets to 
maintain infrastructure, no staff to work with volunteers. #C26 High 
pim 
Leadership Category Findings: 
There are a number of positive statements relating to the value to be gained by 
cooperation, particularly at the strategic level, but these are in the minority and 
caveated by concerns regarding the whole-hearted support for the concept at senior 
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 Organisations are involved because their areas of interest intersect 
with the CBA and catchment management can be a tool through 
which their priorities are achieved. #C41 High pim 
 Some of the key investors within a catchment (UU, EA) might 
understand and support the catchment approach.  However, the 
joining up of activity and resource to deliver wider 
outcomes/additionality is as much of a responsibility of them as it is 
the wider partnership organisation.  Whilst I am sure this does 
happen, how widely does it occur across the large investment 
programmes of these partners or are some of the other 
funding/organisational barriers get in the way? #C34 High pim 
Partner relationships concerns and prioritisation issues are expressed by a large 
number of the responders.  Trust and respect have been identified as critical 
influencers upon effective peer accountability: a number of the responders register 
dismay with the performance of their peers, yet there is no conflict resolution 
mechanism reported.  Commentators identified the hard work required to reach 
agreed-upon common ground, yet the effort involved in managing team dynamics in 
order to progress as a unit is not valued by all participants, in particular, one 
individual who is deliberately introducing contention.  The current mechanism to deal 
with such contention is through the formalising of operational ‘rules’ via the 
production of terms of reference documentation, however, producing such bespoke 
control mechanisms takes away from the resources available which encourage 
collaborating opportunities, such as promotional work.    
 Developing terms of reference (ToR)  appropriate to the role of the 
group takes time and agreement. #C27 High pim 
 This takes an enormous amount of TIME and the relationships 
between the different pieces of work are complex. #C41 High pim 
 Different organisations have different priorities so you need to work 
hard to find the common ground so there is a slow pace in the on-
going development of the partnership but particularly in the formation 
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 [Resource spent] managing the politics and tensions around 
perceived “empire building” aspirations of some members. #C36 
High pim 
Currently, some individuals are not constrained by their peers and form disruptive 
and acrimonious relationships without any consequential action.  This discontent is 
not recognised by all members of the group. The lack of a mechanism to resolve 
these internal issues is raised as a concern by only one high interest/power 
stakeholder. 
 I believe the group should be more successful than we are, so I’m 
stirring the pot, as rivers are not central to the core of our host’s 
organisation.  I’m looking to introduce a forum to remove this political 
interference. #C38 Medium pim 
 It’s very difficult to know how to talk about (and resolve) these issues 
as a group. #C35 High pim 
There is a clear recognition that the demands of maintaining the catchment approach 
is focused on a few, committed individuals -  this is a risk to the sustainability of the 
partnership.  Environmental interested organisations are recognised to be at the fore-
front of the group directing partnership aims, but the lack of consideration of other 
interests is causing frustration with the focus and value of the group to those who 
have more diverse interests, commonly low interest/power stakeholders.  The lack of 
a large, championing organisation, with scope beyond the catchment is called for by 
one low interest power individual as a means of resolving the current frustration with 
the partnership construct. Consequently, the catchment partnership is seen as a 
drain on limited resources by some participants.  
 The catchment-based approach is additional work for minimal 
perceived benefit and therefore very reliant on the enthusiasm and 
energy of a few people in each partnership to get momentum going. 
Most of the partners cannot see what additional benefit CaBA will 
bring to their work. #C16 High pim 
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 Overwhelming emphasis on natural environment versus historic 
environment. #C39 Low pim 
 Catchment partnership is primarily a collection of professional 
(salaried) eco-interested parties, so some stakeholders are not 
represented.  Biodiversity interests have been at the fore.  #CS2 High 
pim 
Knowledge Category Findings: 
Responders reflections are focussed upon a lack of data availability and sharing 
mechanisms.  Investment to support knowledge transfer networks is required and 
smaller organisations are looking to the larger organisations provide the 
mechanisms.  Such expectations are not however made explicit in the partnership 
demands upon core organisations.  There are expressions of dismay with the 
catchment partnership as a concept where the reality of participants’ abilities and 
opportunities are not taken into consideration, resulting a feeling of lack of respect for 
participants. 
 Catchment based approach requires integration and joining up of 
plans and activities of a range of organisations to maximise value.  
The theory behind this is sound.  However, limited resource to 
undertake the process of joining up and operating a knowledge 
transfer network can limit effectiveness, even if resourced at the 
centre of the partnership.  If other partners are effectively not 
similarly resourced for the task of catchment partnership working, it 
can be a barrier to their participation.   #C34 High pim 
 I think that CP needs to be realistic about what its members can/will 
do. As an example, one workshop was convened and it was obvious 
that attendees were unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to take any 
meaningful view. #C19 Low pim 
General 
The open-ended question was included to allow respondents to elaborate on 
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quantitative studies through elaborating main concepts.  It is noted, that all of the 
themes developed from the literature review are found in the narratives supplied by 
catchment partners: thus, selections of extracts relating to the categories derived by 
complexity theory analysis are incorporated in the discussion contained in Chapter 5 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION 
The research presented in this thesis focused on key issues of policy 
implementation: how does the introduction of a complex form of collaborative system 
networking impact policy implementation and how are local implementing agents 
connected to system feedback? The emergence of network analysis and complexity 
thinking in the natural resource areas provides an avenue that allows new insights 
into how implementation can be assessed and helps understand the factors that 
influence environmental management success. 
The research aimed to understand how the delivery of statutory environmental goals 
was, and will be, influenced by the characteristics and structure of implementation 
teams at the micro-level by examining catchment partnerships, their declared goals 
and partners approaches to risk and trust, in addition to how steerage from the 
accountable body is manifest at a whole system level.   Selected UK catchment 
partnership groups in the North-West River Basin were used as a case study.  The 
research was categorised into three different themes linked to the objectives of the 
study (see section 3.3): 
 Network System Dynamics:  How is the implementation system developing? Is 
there a discernible impact due to the Localism Agenda? 
 Ecosystem Service Focus: What is the temporal shift and trade-off within 
catchments (historic analysis) and is this comparable to current goals? Have 
catchment partnerships developed their own unique agenda based on an 
Ecosystem Service (EsS) approach or retained the initial focus on statutory 
goals? 
 Influential Participants: Do all the collaborating partners possess compatible 
approaches to risk and agreement to action? Which actors are involved and 
what are their collaborative relationships within catchment partnerships? 
Which stakeholder groups play an influential role? 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the thematic results at the micro-level, that 
is, those influential participants and the factors which shape their participation 
(Section 7.2), to discuss the ecosystem services identified within the catchments and 
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to identify the system level model and consider the implications of the results for 
environmental policy implementation (Section 7.4).   
7.1 Overall Findings 
The findings of the research set out in this thesis indicate that while the catchment 
context influences the make-up and goal prioritisation of individual catchment 
partnerships, the partnerships studied remain strongly influenced by the mandated 
authority, complying with the system stewardship model where policy aims are 
achieved by the steerage given via influencing central government agents (section 
6.3.2, section 6.3.5). Evidence generated was described in earlier chapters and can 
be summarised as follows: 
• Implementation models have been defined in the literature and three main 
theoretical perspectives identified – a top-down, bottom-up or system 
stewardship approach (section 2.2.1).  By considering the UK WFD and 
catchment management mechanism against Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict 
framework (1995), the disconnect between the political structure and local 
implementing actors is exposed.  The approach launched by DEFRA in 2013 
produces a hybrid of two aspects, that is, an amalgam of the political and 
experimental implementation frameworks (section 6.1), reflecting the arms-
length implementation model specified by system stewardship.  However, 
there are no formal connecting linkages via the publicised River Basin 
Management route which would be expected to provide the support 
responsibilities identified as key to success by earlier researchers. 
• Partnership goals reflect the physical locations and catchment context, 
however, neither partnership have expressed their goals in terms of an 
ecosystem service (EsS) framework (section 6.2.3), even though partners all 
reported ecosystem services important to themselves (section 6.2.1).  The 
primary aims of WFD to protect freshwater for the future and improve water 
quality are found to be the most important ecosystem services identified by 
catchment partners. Irwell partners report greater focus on cultural EsS, i.e. 
recreational and heritage values, than Ribble partners, who place greater 
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• Both partnerships place the catchment host and catchment co-ordinator at the 
centre of their networks (section 6.3.5).  Secondary focus is given to the 
natural capital area and least focus to social capital organisations.  
Prominence is not influenced by the presence of a different host organisation.  
Prominence in networks was identified through social network analysis, 
reducing non-response effects in line with best-practice and focussing on 
robust measures.   
• The influence of the mandated authority remains high (section 6.3.5); both 
partnerships report high prominence and influence for those representatives, 
who thus provide system steerage and so prevent divergence from WFD 
goals, in effect describing a top-down controlling model. Consequently, low 
power/interest stakeholders were most concerned with goal prioritisation 
issues (section 6.3.7).  From the analysis presented in this thesis, it may be 
argued that the greatest prominence in catchment collaborative networks is 
given to the political operation of the partnerships and a secondary focus is 
given to the natural capital area. 
• The networks reported in this analysis have differing levels of cohesiveness 
(section 6.3.5).   Differences are reported regarding the support functions 
provided by the catchment host organisation: the Ribble catchment host 
organisation support the partnership with personnel who are directly involved 
with specific functional interests such as farming, invasive species activity and 
publicity mechanisms.  These additional host resources are not found in the 
Irwell partnership, who include the CaBA support team as integral actors 
(section 6.3.5). 
• While both partnerships are heterogeneous with a wide range of partners and 
interests, those functional groups associated with natural capital improvement 
and legislative responsibilities are found to be most influential in this analysis 
(section 6.3.2).  The Ribble collaborative network appears to be more 
homogeneous than the Irwell network having a larger presence of Rivers Trust 
participants and lacking the local groups and heritage actors identified in the 
former partnership make-up.  There are similarities in stakeholder make-up 
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• Both partnerships report a slightly lower level of agreement on ‘how to do’ 
when compared with the level of agreement on ‘what to do’ (section 6.3.6).  
The levels varied among partners, with representatives of those organisations 
involved in partnership working reporting most agreement to act and most trust 
among partners.  There is no significant difference between the examined 
partnerships, both identifying trust issues which are not addressed by formal 
accountability mechanisms (section 6.3.6). 
 
The following sections consider the key themes of the study.  Quotes from individuals 
within both catchments and UK support organisations are provided to expand on 
survey responses.  Qualitative analysis has been led by the a priori themes 
described in section 5.6.6 and responses from stakeholders provide illumination to 
the quantitative survey results.    All respondents are anonymised and the quote 
sources indicated by code in line with ethical requirements, together with the 
stakeholder power and interest mapping designation (High/Medium/Low).  For 
example, the code ‘High pim’ following a quote indicates the respondent is a 
representative of an organisation or group which has a high rating on the power and 
interest mapping (Figure 6.6).  Respondents are anonymised in line with ethical 
requirements and represented by code – no specific designation is attached to the 
code. The full record of narrative responses and derived deductive coding is provided 
at Appendix C.   
7.2  Influential Participants  
Areas of review considered in the following discussion are the: 
- complexity of the partnerships, which will be reviewed to explore how 
individual attitudes to risk and trust influence the agreement to act.  
- structure of the partnerships, through reviewing the prominence and influence 
of key actors within the catchment partnerships identified by application of 
social network analysis.  
- attributes of the catchment partnership actors, to examine how they are a 










7.2.1 Partner Approach 
Institutions managing ecological systems are noted to be complex, with management 
often decentralised from government bodies to the lowest level of governance which 
is deemed capable of dealing with the required tasks (van Oosterzee et al., 2014).  
Catchment partnerships were instigated by UK Government in 2011 and reflect a 
move to this decentralised concept. Catchment partnerships form a body which 
consists of diverse members: participants range from representatives of UK 
Government Agencies through wildlife charities to local community activists (section 
6.3.1), however, such diversity has been found to produce a management dilemma 
regarding innovation and action (DiTomaso et al., 2007).  The increasing demand to 
include stakeholder participation, such as outlined in EU policy Water Framework 
Directive (EC, 2003), is leading to the adoption of governance models which 
incorporate a network focus, building collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships 
(Kemp & Martens, 2007; Marcussen & Torfing, 2003).  MacLeod et al. (2007) have 
stated sustainable catchment management requires integration of a wide range of 
stakeholder requirements and the multi-stakeholder nature of common-property 
water catchments has been noted to be a challenge (Venter et al. 2008), as 
stakeholders in such groups possess varying views, different values and knowledge 
and their expectations reflect different temporal and spatial scales (Stankey et al., 
2005).  The work reported in this thesis builds on partner relationship research in the 
environmental field, by examining the influence of trust and risk-taking on cooperative 
performance through the application of Stacey’s matrix (section 4.5.2), in order to 
understand the behavioural and social dynamics in catchment partnerships.  The 
evolution of catchment partnerships from existing riverine groups has influenced the 
make-up of partnerships (section 6.3.1) and the shared background has produced 
the higher levels of agreement reported for ‘what to do’, but responders from both 
partnerships reported lower levels of agreement on how to implement actions 
(section 6.3.6), which is characteristic of implementation difficulties common to 
heterogeneous groups (DiTomaso et al., 2007).  For both partnerships, the lowest 
levels of agreement (higher scores) were the responses of mid-range managers of 
large government-orientated organisations. For these organisations, hierarchical 
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to implementers enforced through the imposition of numerous laws and regulations 
(Hall, 2011) removing the decision-making required at the lower working levels when 
encountering risk situations, thus avoiding preferences for risk situations in the public 
sector (Dong, 2017).  Catchment partnerships act as collaborative networks and are 
reliant upon mutual dependence and negotiation which is unfamiliar to those working 
in government organisations, hence the greater levels of uncertainty reported. 
~ There still exists a silo mentality in some organisations.  It can be 
difficult particularly in local authorities to identify the officers who can 
take a lead.  Organisational structures can be a barrier. #C06-High pim.  
Earlier research has noted that innovation and creativity, are more likely in 
heterogeneous groups but the ability to integrate divergent ideas and implement 
actions is more difficult (DiTomaso et al., 2007).  In the findings presented, 
catchment partnerships report trust and risk-taking concerns which impact the 
certainty of the group to deliver actions (section 6.3.6), an aspect symptomatic of a 
heterogeneous group and conforming to DiTomaso et al.’s (2007) earlier research.  
The majority of the respondents in this study correspond to the central region of 
Stacey’s matrix (section 6.3.6), that is, the zone where traditional management 
approaches are less effective and which Stacey termed the ‘zone of complexity’ 
(Seigel, 2011).  In this complex zone, organisations report greater levels of creativity, 
innovation and new method adoption, but the participants may feel they are muddling 
through in order to work to a collective outcome.  Catchment partnerships conform to 
this pattern. 
~  There is a lot of new information to absorb, and at times people may 
feel they are being asked to contribute to something they don’t feel they 
have sufficient knowledge of #C41-High pim.    
Sharing knowledge has been identified as a key principal to build stakeholders 
capabilities including trust (Cvitanovic et al., 2015; Dent, 2006), yet both catchment 
partnerships report a result closer to the ‘Partners never share all their information’ 
end of the scale (Irwell mean 3.93±0.27; Ribble mean 3.83±0.32). Central CaBA 
support officers, who are representatives of some of the environmental NGOs who 
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report difficulties for those catchment partnerships which are newly formed and 
where there are pressures to implement actions. 
~ Young CaBa need time to build trust and avoid the mud-slinging 
which often happens ... and this impacts the trust in listening and 
understanding between partners #CS1-High pim.   
However, the catchment partnerships in this study do have longevity, as both were 
pilots, so the lack of trust reported is influenced by some additional aspect.    
~ general lack of collating and sharing data and evidence #C27-High 
pim.   
Factors which influence the lack of information sharing were provided by the partners 
and reported in Appendix C; the key themes identified by the partnership members 
include a lack of resources to amalgamate various plans.  
~ Catchment based approach requires integration and joining up of 
plans and activities of a range of organisations to maximise value ... 
however, with limited resource to undertake the process of joining up, 
even at the level of operating a knowledge transfer network, 
effectiveness is limited #C34–High pim.   
Additionally, where incomplete data are available, there are concerns expressed 
about the confidence partners possess in making decisions on ‘risky’ data. 
~ The weight of evidence approach is simple in concept but only used in 
practise by those who despite the obvious issues are often happy to 
use [this] information after critical review, while others will either believe 
it verbatim or ignore it #C16-High pim.  
Previous researchers have advocated the sharing of scientific information to avoid 
the group relying on personal experience (Cvitanovic et al., 2015) with the 
expectation that this will build trust.   However, this creates a paradox for catchment 
partnerships: to build trust, information is expected to be shared and projects 
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the available information may not satisfy those desiring such information, so trust 
remains lacking.   
Stacey’s matrix correlates simple management practices, which include traditional 
monitoring and evaluation approaches, to the greatest levels of certainty and 
agreement to act.  Where there is less certainty reported, Stacey proposes the use of 
slightly more complicated approaches such as coalition building, negotiation to create 
an acceptable compromise and evaluation against a vision, particularly where 
detailed plans are not available (Seigel, 2011).  Rather than specific, detailed project 
goals, which are not considered inclusive by those low power/interest stakeholders 
(section 6.3.7), catchment internal relationships may benefit from the greater 
flexibility presented by working to an overall vision, reducing additional measurement 
and progress report demands. 
A previous study by Fernandez-Gimenez et al. (2008) noted that collaborative 
working can lead to trust building.  In their 2008 study, the groups under review 
consisted of multiple individuals with different interests and levels of expertise which 
is comparable to the catchment partnership structures.  Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 
(2008) found the strongest trust relationships were reported when diverse mixes of 
personnel were involved equally in a task and there were repeated interactions 
among group members.  Projects designed by a lead agency alone resulted in less 
trust building, an issue which has also been reported by the catchment partnerships, 
~ Issues include managing the politics and tensions around perceived 
‘empire building’ aspirations of some members #C36-High pim.  
although the counterview has also been reported where the lead agency 
implementing actions is considered competent and is delivering desired outcomes. 
~ We trust [XX] and just let them get on with it #C03-High pim.  
Consideration must therefore be given to the issue of goal alignment which impacts 
the trust levels, the attainment of a shared objective producing greater harmony. 
Catchment partnerships have been in place for over three years and aspects of 
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~ We are quite a diverse range of organisations yet I think our specific 
areas of interest are generally complementary #C26-High pim.   
Where the length of relationship and previous cooperative working has influenced 
management choices, working practices may become familiar leading to a 
homogeneous group reporting greater cooperation and trust among members, but 
where aspects of adaptability and innovation are less likely (DiTomaso et al., 2007). 
~ Representatives have been part of the partnership for a long time; 
[XX] catchment partnership members have been present for a while so 
there is no need to keep building relationships #CS2-High pim.   
However, reports of greater cooperation and trust are limited and for both catchment 
partnerships a slightly cautious approach is currently prevailing. 
Costa (2003) explored how trust functions within work teams and the relation with 
team performance.  Perceived trustworthiness and co-operative behaviours were the 
two strongest components of trust identified in the 2003 study, however monitoring 
behaviours within the team resulted in negative impact on trust.  Where the risk 
associated with trusting is high, monitoring becomes the basis for trust building, 
however there is a risk to the organisation, as in high monitoring / low trust scenarios 
the commitment to the organisation decreases (Costa, 2003).     Work by Aulakh et 
al. (1996) reports the use of monitoring mechanisms between partners is detrimental 
to partnership performance.  By considering a move away from monitoring outcomes 
to a social control mechanism instigated through building a common culture, a social 
obligation to the partnership is formed which is maintained via social pressure 
mechanisms (Aulakh et al., 1996).  These mechanisms include the facilitation of role 
understanding through organisational exchanges, so forming shared beliefs and 
interpersonal interactions.  Survey response analysis presented in this thesis, 
indicates that those who are familiar with partnership and collaborative working report 
greater levels of certainty in the success of actions – this suggests that it is the 
personal experience with partnership working which is crucial to cooperative success 
and trust building.  This raises an interesting question – does a reliance on the 
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evaluation, negate the influence of co-operative working in the catchment 
partnership?   What makes a ‘successful’ partnership, therefore, ought to be 
articulated and agreed within catchment partnerships, and incorporate statements of 
knowledge sharing expectations, together with commitment to catchment partnership 
development through work exchanges between organisations.  In Fernandez-
Gimenez et al. (2008) review, the groups under study included an explicit project goal 
to achieve greater levels of co-operative behaviours, which included trust building.   
Catchment partnership may benefit from adopting similar measures when involved in 
cooperative projects. 
Central CaBa support officers recognise successful partnerships as those where 
specific personal qualities are found. 
~ people with the knowledge [are] in the lead organisation, [they] avoid 
alienating sectors [partners] and bring hard-nosed, business discipline 
to each catchment.  Need a scale of ambition #CS1-High pim.   
Personal qualities are identified as including: 
~ Need a risk taker – need someone with an ability to take and own the 
risk and dedication to keep at it   and   
~ which are project orientated and focussed on action #CS1-High pim.  
This suggests the central support team view partnerships with a recognisable leader 
as those expected to deliver against firm objectives  Within the catchment 
partnerships under study, the Ribble catchment host has been successful in leading 
a catchment wide proposal and attracting Heritage Lottery funding of £2M (2015) with 
an aim to “galvanise the partnership through developing and agreeing a clear 
strategy and plan” (Ribble Life, 2015), The Ribble catchment host acts as a 
champion for their catchment, yet the catchment partnership still reported a lack of 
agreement on how to implement plans as respondents have indicated they consider 
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~  XX naturally risk averse so can’t rely on them to push new concept 
forward #CS1-High pim.    
Asymmetric power relations have been shown to undermine long-term prospects 
(Crona & Bodin, 2011; Longcore et al., 2007) and an institutional design review may 
benefit catchment partnerships integration where apparent success is not fully 
supported by all partners.  Unlike the Ribble catchment partnership, the host 
organisation of the Irwell partnership does not act in the champion role.  Instead, 
partner organisations champion their own areas of focus with resultant issues on 
funding competition and a perceived lack of benefit in the adoption of co-operative 
working. 
~ the catchment based approach is additional work for minimal 
perceived benefit and therefore very reliant on the enthusiasm and 
energy of a few people in each partnership to get momentum going 
#C16-High pim.   
~ I think that [catchment partnership] needs to be realistic about what its 
members can/will do #C19-Low pim.   
The area of least agreement to act and least certainty within the Stacey Matrix is 
termed the ‘zone of complexity’ (Figure 4.2) where the more complicated 
management tools of planning, visioning or negotiation are not considered effective 
(Seigel, 2011), however, it is often found that Leaders may emerge from this zone of 
chaos in order to create stability (Seigel, 2011).   Within the Irwell partnership, the 
diversity of policies and desire by some partners for faster implementation of 
catchment activity has resulted in action-orientated individuals, found in Stacey’s 
zone of chaos, introducing tension and influencing other group members. 
~ Given the size of the area and the number in the group, is swift action 
possible? #C31-Low pim.  
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~ stirring the pot, as rivers are not central to the core of [XX] 
organisation #C38-Medium pim.   
The structure and positioning of catchment partnerships as the mandated authority is 
challenged by a proposal to introduce a pan-catchment forum to improve efficiency, 
~ Want to introduce a forum to remove the political interference #C38-
Medium pim. 
However, the introduction of a new player at the grass-roots which overlaps with 
existing partners has reduced trust and led to core partners withdrawing from formal 
meetings.  Avoidance of issues and the adoption of adversarial positions have been 
previously noted when powerful interests dominate, consequently governance design 
is a critical control within collaborative processes (Beyrner-Farris et al., 2010; Brock & 
Carpenter, 2007; Layzer, 2012; Lynch et al., 2008).   Transparency and openness 
are critical to successful partnerships; however, this is not apparent in the responses 
of Irwell partners.   Ladson & Argent (2002; In Stankey et al., 2005) noted that where 
the focus of the lead organisation does not represent the diversity of values within the 
partnership, there may be resistance to change resulting in adherence to the status 
quo.  The majority of the comments received from low power/interest mapped 
stakeholders relate to prioritisation issues and a lack of perceived interest in non-
water related goals: the application of an ecosystem services framework to address 
this weakness is considered in section 7.3 
Within section 7.2.1 the influence of certainty and agreement on catchment 
partnership activity has been examined.  The application of Stacey’s matrix has 
identified responders who are least certain, and report less agreement on how to act, 
and proposals offered on how to develop internal trust and understanding through 
work exchanges.  Those who reported greatest levels of certainty and agreement are 
those familiar with co-operative partnership working, reflecting their learnt 
experiences. 
~ My project works on a partnership model & so the CP is a natural 
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Experience of coalition building and joint activity co-ordination would be anticipated to 
be valued skills within the partnership and consequently those reporting greater 
levels of certainty and agreement would be expected to have a lead role within the 
group and/or be instrumental influencers among their peers.  The structure of both 
catchment partnerships through social network analysis is examined in the following 
sections to ascertain whether those partners who are comfortable with the 
collaborative approach are the leaders of the group or whether hierarchical functions 
or dominant champions have greater influence.   
7.2.2 Partnership Structure 
Both catchment partnerships consist of stakeholders from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, participating according to their interests (section 6.3.1).   A viable 
Catchment Based Approach is generated by engagement and collaborative, 
partnership working (DEFRA, 2013) and the DEFRA policy document deliberately 
excludes prescriptive methods on how catchment partnerships should be organised.  
However, there are two key roles specified among the wider partnership members, 
the competent authority representation and catchment facilitator/host.  Both the 
partnerships reviewed here report these roles to be present and they are, in fact, the 
most prominent within the collaborative networks.   
Watson (2015b) reported the influence of the host impacted the stakeholder mix; this 
has been found where the partnership hosted by an environmental, community 
orientated charity has a greater range of stakeholders within the collaborative 
network than that managed by a river interest body which lacks the local groups and 
heritage actors within the reported partnership network, however, the prominent 
stakeholders within the groups are comparable (section 6.3.5). 
Key Actors 
The Ribble collaborative network appears to be less heterogeneous than the Irwell 
network with a strong riverine influence due to the presence of host organisation 
personnel in addition to the host officer; these personnel are directly involved with 
specific functional interests such as farming, invasive species activity and publicity 
mechanisms.  Network structures do require support and Kowalski and Jenkins 
(2015) identified a critical role for host organisations to provide technical, financial 
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activity.  Indeed, the Catchment pilot feedback report produced in 2013 noted the 
requirement to provide the additional human, administrative and technical resources 
deemed necessary to deliver an effective catchment-scale collaborative initiative, 
proved to be a barrier to one interested organisation (Watson 2013, p24). While the 
support requirement to facilitate collaborative activity has been recognised and 
fulfilled within the Ribble partnership, such support resources are not apparent within 
the Irwell partnership.   Consequently, there may be more potential for collaborative 
activity in the Irwell by strengthening the co-ordinating role with support resources 
similar to those found in the Ribble partnership, rather than relying upon the central 
CaBA support team.  This echoes the findings of Cohen et al. (2012), where co-
ordination roles are noted to be vital to strengthening co-management actions, 
particularly where no alternative co-operative body exists.  It is known that alternative 
fora for natural capital discussions are present in the UK, for example, Local Nature 
Partnerships/ Natural Capital groups, Associations of Local Authorities; examination 
of how catchment partnership members sit within these other fora would illuminate 
duplication and potentially identify whether catchment partners report low cohesion 
where alternatives exist.   The outcome may give a signpost as to how catchment 
partnerships are developing and linking into policy frameworks which provide 
legitimacy to their actions. Further review of the current network dynamics relating to 
the Irwell Partnership are discussed in section 7.4. 
The Ribble catchment host appears to be critical to the flow of information within both 
the partnership structure and their own organisation.   However, by centring upon 
one actor and one organisation there is a risk to the resilience of the Ribble 
catchment partnership should the host organisation withdraw from the hosting 
function or the key actor be lost.   
Partnership Cohesiveness 
Attributing ‘importance’ to the position of a node in a social network implicitly employs 
a theory of social interaction, normally a variant of the theory of social capital. 
Aspects often mentioned in describing social cohesion are shared values and 
communities of interpretation, feelings of a common identity, a sense of belonging to 
the same community, trust among members as well as the reduction of disparities 
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individuals, however the networks reported in this analysis have differing levels of 
cohesiveness, the Ribble partnership reporting density and centralisation values 
three times those of the Irwell Partnership for the collaborative network (Table 6.18).  
The impact of the different cohesion results upon the commonality of purpose and 
belonging are considered: High centralisation is theorised by Bodin et al. (2006) to be 
beneficial to the relaying of information and speedy decision making, which is 
necessary for the coordination of resources particularly during periods of change. 
However, where a few individuals have a high prominence, there may be a risk of 
increasingly centralised decision making, which was found in the case examined by 
Baird et al. (2016); in this Canadian initiative, high density and centralisation values 
of 33% and 36% respectively were identified, together with a decision making sub-
group (Baird et al., 2016).  The Ribble partnership has a centralisation of 28%, similar 
to the Canadian case, which taken together with the reported high prominence of a 
few individuals, suggests a risk of centralised decision making in the Ribble 
partnership.     
Trust is theorised to impact density results; high density at the initiation of a project 
leads to opportunities to increase trust between participants due to greater 
interactions among actors, however high density levels reported beyond the group 
formation stage may result in social control through the homogenisation of views and 
experiences (Bodin et al., 2006); the development of mutual norms and 
understanding of similar perceptions over time may be reinforced by peer-pressure 
from influential actors, possibly restricting the ability to innovate or introduce new 
actors into the group (Bodin et al., 2006).  The Ribble is less heterogeneous then the 
Irwell as the riverine focus is enhanced by member of the catchment host 
organisation in supporting roles, therefore the density value of 15% may be indicative 
of a similarity of ideas and problem-solution within the group.   The Ribble network 
also identifies a sub-group of senior personnel representing major land management 
organisations who report mutual ties with the catchment host, the host also being a 
key influencer within the network. Consequently, there is a risk of unacknowledged 
influence if decision making and agreements on collaborative actions are not made 
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The Irwell catchment partnership reports very low density and centralisation values. 
The hypothesis between structure and performance outlined by Carlsson and 
Sandström (2008), proposes those structures with low cohesion and higher diversity 
may be less effective in decision making, prioritisation and demonstrate difficulties in 
resolving conflicts between partners.  Since June 2016, key members of the Irwell 
partnership, identified as such in social network analysis, have withdrawn from formal 
meetings and co-operative opportunities have fallen.  Partners have expressed a 
number of reasons for this: difficulties in scale and competition for environmental-
uplift funds are prevalent.  Partners report catchment partnerships are a viable 
method of raising interest in river restoration, 
~ value as a mechanism for drawing together work at a strategic/policy 
level, providing a point of reference and perhaps taking on a level of 
public interface work that the partner agencies don’t have the time or 
expertise to do #C19-Low pim. 
 however, the most reported issue covers the lack of funding to implement projects 
and the sharing of the limited funds available in 2014/15. 
~  major issue ...  those organisations / individuals equipped to manage 
funding and deliver on-the-ground are essentially all in competition with 
each other for the limited funding available #C35-High pim.  
~ Restoration is no longer cost efficient, and progress has slowed.  It’s 
very difficult to know how to talk about (and resolve) these issues as a 
group #C35-High pim.  
~  [XX] might provide a starting point for projects but perhaps only as a 
means of attracting / directing funding... where resources are tight this 
is only going to happen if the input/output is considered worthwhile 
#C19-Low pim. 
In the Irwell collaborative network analysis, those actors who are most certain of the 
collaborative working principals are not as prominent within the network and appear 
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collaborative working within the Ribble network (Figure 6.7, section 6.3.5).  The 
Ribble catchment host appears to be critical to the flow of information within both the 
partnership structure and their own organisation; this is reflected in the higher 
cohesion factor reported for the Ribble network.  Those able to champion the 
collaborative approach in the Ribble are well connected to the catchment host who 
has a key influencing aspect which is lacking in the Irwell structure.  This uniting 
function is not apparent in the Irwell and so information relating to collaborative 
working principals and certainty of delivery may be restricted.  To address this 
potential weakness, the function needs to be delivered, if not by the host, by one of 
the key practioners who can champion the success to other partners and to a wider 
stakeholder audience.  
Theoretically, both partnerships may benefit from a denser network traditionally 
achieved by a more hierarchically structured group, however previous researchers 
have warned against systems which are too dense as there is a risk of peer-pressure 
from influential actors which may restrict the ability to innovate or introduce new 
actors into the group (Bodin et al., 2006).  A move to a controlling hierarchy based on 
the current collaborative structures may reduce the influence of social and 
community groups and deliver a more homogenised partnership.  There is a 
particular risk in the Irwell where those possessing collaborative work methods are 
more marginalised than in the Ribble.   
7.2.3 Catchment Partnership – Micro-level Evolution 
The catchment based approach policy framework as designed by DEFRA allows for 
flexibility of approaches and recognises that the patterns of partnership working will 
evolve.  The catchment partnerships considered within this study have engaged with 
the current Catchment Based Approach programme and fulfil the requirements as 
specified in policy documents (DEFRA, 2013).   
The findings from the social networks analysis contained in this thesis, suggest future 
UK policy guidance outlining partnership-led approaches would benefit from the 
inclusion of  aspects of Gugu and Dal Molin’s (2016) recommendations to address 
identified weaknesses, specifically:- clearer statements specifying the resource 
requirements necessary to fully support collaborative partnerships initiatives, so 
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partner; to be transparent of where such support is located in the system; and 
ensuring diverse stakeholder representation enables a range of views and ideas to 
be explored, which may challenge approaches and so maintain adaptability and 
sustainability in the future.  The stakeholders present in the partnerships are similar 
to the River Basin (RB) management contributors (section 6.3.1): the lack of 
difference in stakeholder diversity between the RB and Catchment groups has no 
doubt assisted in focussing the catchment partnership on WFD requirements, the RB 
raison d'être, and so local, non-riverine participants have been found to lack 
influence, being peripheral within partnership social networks. The stakeholder 
mapping of interest and power highlights the continuing notable influence of the 
mandated authority, water companies and wildlife conservation stakeholders, who 
are also key members of the NW River Basin liaison panel.  The homogeneity of 
stakeholders between RB and Catchment groups, reinforces similarities of approach 
to problem solving across geographic scales.  To encourage new ideas and 
approaches to problem solutions, catchment partnerships may wish to review 
stakeholder representation, to prevent RB scale interests from overpowering local 
influence. 
While useful at the implementing team level, Gugu and Dal Molin’s (2016) 
recommendations do not consider the multi-level aspect found in the whole network 
model.  Therefore, network management strategies are required which direct 
interactions between actors via steering strategies which unite the various views and 
perceptions of the actors involved (McGuire, 2006): such steering strategies cover 
the selection of actors who possess the necessary resources to address the policy 
needs and who are motivated to do so.  The influence of such a steering agent is 
identified and discussed in section 7.4.   
Partnership arrangements involve actors agreeing to work together to achieve 
common aims, so building collaborative, multi-stakeholder groups (Kemp & Martens, 
2007; Marcussen & Torfing, 2003), however, in the case of catchment partnerships 
there is no requirement for groups to produce a written partnership agreement and/or 
be directed by a formal steering group, although CaBA Support best-practise 
documents do advocate such formalisation of roles and responsibilities (CBA, 
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not however offer joint bargaining power to access financial resources, as the 
partnership network does not have a separate legal status outside of its members 
and financial transactions occur within each independent organisation, consequently, 
large scale opportunities are often more difficult to attract (OTS, 2008).  The Ribble 
partnership has secured a large Lottery Fund award, but such funding has been 
through the auspices of the Rivers Trust and not in the name of the partnership.  This 
action has provided the catchment unit with public liability coverage, removing legal 
and financial penalty risk, encouraging the imaginative and wide-ranging actions 
expected by DEFRA.  To facilitate such financial opportunities, there is an argument 
for catchment partnerships to legalise their status - should CPs continue to exist as a 
separate entity or become ‘embedded’ within the local Rivers Trust organisation?  
Embedding does present a risk as the strategic direction of Rivers Trusts has been 
noted to exhibit a WFD focussed agenda and so the catchment partnership may lose 
social-focus benefits, but there is a great opportunity to be seen as a more relevant 
and credible organisation.  Thus, the Rivers Trust ‘formulae’ regarding the method of 
approach, planning, prioritisation and measurement is embraced, both explicitly and 
implicitly, diluting competing stakeholder preferences.  As social-orientated agents 
are currently either not present in one of the examined partnerships, or walking away 
from the partnerships as they are currently structured in the second, maybe it is time 
to consider a change in system structure: the proposed agent is, therefore, not the 
EA nor CaBA Support, a de facto Rivers Trust support team, but the Rivers Trust, 
who are, thus, clearly recognised and held accountable for delivery of WFD and EsS 
requirements.   
7.3  Ecosystem Services Focus 
Barriers to achieving WFD improvements have been presented in the NWRBM plan 
as four key issues.  This RBM framework is not reflected in catchment plans, but 
when such a comparison is made, the impact of local context on goal choices is 
made apparent - a strong riverine and riparian focus is reported for the Ribble 
partnership versus the urban, green-infrastructure focus found in the Irwell 
partnership plans (Table 6.10).  Partnership key aims are presented in terms relating 
to the water quality, ecological potential and resilient water bodies (James et al., 
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presented in WFD terms (Table 6.11).  But is WFD the only desirable outcome?  The 
mandated authority confirmed their desire to direct CPs to the achievement of WFD 
goals in preference to non-WFD aims at the 2017 CaBA conference, yet Chan et al. 
(2012) identified a focus on ecosystem services as a means for improving decision-
making through the integration of ecosystem service information into planning and 
management.  Further, Wallace (2007) advises measures of EsS ought to be in 
terms overtly relevant to the daily lives of people, in order to engage a diverse group 
in natural resource decisions, thus, the significance of the work which examines the 
range of ecosystem services present in historic published material is shown, through 
recognising what and how stakeholders recognise EsS.  By examining the intrinsic 
values contained in historic published material, socio-political factors forming an 
alternative focus for catchment partnership goals are explored (section 6.2.2). 
The catchment ecosystem services case studies have not sought to identify cultural 
aspects of spirituality and aesthetic appreciation as the narratives examined do not 
record these facets.  Areas for further study would be examination of aesthetic 
appreciation deduced from pictorial records, plus existence values of well-being and 
sense of place through direct interaction with stakeholders.  In both cases, the 
ecosystem service framework would appear to be a suitable method of analysis 
incorporating the tangible aspects and the emotional responses.  Historical narrative 
analysis has been possible for the area under study due to the existence of 
publications which provide sufficient detail for ecosystem services identification.  The 
applicability of this method to other locations is constrained where such records do 
not exist, however an alternative application of the ecosystem service framework in 
the identification of social recollections with local stakeholders could be equally 
revealing.  A discussion of the EsS found in the catchment examinations (section 
6.2.2) follows. 
Over the past 300 years, the rivers have been impacted by those people living and 
working on its banks: changes in economic drivers, technology innovations and 
social movement have advanced and relegated the importance of specific aspects of 
the river to local populations.  The intuitive methodology adopted in the case studies 
has enabled temporal changes in key ecosystem services of provisioning, regulating 
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historical public data sources which may be considered unsuitable for advanced tools 
and techniques such as GIS. 
The ease of identification of tangible benefits has previously been noted by Guo et al. 
(2010) and this case study reconfirms this observation within both catchments, 
however, the temporal change in EsS prioritisation along a given river length is found 
to be influenced by typography and underlying geology.  For the Ribble catchment, 
the migration from regulating services which maintain an agricultural tradition to 
provisioning services supporting industrial based economic developments are found 
in tributaries which drain uplands and so pass through valleys which support water-
powered industrialisation in early industrialisation period.  Thus, there is a duality of 
importance found in the Ribble catchment in the 21st century: both agricultural and 
industrial traditions.  This duality is lacking in the Irwell catchment which developed 
industrial and residential sites upon agricultural lands throughout the flood plain.  
Analysis has found contentions within ecosystem services categories which can be 
unpicked and made visible by the application of the ecosystem service framework.  In 
the Irwell catchment, the major tangible benefit of providing water for industrial 
process in the 1800s is readily identifiable from the construction of mills and weirs 
along the river channel; however, the social impact of pollutant dispersal and 
contamination of drinking water is recorded in published histories, for example, the 
impact of the cholera epidemic in Manchester in 1832 (Harwood, 1895).  Provision of 
clean water for drinking is critical to the health of the population but is a secondary 
provisioning value for the Irwell, the primary value continuing to be a provisioning 
service supporting industrial processes.  Through cultural bequest value analysis, the 
historical social value conflict and method of resolution is illuminated; in this case 
Manchester and Salford obtained an alternative clean water supply from 1851 which 
still impacts the hydrology of the Irwell in the 21st century, with over half of the current 
North West water supply extracted from Cumbria and Wales (UU, 2018).  Disservice 
aspects are less reported in ecosystem assessments (Lyytimaki et al., 2008) and in 
this study the methodology applied has identified disservices values as disruptions to 
local infrastructure (bequest disservice) and reduced skill opportunities (cognitive 
disservice).  Consequently, the full impact of an event, for example a primary-
regulating flood event, is illuminated when an ecosystem service and disservice 
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recreational value for urban populations, consequently, cultural services ought to be 
important for both catchment management teams.  However, the full range of cultural 
service identified includes bequest and cognitive areas in addition to the more readily 
identifiable recreational services (Guo et al., 2010).  Areas of spiritual and artistic 
appreciation are not addressed in the method used, so further opportunity exists to 
use alternative sources to examine those cultural services.   
As demonstrated here, applying the ecosystem service framework to landscape 
management has the potential to identify conflicts otherwise obscured and so enable 
solutions to be proposed which alleviate stakeholder concerns.  Thus, the application 
of the ecosystem services framework facilitates the identification of cultural values 
which add a further important dimension to landscape assessment and provide a 
benchmark against which the current catchment management knowledge and 
importance of ecosystem services can be placed, recognising individual knowledge 
and awareness of the ecosystem services terms are likely to vary among catchment 
managers. 
Both the RBM and catchment plans, as published in current material, are presented 
without reference to either improving or maintaining provisioning, regulating or 
cultural ecosystem services.  To incorporate an EsS perspective requires participants 
to understand EsS or be aware of who may possess such knowledge within their 
group if they believe they are lacking information.  The research presented here 
undertook such a knowledge examination within the selected catchment partnerships 
and found all members are able to prioritise riverine goods and services, even if they 
believe they are not aware of EsS as a concept (section 6.2.1).  This suggest it is the 
terminology which is barrier to application of an EsS framework, rather than a lack of 
services appreciation.  This finding conforms with previous research which found the 
term ecosystem service was not commonly understood outside of the scientific and 
policymaking community (Norgaard, 2010; Thompson et al., 2016).  Thompson et al. 
(2016) found <10% of their survey participants had heard of the EsS term.  In the 
research presented in this thesis, there was a greater proportion of respondents who 
had some awareness of the term – only one respondent reported never having heard 
of the term.  As the majority of the responders are associated with riverine 
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awareness and use of the EsS term, but disappointing to find plans and programmes 
do not contain an EsS aspect to guide the partnership decision making approach.    
Through capturing the participants personal values of specific ecosystem services, a 
number of cultural aspects not prioritised in the main published aims have been 
identified, specifically recreational and spiritual opportunities in the urban 
environment: these aspects were not lacking in the more rural Ribble catchment 
partnership responses, achieving similar levels of importance as wildlife habitat 
services.  Cultural EsS have played an important role in motivating support for 
ecosystem protection (Daniel et al., 2012) and this study has found the lack of an 
EsS framework approach within either the RBM plan or publicised catchment 
programmes may have contributed to a suppression of cultural services valuation in 
action plans, resulting in an unresolved frustration from members of the partnership 
for whom riverine services are not their area of interest. 
~ There is an overwhelming emphasis on natural environment versus 
[other considerations] #C39-Low pim.   
~ Catchment partnership is primarily a collection of professional 
(salaried) eco-interested parties, so some stakeholders are not 
represented.  Biodiversity interests have been at the fore #CS2-High 
pim.   
This is comparable to the findings of Butler et al. (2001, In Stankey et al., 2005) who 
found complexity exacerbated stakeholders’ concerns regarding impacts on their 
areas of interests, and also those of Daniel et al. (2012), where weak integration of 
cultural EsS in policy framework obstructed opportunities. Both of the examined 
catchment partnerships’ publicity material place importance on the social benefits of 
the rivers, yet those stakeholders most associated with heritage and leisure activities 
are found to be more peripheral within the key people and collaborating networks, 
functional groups associated with natural capital improvement being more prominent 
and influential (Figure 6.7). Consequently, the partnership remains focussed on WFD 
goals and the lack of adoption of an ecosystem service approach to visioning, results 
in cultural EsS receding in importance.  The catchment partnership will no doubt be 
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an opportunity to deliver multiple benefits which adoption of an EsS approach to 
planning and evidence analysis could fulfil, engaging a greater diversity of 
participants within the catchment partnerships.  Blackmore et al. (2016) argue for an 
expansion of the catchment partnership mandate to emphasise more than WFD.  
The research contained in this thesis also supports a widening of interests, 
demonstrated by the importance participating actors give to a range of ecosystem 
services beyond water quality.  It follows that a formal statement on the mandatory 
use of the ecosystem service framework within policy documentation would ensure 
consideration of aspects beyond WFD, such as those cultural aspects relevant to 
health and well-being, so inviting greater appreciation and potential contribution from 
social funding bodies. 
The timeline of ecosystem service interaction and reaction to events has been 
explored and the current value of the river to those who work and reside along the 
river length is considered: for the Ribble, there remains a predominantly agricultural 
focus in the main river channel impacted by regulating services, however in 
urbanised Ribble tributaries and throughout the Irwell catchment, the river is 
predominantly recognised as a recreational-focussed asset (APEM, 2004; HLF, 
2011).  In the 20th century, concerted efforts were made to address water quality 
issues in the North West river basin as UK Government funds were made available to 
‘clean’ rivers in the UK in the 1970s and 80s.  In exposing the timeframe of ecological 
degradation and recovery, current development plans for the catchments may be 
examined to ensure impact assessments have sufficient depth and breadth.  By 
presenting plans in neither RBM or EsS framework, but introducing WFD foci, the 
ability to see the value of the catchment partnership contribution to local population-
needs is obscured: opportunity exist for catchment partnerships to enhance their 
current perception and contribute to a wider audience through adoption of an 
ecosystem service framework in their plans which will provide a temporal view of the 
changes desired and provide a relevant focus for local groups. 
7.4 Network System Dynamics 
Within this thesis, organisational complexity analysis has been explicitly applied to 
the interactions of members of the selected catchment partnerships to expose the 
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complexity analysis approached from a systemic view-point to explain why system-
wide behaviour emerges from the interactions between larger collections of simple 
components (Cairney, 2012b) may also be applied to the system stewardship 
framework uncovered.  
The shift from government-centred to system network-centred approaches to 
implementation has led actors from the public, private and non-profit sectors to be 
involved in compliance, monitoring and oversight functions (Papadopoulos, 2010).  In 
the Institute for Government working paper, System Stewardship: the future of policy 
making? (Hallsworth, 2011), the author argues that, policy makers need to see 
themselves less as sitting on top of a delivery chain, but as stewards of systems with 
multiple actors and decision makers whose choices will decide how policy is realised. 
Hallsworth (2011) defined system stewardship to be one of making structured 
judgements, taking in to account the goals, rules, feedback and the intervention 
response required to a given situation.  However, central government are not the only 
actor that may perform a system stewardship steering role (Jones, 2011) and in the 
case examined in this thesis, the supportive functions undertaken by both the EA and 
the CaBA Support Group both fulfil oversight roles. DEFRA established the CaBA 
Support Group to steer and support the development of new capability and delivery 
mechanisms to facilitate engagement around WFD and related delivery via these 
partnerships (DEFRA, 2014, p1).  Cohen et al. (2012) noted co-ordination roles are 
vital to strengthening co-management actions: technical and team development 
support resources are not currently delivered by the host organisation in one of the 
studied partnerships, but by the central CaBA support organisation.  Consequently, 
there is an additional collaborating body which provides influence, directing the 
development of management procedures and practices, in addition to the mandated 
authority. For example, CaBA Support best-practise documents advocate the 
formalisation of roles and responsibilities in a written partnership agreement and/or 
be directed by a formal steering group (CBA, 2017b) even though there is no policy 
requirement for groups to do so.   The oversight role of CaBA central support team, 
thus, grows more influential, leading the development of the catchment approach, yet 
the diversity of participants within that group is lacking being primarily Rivers Trust 
personnel (CBA, 2017a). CaBA support group act in effect as a sub-contractor to 
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acknowledgement of their influence toward fulfilment of WFD goals.    Figure 7.1 
identifies this additional agency alongside the roles and feedback route of the WFD 
designated, responsible agent, the EA; thus, DEFRA exert influence to both system 
steward agents, that is, the EA and the CaBA Support team.   
 
Figure 7.1: Dual System Stewardship model in the current catchment management 
system. (Author’s own, 2018, unpublished). 
Feedback loops to DEFRA provide intelligence on the state of water quality to fulfil 
EU reporting requirements via the EA and also information is provided to Ministers 
from CaBA support regarding the catchment approach adoption and project delivery 
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develops −  their development was publicised at the national CaBA conference, 
Manchester 2017 − there is a greater influence from the central CaBA support unit in 
all catchment partnerships, including those where to date catchment host 
organisations may have provided support.   
The oversight role of CaBA central support team thus grows more influential, leading 
the development of the entire catchment approach, yet the diversity of participants 
within that group is lacking being primarily Rivers Trust personnel, thus, a strong 
Rivers Trust focus leads both development and advocacy for the catchment based 
approach and has a considerable presence managing a large number of catchment 
partnerships as the host organisation (Table 2.5).   
Despite the shift in tasks from central government to management by multiple 
agencies at multi-levels, the research reported in this thesis finds the UK Ministry 
(DEFRA) still maintains an important role in steering environmental policy to achieve 
WFD goals and objectives. DEFRA formulates the vision and direction of UK policy 
and directs through regulation the EA, as the responsible authority, and also controls 
CaBA support group resources. 
Borzel (2011: In Curry, 2015) identified issues with the termination of network 
management structures and the regaining of control by central governments.   The 
current catchment policy framework lacks a termination framework, and consideration 
of how legitimisation of action is to be maintained should catchment partnerships 
terminate, must be factored into future implementation directives.  However, within 
the identified network the statutory responsibility is retained by UK Government 
whether catchment partnerships cease or not, as the system stewardship model 
maintains overall control by DEFRA via the EA. 
As it stands, the water policy system examined identified a similarity of representation 
at different levels, both river basin and catchment, where the influence of host 
organisations and EA co-ordinators provide a cohesive focus on WFD goals and 
provide strong influence within catchment partnerships.  Thus, the control and co-
operation which prevents the collapse of the system network identified by Blackman 
(2001) is present.   The steering ministry (DEFRA) and the two agents, the EA and 
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2015) which is directed to the hierarchical structure, rather than the devolved level 
recommended by Amagoh (2008).   
The approach taken by DEFRA, in utilising a Rivers Trust orientated support network 
to steer the catchment partnership actions, makes it difficult to hold UK Government 
accountable for decisions made through their influence as there is a lack of 
transparency of this activity.  The implications for accountability in a complex policy 
implementation situation is further reviewed in the following section.   
7.4.1 Policy Framework  
The CaBA policy framework was published in May 2013 with an objective of 
establishing locally-focussed decision making through the launch of catchment 
partnerships (DEFRA, 2013).  Governance options are currently being appraised 
following the award of €20.0 million in 2014/15 to the UK Environment Agency (LIFE-
IP RBMP-NWRBD UK) to address barriers for the North-West England river basin 
water bodies which prevent achievement of “good” ecological status, as required by 
the Water Framework Directive (EU, 2016).  To contribute to this discussion, the 
following key points highlighting the risk to policy delivery through a non-statutory, 
unaccountable model and the means to address these risks, are presented. 
Matland’s implementation analysis tool (1995) was applied in this study to explore the 
WFD implementation mechanism within England & Wales.  The WFD policy 
document contains key requirements for water quality and quantity, applicable 
throughout the EU, and defines the measures and reporting time frames.  There is no 
doubt this is a political implementation model and as such provides legitimacy to the 
hierarchical sub-structure of implementing actors, but there is also an un-expressed 
responsibility for the governing levels to ensure supporting resources are available to 
facilitate the actions delivering the policy targets. However, the catchment level of 
implementation in England and Wales is not tied-in to this political structure, and sits, 
as a non-statutory element, so acting as an experimental implementation mechanism 
(section 6.1).  Hovik and Hanssen (2015) stress the importance of political anchorage 
as the key to integrating the local and hierarchical networks; there appears to be a 
significant opportunity to anchor catchment partnerships within river basin district 
planning, beyond that of advisory status.   Currently, catchment partnerships are not 
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dominant player, and their ability to contribute to WFD goals is constrained, albeit 
their key aspirations remain WFD objectives. 
The CaBA policy framework delivered national coverage of multi-organisational 
partnerships but lacked a formal mandate or identified accountability mechanisms.  
From the evidence presented in this research thesis, the CaBA policy framework has 
enabled a system approach to policy implementation.  The catchment partnership 
working approach introduced by DEFRA (2013) has delivered a co-operative, 
networking structure, consisting of linkages between individual members of different 
organisations who are collaborating partners (Berkes, 2009), however, the 
implementation of WFD through this mechanism has proved to be challenging (HoL, 
2012).   Networks may create an accountability deficit where responsibility is difficult 
to apportion (Papadopoulos, 2010), so the following discussion considers the two 
accountability typologies presented in the system model, that is democratic 
accountability and secondly, peer to peer accountability.   Illumination of the current 
situation within the examined catchments is provided by reflecting upon the results of 
both the quantitative and qualitative analysis.   
Democratic Accountability:  Elected policy makers are charged to account for their 
decisions and so the framework of network implementation complexity does not mix 
well with traditional government accountability (Peters & Pierre, 1998).   Under earlier 
policy implementation models, public accountability was linked to the bureaucratic 
top-down model where those ‘lower’ in the process structure had to account to their 
superiors; an alternative bottom-up accountability view developed, that is, the users 
of a service, ‘customers’, were to hold the bureaucrats accountable (Abels, 2007). In 
the stewardship system examined, democratic responsibility lies in the publicised 
statutory route (Figure 4.1), that is, EU    DEFRA    EA    RBM, and formal feedback 
of compliance standards, such as, specified measures and reporting requirements 
relating to WFD, is through this same ‘top-down’ route, so excluding multi-level, non-
statutory elements and an additional steering agent.  Catchment partnerships are 
expected to fulfil the WFD policy demand for stakeholder inclusion in decision-
making, a role specified in policy documentation  important to ensure there is a 
clearer link between river basin management planning, underpinned by stakeholders 
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p15), however, the CaBA approach launched in England and Wales in 2013, delivers 
a non-statutory, complementary body to support the formalised WFD implementation 
mechanism.  WFD policy implementation is co-dependent on local activists to 
engage in projects which support the river basin plan; such activists are not 
hierarchically linked to the river boards and thus not under any legislative pressure to 
deliver WFD goals, breaking the formal democratic top-down accountability line.  
However, the catchment policy framework does explicitly require catchment 
partnerships to support WFD, and river basin management plans do have specific 
sections for catchment contributions, thus the partnerships are linked to the 
democratic accountability feedback (bottom-up) framework.   
Rhodes (in Moran et al., 2006) notes that the presence of multiple accountabilities 
fragments policy design and policy delivery and so weakens central control.  Steps 
are taken to reduce this potential weakening of power by ensuring the EA, the UK 
Ministry agent, is a mandated partner within catchment partnerships.  However, this 
study found frustration within partnerships due to the constraints placed on group 
goals which arise from the influence of the mandated organisation (see section 7.2).  
This expression of interference echoes the findings of Goodwin and Grix (2011), who 
considered the introduction of network policy implementation models results in a 
paradox: there is an increased dependence to deliver state-set goals and operating 
models by independent actors outside the central government organisation, yet to do 
so reduces the autonomy of those ‘independent’ actors.   
Under a traditional accountability framework, innovative and adaptive programmes 
that address new opportunities and adjust to changing condition are likely to be 
evaluated negatively (Patton, 2011), as traditional approaches to accountability often 
evaluate and validate programme models through targets, seeking pre-identified, 
intended outcomes (Mills & Koliba, 2015; Patton, 2011).  This approach forms a 
tension between collaborating partnerships and funders who anticipate explicit pre-
ordained criteria to be met; such tensions are reported by the responders to this 
study, finding a lack of support among funders for the multi-partner, collaborative 
approach – external bodies business strategies are not synchronised with the 
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for further UK devolution where the expectation of fulfilment by localised groups will 
not occur if funding opportunities remain constrained.  
The stakeholder concept embedded in the Aarhus Convention (E.C., 2015) has 
encouraged information and explanation sharing beyond the range of actors involved 
in the implementation process and Governments are now commonly held to account 
through the involvement of different interest groups.  In the case examined, it is the 
Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords who have acted as 
external reviewers of the democratic process in the UK and outcomes from their 
committee reviews have critiqued WFD implementation processes including the 
catchment based approach (HoC, 2016; HoL, 2012).  Consideration of variable 
accountability standards appropriate for complex policy-delivery processes does not 
appear to be considered within current legal statutes.  The CaBA policy framework 
delivered national coverage of multi-organisational partnerships but lacks a formal 
mandate or identified accountability mechanisms.  DEFRA, and its responsible body 
the EA, must maintain the existing democratic accountability link to comply with 
statutory demands, however it is considered future CaBA policy frameworks need to 
specify the ongoing long-term support requirements, monetary and people, together 
with consideration of the wider accountability remit. In their analysis of organisational 
change in the public-sector Dunleavy et al (2005) identify a stall, or even reversal, of 
the transition to new forms of public sector management in advanced countries, due 
to the adverse indirect effect of increased institutional and policy complexity – it is 
possible the additional complexity introduced through formalising accountability 
within the system stewardship network would be a barrier to further diverse agent 
participation. 
Peer–to-Peer Accountability:  From the evidence presented, the CaBA policy 
framework has enabled a system approach to policy implementation, however, the 
inclusion of regulatory and statutory bodies, plus NGOs, within the system network at 
differing levels has implications for accountability. Accountability which has been 
found in network structures is commonly based on ‘peer’ forms of monitoring and 
legitimacy between network participants, rather than the usual democratic form of 
accountability (Curry, 2015).  Traditional approaches to accountability evaluate and 
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outcomes (Mills & Koliba, 2015; Patton, 2011), in contrast, complexity sensitive 
evaluation supports the development of innovation and the generation of possibilities 
as there is no pre-conceived, known solution (Patton, 2011).  This forms a tension 
between catchment agents and funders who anticipate explicit pre-ordained criteria 
to be met, such as those identified in WFD policy documentation, and the alternative 
accountability focus of those involve in the emergent implementation who respond to 
the dynamic opportunities presented in the local catchment context.  
Networks often favour the presence of specified or specialised groups of actors, 
elected and unelected; this may result in weak representation for citizen groups or 
elected groups not linked with the specialism (Papadopoulos, 2010). This is found to 
be the case in the system network examined, where the catchment partnerships are 
dominated, and led, by river interest groups.  The lack of a control mechanism has 
led to a lack of trust being expressed by less powerful collaborating actors. The 
formalisation of internal working relationships outlining behaviours, expectations and 
commitments is being addressed through terms of reference documentation, but 
production is taking a lot of resource, as some partners view CaBA activity as a 
burden and an addition to their normal working requirements.  The lack of a conflict 
resolution mechanism is resulting in high levels of continuing dis-trust, found in both 
quantitative and qualitative findings, particularly among larger conservation 
organisation representatives who have already experienced project tensions.  
Currently, vocal participants not satisfied with either the aims or performance of the 
partnership are deliberately introducing contention, forming disruptive and 
acrimonious relationships likely to results in the abandonment of the partnership by 
key organisations.  The literature on peer accountability does outline tools which may 
be applied in complex, multi-actor situations (Behn, 2001; Bovens et al, 2008; Boyne 
& O’Toole, 2006; Esmark, 2007; Fung, 2004; March & Olsen, 1995), but were not 
identified with a specific typology of complexity.  To correct this omission, peer-to-
peer tools are now presented against an axis of implementation complexity, to aid the 









Figure 7.2: Accountability tools aligned to implementation complexity, presented here 
arranged from low complexity to high complexity. (Author’s own, 2018, unpublished). 
The current WFD / catchment implementation model analysis presented earlier, 
identified, by the application of Matland’s framework (1995), two aspects that is, a 
Political model to the River Basin level and an Experimental model at the catchment 
level. Through a comparison of the issues and barriers to implementation so 
identified, accountability tools most appropriate for the mixed implementation models 
uncovered may be identified.  
Political complexity may produce goal conflict and so administrative solutions are 
often less prevalent due to a lack of agreement.  Where power interests shape the 
choice of action and prioritisation of activities, agreement on process or the actions to 
be adopted is a key measure of accountability.  High conflict on what to do acts as a 
barrier to entering the process as there may be goal incompatibility, threats to self-
interest and aggressive power-based behaviours with disputes resolved by 
bargaining or coercion. Lack of achievement to the simple reporting requirement set 
out in WFD documents has been identified by EU Review, yet there is a lack of 
consideration of different reporting mechanisms other than achieving set targets. In 
these politically complex cases, 3600 feedback and Representation Perspective 
reviews which consider a set of standards drawn together from all those involved 
organisations present to assess behaviours and interactions among the actors, may 
provide a richer understanding of why implementation is lagging in some EU States.   
In Experimental implementation models, administrative accountability may be limited, 
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powerful agents may capture the implementation process resulting in outcomes 
significantly shape by individual and group interests, thus local goals are more likely 
to be met than statutory objectives. The local context results in different priories for 
each catchment partnership which makes it difficult to monitor activities as there is a 
lack of a formal reporting route, lack of uniformity of understanding across multiple 
sites, variation in participation and local diverse implementation actors present.  
Here, Learning Development, which assesses both knowledge and competence to 
delivers the desired goals is proposed as a method to evaluate implementation and 
such assessment may be evaluated by external fora.  Internal working highlighting 
the degree of delegation and/or involvement may be reviewed through Accountable 
Autonomy which is performed by close, interactive dialogues among the range of 
actors. While Learning and Accountable Autonomy are considered to be appropriate 
tools for experimental implementation models, there is no barrier to consideration of 
360o and Representation tools (section 2.2.2), which may be preferred options for 
different catchment partnerships.  
Figure 7.3 summarises the alignment of accountability tools to Matland’s Ambiguity-
Conflict implementation policy framework (1995).  
 
Figure 7.3 Accountability aligned to Matland’s implementation model framework. 
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Although a democratic accountability framework is found to be present within the 
total system via the political, statutory model, there is a lack of peer to peer 
accountability linked to the multi-level nature of the decision-influencing actors. To 
address the lack of peer accountability in the current catchment policy framework, 
based on the research reported here, it is proposed that accountability tools are 
specified in future policy documentation and applied across all the multi-levels, 
including steering agencies. 
An updated policy framework is required now that catchment partnerships have 
developed into more mature organisations.  Within the DEFRA policy directive which 
launched the catchment based approach there are weaknesses which need to be 
strengthened to address the network system adopted, particularly clarity of the dual-
network structure and steerage responsibilities, accountability of both the democratic 
and peer networks through the use of appropriate tools, and enablement of wider 
natural capital benefits through the mandated application of an ecosystem service 
approach.  However, there is a danger of continuing complexity and problem-solving 
overload: In their analysis of organisational change in the public-sector Dunleavy et 
al (2005) identify a stall, or even reversal, of the transition to new forms of public 
sector management in advanced countries, due to the adverse indirect effect 
increased institutional and policy complexity.   
The adoption of current ‘digital-era’ information technology, social media, is 
suggested as a mechanism to re-integrate and simplify the relationship between 
agents and the public, thereby embracing the cultural and behavioural changes 
prevalent in society (Dunleavy et al., 2005).  Outcomes are identified as reducing the 
layers of impenetrability by removing agents and re-connecting processes, facilitating 
the direct flow of information to the public and allowing the public a mechanism to be 
engaged in the democratic process (Dunleavy et al., 2005). The availability of 
information through the internet and views registered on social media has increased 
the demand for transparency of decisions and actions and also responsiveness to 
issues raised, so opportunity is considered to exist within an updated policy 
framework to specify an integrated communication strategy, so relieving demand 
upon individual partnerships and utilising digital-era media as per current cultural 
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7.4.2 Localism Agenda Implications 
Important insights into the recomposition of local power relations under the Localism 
and Devolved Powers agenda are presented (LINK)   Evidence of a network design, 
the network system model, in which UK Government retains ultimate power over the 
central objectives and exerts influence over the composition of the local system 
stewardship network, is reviewed in the previous section.  Playing such a determining 
role in both network composition and rules of participation has enabled DEFRA to set 
the framework within which catchment partnerships operate.  
Concurrently, a similar remoulding of local governance networks is occurring: since 
2010, the UK Government has undertaken a radical programme of devolution in 
England, facilitating the decentralisation of power to councils, neighbourhoods and 
individuals (CLG, 2015).   Bailey and Wood (2017) identify the creation of 
reconstituted networks under the English devolution approach, which maintains 
central government priorities at the local level through the outline of what local 
authorities should be doing and the way in which they should be delivering 
programmes (p975).  This emerging model establishes a structure which aligns the 
local political agenda to Treasury objectives, which Bailey and Wood (2017) termed 
‘centralisation by stealth’.   
The Localism Agenda is a prominent part of local politics throughout the North West 
River Basin, as seen by the introduction of the Mayoral Office for Greater Manchester 
and by moves to introduce a new combined authority for Lancashire (GMCA, 2017; 
LCC, 2017).  However, the move to decentralising power is not an opportunity for 
local areas to define their own political and socio-economic goals, but a devolution 
model where central objectives are delivered by local government. This can be 
understood through the lens of meta-governance outlined by Bailey and Wood (2017) 
where central government exert influence over local networks through network 
framing - the mechanism through which asymmetric relations between actors within 
the networks, networks in different locations and central government departments are 
constructed.  
Greater Manchester is at a more advanced stage of locally devolved powers and the 
current reconfiguring of the Greater Manchester environmental network is 
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has reworked environmental policy implementation to the local level, through the 
establishment of Natural Capital Groups and Local Nature Partnerships which sit 
under the GMCA umbrella.  Additionally, there are further environmental interests at 
lower hierarchical levels, such as the Low Carbon Hub.  Bailey and Wood’s (2017) 
review of outcomes pertaining to the devolution narrative, found only 0.8% of the 
devolution arguments related to the environment – with comments on carbon-
reduction prevalent.   
 
Figure 7.4: Localism and devolved powers impact upon the governance structure of 
Irwell catchment partnership 2017. (Author’s own, 2018, unpublished). 
Presently, the Irwell CaBA Partnership sits as attendees to GMCA fora, but maintains 
a links to the governance framework identified in 2013 and so is not yet completely 
placed within the local authority mechanisms.   Future governance may involve the 
transfer of CaBA local groups from DEFRA steerage to DCLG control, however, to 
achieve such a placement, requires the agreement of multiple UK Government 
departments (DEFRA and DCLG) and formalisation within the local devolved powers 
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needs to address the placement of the CaBA support group, which currently sits 
outside of the local powers scope.    An ability to rescind responsibilities which may 
be imposed through the localism agenda is not presented in catchment partnership 
policy documentation and there is a need to address this inconsistency within the 
range of emerging agreements.  Such agreements need to establish limits on central 
control imposed via devolved supporting mechanism, the performance accountability 
and the evaluation mechanisms which Bailey and Wood (2017) consider are to be 
fulfilled in order to continue to receive HM government funding via the localism 
agenda.  
The policy design of the catchment partnerships reflects the overall expression of 
localism combining local empowerment and collaboration with the private sector, 
however the transition to less ‘dependency’ on central government is not addressed.  
Central government power continues to be present in the partnerships through the 
mandated authority and WFD environmental investment, consequently, local aims 
and priorities remain largely undelivered.  The heterogeneity of catchment 
partnership goals and objectives do not fulfil a simple standardised delivery model as 
each site is a distinct, unique requirement and the mechanism for accountability in 
complex networks remains unspecified for catchment partnerships.  The involvement 
of local government actors reflects a ’co-opting’ of elites (Bailey & Wood, 2017), who 
are thus responsible for policy success or failure, but who’s goals are directed from 
central government. Localism does not deliver a fully decentralised decision-making 
opportunity but does devolve accountability to potentially unprepared local actors.  
Are catchment partnerships at risk of being a scape-goat for the failure to achieve 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
Implementation of water policy in England has been directed from the European, to 
national, to regional levels, to localised actors.  As a result, there is a vertical aspect 
to measuring policy effectiveness, while links between government agencies and 
non-state led actors at the catchment scale bring a horizontal aspect to the 
catchment partnership structure.  Implementation of the catchment partnership 
approach has not been proscriptive allowing the local context to influence partnership 
development.   
The research reported in this thesis focuses on the structure of mature, catchment-
scale partnerships and, drawing on theoretical insights of implementation and 
complexity science analysis, has identified an active system stewardship model.  By 
applying complexity research methods, the study outcomes have illuminated dual-
steerage at the system (macro) level and exposed concentrated decision-making and 
the setting of direction among a few core actors at the individual (micro) level.  The 
application of a complexity science approach has proved to be suitable for the 
examination of implementation models where there is a mixed typology, identifying 
system dynamics at both the macro and micro level.  
So, who are the movers & shakers? 
The transfer of power and function from the central ministry outlined by Rhodes 
(1996) which delivers governance, as opposed to government control, is not found in 
this examination of the catchment based approach, nor is the network of catchment 
partners found to be composed of power-equal partners. 
Goodwin and Grix (2011) outlined an asymmetric network concept where the shift 
from government to governance through agencies is discernible, but power and 
ultimate leadership remains with the state; such a controlling network has been found 
in this study where the system stewardship agent operates to direct catchment 
partnership actions.  The external legitimisation network outlined in government 
documents refer to EA/RBMPs and is focussed on WFD objectives, however, 
catchment partnerships are unable to influence the overarching WFD goals as there 
is no statutory link into the regional River Basin Boards.  The research has exposed a 
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whose goals have been found to be complementary to WFD objectives (Short, 2015).  
Consequently, DEFRA is able to increase other actors’ dependence through both its 
agents, that is, system stewards, and so limit the involvement of potentially rival 
sources of power focussed on non-WFD goals.  Plans for monitoring and evaluation 
outlined by CABA Support at the Manchester conference 2017, challenge the idea of 
local catchment partnerships controlling evaluation of their own activities, remaining 
accountable to centrally-defined models of good practice.  While environmental 
management may have the form of self-determining networks, the reality is the state 
retains a top-down control, so the diverse participants in the catchment-based 
approach delivery mechanism are not equal partners with government in the policy 
direction-setting process.  The stewardship model encourages a movement of 
delivery-expectation from authority bodies to local agents but constrains the flexibility 
of those local actors through top-down controls. Are catchment partnerships at risk of 
being a scape-goat for the failure to achieve challenging environmental goals, as the 
expectation for policy delivery moves from central to local agents?     
Challenges by emergent leaders have been identified in one partnership through 
utilising Stacey’s complexity matrix to map individuals into the zone associated with 
low goal agreement and high distrust.  Dissimilar risk and trust perspectives have 
been identified within each of the examined partnerships, but those individuals most 
at ease with collaborative partnership working are not identified as key individuals.  
Active participation of all members ought to be encouraged to improve the levels of 
cohesiveness, so providing further collaborative learning opportunities.   
The duality of implementation model typology found within the identified system 
stewardship model impacts the choice of accountability tools: those at the ‘top’ of the 
system recognising a need for simple, best-practice accountability mechanisms, so 
disregarding the inherent complexity with the network system model which demands 
a similarly complex accountability framework for both the political and peer-to-peer 
aspects.  Suggestions to resolve this contention are identified and presented here 
along an increasing continuum of complexity.  Consideration should be given by 
mature catchment partnerships to their stakeholder make-up and organisational 
structures, particularly where links into system stewardship mechanisms steer 
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The lack of an application of the EsS framework to catchment planning runs a risk of 
short-term prioritisation of those projects deemed to deliver ‘immediate’ benefits as 
the examination of historic EsS identifies extended time-frames before improvements 
are delivered.  The lack of appreciation and recognition of the temporal change 
highlights a risk to the sustainability of the catchment based initiative should UK 
Government resource be withdrawn on the basis of non-achievement of goals. 
A major difference in the operation of the two catchments has been uncovered 
regarding the championing of river restoration by the catchment host.  In the results 
described in this thesis, CaBA support were found to be embedded in one of the 
catchment partnerships examined, where the partnership in question was lacking 
support resources.  The alternative partnership, led by a Rivers Trust member, was 
found to offer the additional support identified as key to successful partnership 
functioning.   CaBA support team identified one partnership as a strong performer, 
particularly in attracting funding, however, there is no acknowledgement that the 
mechanism for gaining access to large funds is due to the removal of financial liability 
risk.  Both partnerships are responding to risk avoidance in two different ways; one 
through embedding into an organisation which provides financial and legal liability, 
the second by avoiding the large-scale, imaginative, high-risk actions and 
maintaining a range of activities compatible with partner organisation aims.  The 
stakeholder make-up of the two partnerships studied is representative of the overall 
position, but it is acknowledged that to assess the risk-reduction strategies 
throughout the English catchment partnerships, it would be advisable to expand the 
scope of the current research.  However, from the evidence obtained, in order to 
deliver the high-impact activities required to deliver WFD targets, the legal structure 
of catchment partnerships must be addressed. Restructuring power and control away 
from UK Ministry to leverage financial opportunity is not probable, unless the 
partnership is controlled by a statutory body with appropriate liability to undertake 
financial transactions. Following the award of LIFE IP RBMP-NWRBD UK, 
governance options are being appraised: outcomes which have particular relevance 
to catchment partnership policy within England are considered within this thesis and 
alternative governance structures proposed, that is, embedding catchment 
partnerships within the Rivers Trust organisation and/or linking catchment 
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working mechanism which was intended to deliver the EU WFD aims through broad 
support is in fact limited in scope and constrained in its aims.   
In both catchment partnerships, the representative of the mandated government 
organisation is both prominent and influential, providing a crucial bridging link 
between the top-down and bottom-up actors. The networks found within the 
catchment partnerships examined are driven by Hosts and Co-ordinators, thus, the 
transfer of power and function from the central state outlined by Hill and Hupe (2002) 
is not found in this examination of the catchment-based approach policy.  There is 
currently no move toward a total collaborative form of experimental implementation 
as outlined by Matland (1995), nor to an initiative of networks autonomous from 
Government intervention.  Within this study of environmental management, the UK 
ministry retains strategic control over policy making and administrative 
implementation, conceding little power to non-state agencies, despite the recent 
developments that have seen an increase in the number and variety of actors 
involved in the formulation and design of implementation projects.  Stewardship 
theory is characterised by an enabling structure which allow participants the freedom 
to implement actions without the presence of limiting controls, reflecting the 
devolved-power aspect identified in the experimental implementation model 
(Matland, 1995).  In the evidence found in this study, central controls remain strong: 
the steer, both policy and resource which are controlled by the UK Government, 
preserves the overall direction setting and performance management standardisation 
at the top-level, reflecting a top-down implementation model to the lowest street-level 
agencies.  The inclusiveness of the current stewardship regime is questioned, yet, 
the Stewardship model has significant opportunity for more involvement of local 
representatives, encouraging greater input and flexibility in decision-making at the 
devolved level, if responsibility for the support and development of collaborative local 
teams is accepted by policy champions.   
This study contributes to the broader discussion on how EU policies are implemented 
by member and associate states; those which adopt a similar approach to policy 
implementation would benefit from guidelines which identify the purpose and scope 
of street-level activist participation and the institutional processes which legitimise 
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as Localism Acts which transfer power from government to devolved Regional actors, 
will have to address and resolve the issues identified in this study and address the 
dual steerage from potentially competing government departments. Continuing 
financial constraints which restrict Central government expenditure are expected to 
continue in the short-term.  Such constraints will impact not just water environment 
improvements, but also actions for air quality improvement, carbon reduction and 
wider environmental concerns. 
Has the evidence contained in this thesis pointed toward delivery of the effective and 
urgent actions required by COP at the Aichi Convention in 2010?  Are EsS likely to 
be resilient by 2020?  From the examination of the political, economic and social 
factors which impact catchment partnership effectiveness in England, the answer is 
not through this delivery model.  The partnership working mechanism which was 
intended to deliver the EU Biodiversity Strategy Aims through broad support, is in fact 
limited in scope and constrained in its focus as major issues lie with who is driving 
the partnership and to what end.  Firstly, EsS are not apparently at the heart of plans 
and the length of time required to register change not outlined.  Secondly, 
restructuring power and control away from UK Ministry to leverage financial 
opportunity is not possible unless the partnership is controlled by a statutory body 
with appropriate liability to undertake financial transactions, as funding for non-
statutory collaborative groups is not supported by those who control the purse 
strings.  Finally, there is a residual belief within the partnerships that senior 
management commitment to the concept is not welcomed at the mandated authority, 
due to the outsourcing of jobs and removal of power over delivery priorities.  The 
powerful and influential movers and shakers are the familiar organisations, and the 
non-statutory CaBA operating model is unable to step up the challenge of delivering 
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The questionnaire is divided into three sections. 
Section 1 requests information about yourself and your knowledge of 
the ecosystem services concept. 
Section 2 seeks to identify your frequent contacts within, and beyond, 
the catchment partnership 
Section 3 explores the issues most commonly raised by catchment 
managers and the way the Partnership is working, together with 
the awareness of river services and goods. 
 
Please complete the questionnaire as instructed before saving and 
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SECTION 1:  You and Your Organisation. 
Q1:  How would you describe the type of organisation which you represent 
at the XX Catchment Partnership? Tick one box only. 
1 Academic  
2 Agricultural  
3 Industry & Business (non water)  
4 Local Authority  
5 Private Water Business  
6 Public Service  
7 Recreational  
8 Regulatory Body  
9 River Conservation  
10 Social Engagement  
11 Wildlife & Conservation  
12 Other – please describe  
 
 






1 Never heard of it.  
2 Heard of the term, but not sure what it means.  
3 Heard of it and comfortable with its meaning.  
4 Know how to use the term in conversation and 
respond to questions. 
 
5 Fully understand the nuances of the term and 

















SECTION 2: Your Frequent Contacts  
Q3: Thinking of the people in the XX Partnership, who do you judge to be the key 









Q4: Thinking of the people in the XX Partnership, with whom do you collaborate 
the most?  Note: there is no need to complete all the boxes, it is your main 









Q5: Thinking of people in the XX Partnership, who would you go to if you required 













Remember, all responses will be anonymised in 
published results and no-one will see the names of the 
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SECTION 3: Your View on Catchment Management 
Q6: How would you rate the following aspects of partnership collaborative 
working?  Mark one box between the two statements which, on balance, you 










agree on what 
to do. 
       
Partners never agree 
on what to do. 
6.2 
Partners always 
base actions on 
reliable facts. 
       







how to do it. 
       
Partners never agree 
on how to do it. 
6.4 
Partners always 
share all their 
information. 
       





trust each other 
       






       
Partners never 






       
Partners always stick 




willing to take 
risks 
       
Partners are always 
cautious 
 
Please add any explanatory comments: 
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Q7.  The following table identifies the range of services which are provided by 
rivers.  Thinking of the River X, please indicate which of these services are most 
important to you. 
Please identify the top 10 only 
 





A reflective and spiritual asset  
An asset to be retained for future generations  
Buffers water flow rates, which therefore remains stable and 
predictable 
 
Clean water provides habitats for animals and plants  
Cleans waste water via biotic processes  
Dilutes pollutants and moves them down-steam   
Inspires and drives local population culture  
Moderates floods, retaining water on flood plain  
Natural landscape erosion & deposition mechanism  
Offers artistic and appreciative opportunities  
Provides a food source for animals   
Provides a food source for humans (fish, fowl, etc)  
Provides a habitat supporting young stages of biotic life cycles   
Provides a transportation link for species   
Provides biomass harvested for fuel   
Provides bio-medicinal products, healthcare goods  
Provides clean water for irrigation (agricultural use)  
Provides drinking water source for animals  
Provides drinking water source for humans  
Provides human skill development opportunities   
Provides recreation opportunities  
Provides water for industrial use (washing etc)  
Provides water for use in steam power   
Provides water power (green energy)  
Seasonal, natural variations in flow provide a range of habitats    
The history of the river and its buildings adds to an individual’s 
sense of place and pride in their area. 
 
Transport link for humans  
Wetlands filter pollutants (reed beds)  
 
 
Many thanks.  
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APPENDIX C Participant Comment & Developed Code Schedule  







Financial opportunity 1 
Economic funding uncertainty 
Incentives 
Resource restriction 2 Cost effective 
External policies 3 
Return on investment 





















Own resources 7 
Commitment 
Collaborative process 
Financial support (for CP) 8 Economic supportive costs 
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Obtaining even basic data about the catchment. C44 10 C44 L 
Data available relates to WFD.  Hence it provides only one description of the catchment. 
C44 
10 C44 L 







CB Management is new to may partners.  There is a lot of new information to absorb, and 
at times people may feel they are being asked to contribute to something they don’t feel 
they have sufficient knowledge of.  Organisations are involved however, because their 
areas of interest intersect with the CBA and catchment management can be a tool 






My issues are around coordination of the partnership – developing and maintaining an 
agreed and positive direction of travel whilst balancing the needs/opinions and interest of 
those in the partnership.  This takes an enormous amount of TIME and the relationships 
between the different pieces of work are complex.  I find myself managing multiple 





Conflict between European Directive and Heritage over weir removals C39 3 C39 L 
Overwhelming emphasis on natural environment versus historic environment C39 5 C39 L 
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Loss of jobs, skills, experience and capacity at local authority and national agency level 
C39 
3 C39 L 
Managing a wide range of partner priorities and aspirations C36 5 C36 H 
Identifying funding to make the Catchment Host role sustainable C36 8 C36 H 
Managing the politics and tensions around perceived “empire building” aspirations of 
some members C36 
6 C36 H 
Catchment based approach requires integration and joining up of plans and activities of a 
range of organisations to maximise value.  The theory behind this is sound.  However, 
with limited resource to undertake the process of joining up, even at the level of 





even if resourced at the centre of the partnership, if other partners are effectively not 
similarly resourced for the task of catchment partnership working, it can be a barrier to 
their participation – so if you are paid for a project outcome, if that project carries no 
resource to networking/comms etc, it can be hard to justify engagement – making it 
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some of the key investors within a catchment (UU, EA) might understand and support the 
catchment approach.  However, the joining up of activity and resource to deliver wider 
outcomes/additionality is as much of a responsibility of them as it is the wider 
partnership organisation.  Whilst I am sure this does happen, how widely does it occur 
across the large investment programmes of these partners or are some of the other 
funding/organisational barriers get in the way.  So if a FCRM scheme needs delivering 
within a timescale (normally financial years) to justify central govt. funding, what is the 
likelihood of genuine join up and cross benefits to other partners programmes and 






Boundaries of catchments don’t always follow other boundaries organisations follow and 
therefore management can be disjointed. C28 
9 C28 H 
Getting people to work collaboratively in the true sense of the word takes time and 
effort. C27 
7 C27 H 
Different organisations have different priorities so you need to work hard to find the 





A general lack of collating and sharing data and evidence C27 11 C27 H 
Keeping track of who’s doing what in the catchment C27 11 C27 H 
Getting organisations/individuals to take ownership of actions or provide resources to 
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Slow pace in the on-going development of the partnership but particularly in the 






Developing ToR appropriate to the role of the group C27 6 C27 H 
Finding funding to sustain the host’s role C27 8 C27 H 
Obtaining funding for delivery C27 1 C27 H 
Competition within the Partnership for funding C27 1 C27 H 
The scale of the challenge is enormous but although we have made progress local 
authority cuts have had a negative impact – no budgets to maintain infrastructure, no 









Invasive species C22 5 C22 H 
Lack of co-ordinated management of habitats throughout the catchment C22 9 C22 H 
Inconsistent levels of community engagement throughout the catchment C22 4 C22 H 
Lack of promotional work to raise profile of the River Irwell and its value for communities 
and biodiversity C221 
4 C22 H 
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As the person who manages angling and invasive species within [xx] parks service the 
main issues of concern for my area of work are Angling, Invasive species, Flooding and 
Water quality/pollution C21 
5 C21 L 
Flood management C19 5 C19 L 
Improvement for Ecological/recreational reasons C19 5 C19 L 
Invasive species C19 5 C19 L 
Partnerships lack the confidence to use a weight of evidence approach. This approach is 
simple in concept but only used in practise by those who are technically skilled. e.g. a 
modeller is often happy to look at model output critically and use it despite obvious issues 




CaBA provides the opportunity to allow catchment management to flourish but there are 
few incentives for organisations to move it forward (money, perceived support technical, 
perceived support political) This means that the catchment based approach is additional 
work for minimal perceived benefit and therefore very reliant on the enthusiasm and 




Most of the partners cannot see what additional benefit CaBA will bring to their work. It is 
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The Environment Agency officially supports the CaBA, however, when you work with 
them, the higher up you go the less real support there is. This is not surprising as CaBA 
will inevitably reduce EA headcount and influence if it works. Realistically the EA will 




The EA wants to control the CaBA to its own agenda. They keep saying that their budget 
is being reduced so they need others to deliver their work. This is a rather unfortunate 
message which does not motivate the third sector and is limiting the ambition, and 






Money. CaBA either needs a huge central budget (not likely) or a very high profile and 
backing from the top to help mobilise external funding (this is the what is needed). When 
partnerships are meeting they need to be able to see that they are part of the 'next big 







Too many organisations chasing the same money that do not have Rivers/WFD as a 





A lack of up to date riverine terrestrial habitat data leading to Project/organisation led 




Unless funding is provided for strategic rather than project outcomes the current 
approach in the Irwell catchment will fail to have much bearing on whether WFD 
objectives are met.   EA/UUL will not need the group’s assistance other than as a rubber 
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Allocating sufficient time while delivering everything else that I have to as part of my day 
job which is largely unconnected with the xCP. C13 
7 C13 H 
Arranging time when key players can meet together. C13 5 C13 H 
Change in public bodies meaning a loss of continuity C13 6 C13 H 
I have specialist knowledge about the waterway I manage & some knowledge of the Y 
valley.  It’s difficult to keep abreast of the issues facing other waterways in the Irwell 




Funding is a key issue. C06 1 C06 H 
Increased pressure on all sectors in terms of staffing & resources.  The Environment 
Agency are very interested in working in partnership with other organisations however 
they have are affected by cutbacks within their organisation as are other partners.  Public 





Coordination & consultation are crucial. Working in partnership has made catchment 
management seem a possibility. Having a dedicated project manager for the Partnership 
has been key to taking things forward. It’s sometimes difficult to respond to catchment 





Some areas of work such as flood prevention/mitigation don’t appear to be proactively 
dealt with outside of the Environment Agency. C06 
7 C06 H 
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Resources C53 2 C53 M 
Co-ordination C53 6 C53 M 
The major issues haven’t changed either during or as a result of the evolution of 
catchment based management.  The Irwell is still in poor condition and it remains very 
challenging making both local and catchment scale improvements.  However, the 
evolution of catchment management has made the task of making improvements more 




There are a lot more politics to navigate when applying for the little funding currently 
available and when drawing project specifications, which is impacting heavily on cost 
efficient restoration of the environment and is slowing progress.  The politics appear to be 
necessary to navigate the most major issue of the elephant in the room, being that those 
organisations/individuals equipped to manage funding and deliver on-the-ground are 








It has been implied that the number of partners collaborating on a project may in itself be 
a measure of a success and worth making a target.  While this may help navigate the 
elephant, where more orgs/individuals receive a “share” of the funding, the environment 
doesn’t appear to be getting the same bang for the buck as those organisations sharing 
the money.  Restoration is no longer cost efficient, and progress has slowed.  It’s very 
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We are quite a diverse range of organisations so I think our specific areas of interest are 





We are interested in the whole catchment where as many others, including EA, are often 
focussed on the water body/river level C53 
9 C53 M 
The Universities represented on the Partnership bring very welcome rigour & overview to 
the proceedings.  I find this very helpful. It helps prevent the Partnership from focussing 





I feel that inevitably each partner on the xCP represents their interests to some extent.  
Although I am employed by zz I participate in the Partnership as the yy project officer.  
My project works on a partnership model & so the xCP is a natural extension to the way I 





The Rivers Trust is pushing the multiple benefits of the CaBA. My perception is that other 
organisations, especially the EA and local authorities, see CaBA as a new (money poor) 
way to fund single issue projects as before. United Utilities clearly get the concept 
because they need to do the work anyway and have the funding but CaBA gives them the 
potential to deliver significant publicity and CR benefits from the same resource. The Red 
Rose Forest also see that demonstrating multiple benefits gives them a better chance of 





To an extent – wider pressures and responsibilities to take into account. Local authorities 
do not have the luxury of a single focus (river) C19 
5 C19 L 
River catchment management and coordination is not my organisations key focus 
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There still exists a silo mentality in some organisations.  It can be difficult particularly in 
local authorities to identify the officers who can take a lead.  Organisational structures 
can be a barrier. C06 
6 C06 H 
Differing priorities from different groups such as hydro-power companies vs weir removal. 
C13 
5 C13 H 
I also think that RR needs to be realistic about what its members can/will do. As an 
example, one workshop was convened to provide views on the prioritisation of work on 
specific physical assets (culverts, weirs etc) and it was obvious that attendees were 
unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to take any meaningful view (there is a great deal 







XX might  provide a starting point for projects but perhaps only as a means of attracting 
/directing funding.  However, this would only work if there was buy-in to the group as a 
representative body and in circumstances where resources are tight this is only going to 





Too much jargon associated with every sector – need to talk in common language which 
can be understood by the layman. C41 
6 C41 H 
We trust [xx] and just let them get on with it. C03 6 C03 H 
I believe the group should be more successful than we are, so I’m stirring the pot, as 
rivers are not central to the core of our host’s organisation.  I’m looking to introduce a 





Young Cabal need time to build trust and avoid the mud-slinging which often happens ... 
and this impacts the trust in listening and understanding between partners. CS1 
6 CS1 H 
The weight of evidence approach is simple in concept but only used in practise by those 
who despite the obvious issues are often happy to use [this] information after critical 
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Representatives have been part of the partnership for a long time; [XX] catchment 
partnership members have been present for a while so there is no need to keep building 
relationships. Catchment partnership is primarily a collection of professional (salaried) 
eco-interested parties, so some stakeholders are not represented.  Biodiversity interests 





people with the knowledge [are] in the lead organisation, avoid alienating sectors 
[partners] and bring hard-nosed, business discipline to each catchment.  Need a scale of 
ambition.  Need a risk taker – need someone with an ability to take and own the risk and 
dedication to keep at it, who are project orientated  and focussed on action. XX are 





CP has value as a mechanism for drawing together work at a strategic/policy level, 
providing a point of reference and perhaps taking on a level of public interface work that 
the partner agencies don’t have the time or expertise to do C19 
4 
5 
13 
C19 L 
 
 
